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 My dissertation offers a new account of the explosion of sentimental literature in 
fifteenth-century Iberia and, at the same time, suggests a new way of reading that literature. 
Through the concept of the affective community, which suggests that political, religious, and 
literary communities (genres) are held together and shaped not so much by shared emotion as by 
a shared ethical attitude toward emotion, I analyze exemplary works of the principal genres 
involved in this explosion: cancionero poetry and sentimental fiction. Other important genres 
such as the chronicle and chivalric fiction also play key roles in my analysis, and my approach 
throughout is comparative, dealing substantially with works not only from Castile, but also from 
the kingdoms of Portugal and Aragon. 
The most important texts in the dissertation are Pedro de Corral‘s Crónica sarracina (ca. 
1430); Pedro, Constable of Portugal‘s Sátira de felice e infelice vida (ca. 1450); and the poetry of 
Ausiàs March (ca. 1397-1459). However, I also discuss moral, theological, and political treatises 
by crucial figures such as Alonso de Cartagena (1384-1456); Alfonso de Madrigal, el Tostado 
(1410-1455); Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo (ca. 1404-1470); Diego de Valera (1412-1488); 
Duarte I of Portugal (1391-1438); and the Infante Pedro, Duke of Coimbra (1392-1449). 
Through my discussion of these treatises, I show how the emotional asceticism of Stoic and 
early-Christian thought was increasingly held to be inadequate for the period‘s political 
challenges, giving way before a politics that emphasized psychological unity beyond the strict 
limits of reason. 
  
It is in the more traditionally literary works, however, that these evolving political 
postures found their furthest-reaching development. I show that Corral, the Constable, and 
March each develops a novel affective rhetoric that reenvisions or rejects their communities‘ 
preexisting affective paradigms, laying bare how mourning and compassion can form the basis 
for new communitarian possibilities. I argue, finally, that this rhetorical modeling of a 
communitarian politics of mourning and compassion – and the forms of subjectivity it articulates 
– is relevant to ongoing contemporary debates surrounding affect and community that seek new 
formulations of these concepts after the so-called death of the subject.  
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To the memory of my father 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first day after a death, the new absence 
Is always the same; we should be careful 
 
Of each other, we should be kind 
While there is still time. 
 
– Philip Larkin, ―The Mower‖  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
PASSION, EMOTION, AFFECT 
 
 
 
[L]a idea es averiguar si el saber del que emanaron en un primero estadio los términos de la pasión guarda algún 
mensaje viviente y desconocido para nosotros, y examinar, al mismo tiempo, cuáles fueron las circunstancias – 
históricas, sociales, epistemológicas – que han nublado para nosotros ese conocimiento. 
– Ivonne Bordelois, Etimología de las pasiones 
 
 
 
Iberia‘s fifteenth century saw the rise or resurgence of literature that was not just 
sentimental, as it is sometimes called, but about sentiment itself. Cancionero lyric and 
sentimental fiction are often studied as expressions of the affective system known as courtly 
love, and critics sometimes try to isolate particularly Iberian strains of courtly culture. 
Meanwhile, in genres we are less likely to think of as sentimental, such as wisdom literature and 
romance – which through its epic and chivalric themes colors a great deal of the period‘s 
historiographic production – ethical questions regarding both public and private emotion begin to 
arise persistently. Two critical tendencies have defined the study of affect in the literature of this 
period. The first is the modern tendency to understand literary works in general, and lyric poems 
in particular, as relatively transparent expressions of their authors‘ inner feelings. From this 
perspective, the emotional commonplaces still pervasive in fifteenth-century texts look like 
medieval residue, soon to be washed away by nascent humanism in a march toward the novel. 
But the second, and more common, tendency is to understand the emotions in particular texts as 
(mere) instantiations of widespread tropes, so that texts themselves are divided into rare 
masterpieces and their epigones. This critical practice may reflect a more ―medieval‖ 
understanding of authorship, but it severely limits interpretive possibilities and makes it difficult 
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to account for literary change that, from a purely historical perspective, is evident. What is 
missing from the models of authorial self-expression and tropic instantiation is the sense that 
participation in an affective discourse can also be an intervention: placing an obstacle in a stream 
in order to divert it. The authors I study in the following chapters were not unmediated products 
of their period‘s affective discourses, but neither did they stand completely outside them, coldly 
assembling their texts from discrete encyclopedias of tropes. Rather, their texts are self-
consciously rhetorical, advocating and modeling – and, thus, expressing – new affective 
possibilities. 
 As the preceding paragraph illustrates in its use of the terms ―affect,‖ ―emotion,‖ 
―sentiment,‖ and ―feeling,‖ the first difficulty in fashioning a critical concept from affect is 
terminological. Why ―affective communities‖ instead of ―emotional communities,‖ ―sentimental 
communities,‖ or even ―passionate communities‖? These terms resist definitional consensus and 
thus present a double instability: their medieval and modern usages are both inconsistent, so it 
becomes almost impossible to fix a critical starting point. In other words, neither critical subject 
(contemporary discourse) nor critical object (historical discourse) is stable. ―Emotion,‖ which 
has been the dominant term since around 1800 (Rosenwein 3), suggests itself as an all-
encompassing neutral term precisely because of its anachronism for the Middle Ages – but there 
is no contemporary agreement about what ―emotion‖ describes. We might expect the field of 
psychology to have forged a technical definition, but as Theodore R. Sarbin writes, efforts in this 
direction have so far been unsuccessful: 
One outcome of the opacity of the term ―emotion‖ is the failure to achieve a common 
definition. Some writers talk of ―having‖ an emotion, others of the ―experience‖ of 
emotion; some equate emotion with visceral activity, some with the perception of visceral 
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activity; some use emotion and feelings as equivalents, others argue that feelings are 
constitutive of emotion; others treat emotions as patterned organismic responses.
1
 (85) 
 
The term is sometimes adopted openly as a convenience,
2
 but its own resistance to definition – 
its ―opacity‖ – means that it is as likely to hinder as to help a critical investigation. This is 
especially true because terms such as ―affect‖ and ―feeling‖ are often found in definitions of 
―emotion,‖ and not as pure synonyms. As such, adopting or asserting ―emotion‖ as the broadest 
term is not necessarily a helpful heuristic strategy. 
 If modern usage turns out to be inconsistent, we might turn to a close examination of 
historical usage in an attempt to pin down our object of study. But what is true of modern authors 
is true of pre-modern ones: there was some consistency in their usage of terms such as ―passion,‖ 
―affection,‖ and ―sentiment‖ (Rosenwein 3), but there is enough variation among systematic 
treatments of the passions to give pause. Contemporary theorists often make lists of ―primary‖ 
emotions, but ―the number and type of emotions taken to be primary varies from one theorist to 
another‖ (Harré 3), and this is true of ancient and medieval categorizations as well. Attempting 
to delve deeper into history through etymology turns out to be, in a sense, a dead end: 
In reality, there is no Indoeuropean lexical root from which a term equivalent to passion 
can be derived, and the reason alleged by specialists for this empty space in the originary 
vocabulary is that at that level of history there was not only no difference between 
emotion and passion, but the very abstract notions of ―passion‖ or ―emotion‖ did not exist 
as we perceive them today.
3
 (Bordelois 29) 
 
                                                 
1
 Compare James Hillman‘s similar statement: ―Yet when we come home to systematic (academic or theoretical) 
psychology to inquire quite naïvely: ‗What is emotion; how is it defined; what is its origin, nature, purpose; what are 
its properties and laws; everyone uses this concept ―emotion‖ – what are we speaking about?‘, we find a curious and 
overwhelming confusion‖ (5). 
2
 ―I use the term emotions in this book with full knowledge that it is a convenience: a constructed term that refers to 
affective reactions of all sorts, intensities, and durations‖ (Rosenwein 4); ―In emphasizing the term emotions in this 
book, we are asserting that this concept subsumes the phenomena denoted by other labels – sentiments, affect, 
feelings, and the like – which are often employed by theorists and researchers‖ (Turner and Stets 2). 
3
 All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. In the rest of her fascinating study, Bordelois makes clear that 
there are indeed deep etymological roots for particular emotions, such as anger and love (29). 
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This uncertain origin, along with the constantly varying usage that followed it, gives rise to a 
problem fundamental for this dissertation. We can look at particular authors‘ usage and try to 
work out what ―passion,‖ ―affection,‖ or ―sentiment‖ meant to them. But the social nature of 
affect is at the conceptual center of my argument. How can we locate the usage of an individual 
author within broader, but unruly, social structures? 
 Social constructionists in the field of psychology have addressed this question, 
emphasizing affect‘s linguistic basis. They argue that varied usage (across time, space, and 
languages) does not obscure affect as an object of study – it constitutes it: 
We can do only what our linguistic resources and repertoire of social practices permit or 
enable us to do. There has been a tendency among both philosophers and psychologists to 
abstract an entity – call it ―anger,‖ ―love,‖ ―grief‖ or ―anxiety‖ – and to try to study it. 
But what there is are angry people, upsetting scenes, sentimental episodes, grieving 
families and funerals, anxious parents pacing at midnight, and so on. There is a concrete 
world of contexts and activities. We reify and abstract from that concreteness at our peril. 
(Harré 4) 
 
Eschewing reification is only the first methodological step, however. After all, we can no longer 
witness medieval anger, medieval love scenes, or medieval funerals: only their textual or visual 
representations. Some grounding in the abstract, reified thought of these representations‘ time is 
essential for analyzing them. And it is through studying ancient and medieval treatises on the 
passions that widespread patterns start to emerge: categorizations of the passions varied widely, 
but the problematics central to those categorizations remained relatively constant and limited 
and, what‘s more, are strikingly similar to the problematics of contemporary debates. 
In broad terms, the explorations of affect carried out by Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, 
Church Fathers, Cartesians, early psychologists and evolutionary theorists, psychoanalysts, and 
social constructionists focus on a small set of problematics: the relationship of the soul or mind 
to the body; the participation of reason in the passions or the conflict between the two; passivity, 
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activity, and the subject/object relation; and, most broadly, ethics or practical wisdom, which 
includes discussions of virtue and vice or sin and also of sociopolitical relations. These 
problematics are more closely related than they may initially appear. 
In his 1895 ―Theory of Emotion,‖ John Dewey attempts a synthesis of Charles Darwin‘s 
and William James‘s theories of emotion; the chief claim of this synthesis is that emotions do not 
precede and cause their physical manifestations (such as crying or laughing), but rather are 
attitudes we adopt toward those physical movements, which were originally purposive (see, for 
example, 1: 568-9). Thus, Dewey is mostly preoccupied with the mind/body relation, but he 
mobilizes the ethical understanding of emotion in justifying his focus on behavioral rather than 
―psychical‖ emotion: ―We certainly do not deny nor overlook the ‗feel‘ phase, but in ordinary 
speech the behavior side of emotion is, I think, always uppermost in consciousness. The 
connotation of emotion is primarily ethical, only secondarily psychical‖ (2: 17; my emphasis). 
Dewey‘s ultimately sociolinguistic observation that talk about emotion is talk about expressions 
of emotion (behavior) dovetails with the teleological Darwinian argument that those physical 
expressions must have served some purpose in the early stages of humankind‘s development. 
Thus, when Dewey concludes that ―the emotion is, psychologically, the adjustment or tension of 
habit and ideal, and the organic changes in the body are the literal working out, in concrete 
terms, of the struggle of adjustment‖ (30; emphasis in original), his adherence to the historical 
and social (which accounts for the ―ideal‖ held to be in tension with the evolutionarily useful 
―habit‖) demonstrates the ongoing theoretical link between questions of mind and body and 
questions of ethics.
4
 
                                                 
4
 It should also be pointed out that the division between affect as feeling and affect as behavior is ancient as well: 
―The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by 
pain or pleasure‖ (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1378a). One might object that the disappearance of the concept of soul (rather 
than mind) marks an important contemporary break with ancient and medieval thought, but as Hillman reminds us, 
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This persistence of ancient problematics in modern theorizing would have come as a 
surprise to René Descartes, who must have thought he was making a definitive break in opening 
his Passions of the Soul with a denunciation of all previous theories of affect: ―The defectiveness 
of the sciences we inherit from the ancients is nowhere more apparent than in what they wrote 
about the Passions‖ (18). In the treatise‘s preface, he has already made clear that he has not 
sought to explain the passions ―as an Orator, or even as a moral Philosopher, but only as a 
Physicist‖ (17). The modern reader, considering emotion an empirical phenomenon, might 
expect the first two of these professions to require more of an explanation than the last, but 
Descartes has identified here the two fields of inquiry, along with that of medicine, that had until 
the Renaissance provided the most extensive discussions and systematizations of affect. In fact, 
the methodological division of Descartes‘s preface is anticipated in Aristotle‘s De Anima:  
[T]he natural philosopher and the dialectician would give a different definition of each of 
the affections, for instance in answer to the question ―What is anger?‖ For the dialectician 
will say that it is a desire for revenge or something like that, while the natural philosopher 
will say that it is a boiling of the blood and hot stuff about the heart. And of these the one 
will be expounding the matter, the other the form and rationale. (403a) 
 
Aristotle himself approached the problem both as a natural philosopher and dialectician, but this 
was not the rule in the centuries that followed. Rather, the two traditions rejected by Descartes – 
rhetoric and moral philosophy – tended to remain separate. Late-antique and medieval rhetorical 
and moral treatments of the passions sometimes incorporate ―naturalistic‖ humorism, but they 
are much likelier to focus, like Aristotle, on the soul and perception; early Christian accounts add 
the element of demonic persuasion or suggestion. It is the dominance of these Stoic and patristic 
                                                                                                                                                             
the soul lives on in still-prevalent concepts of psychic ―energy‖: ―[W]here the soul is often denied a place in modern 
psychology, the soul is still represented in all its classic ambiguity by such concepts as psychonic energy, vital 
energy, bio-energy, nervous energy and the like, all combinations of mind and matter … In short, it is our contention 
that the flow of energy model as an explanation of emotion has replaced the soul model and that the energy model, 
untenable logically and empirically, is only intelligible on the basis of the earlier model, the soul‖ (77). 
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theories, with their ethical focus on reason and the will, in fifteenth-century Iberia that first 
suggests ―affect‖ as the best term for this study. 
As I will discuss in chapter one, Cicero and Seneca were the most influential Stoics in 
medieval Iberian thought, and two of the most important classical auctoritates in discussions of 
practical wisdom and politics. For the Stoics, and Cicero in particular, the fact that the cause of 
all emotion ―is to be found entirely in belief‖ (Tusculan Disputations III.24) does not make 
emotions rational.
5
 Cicero adhered to the four-fold Stoic classification of the emotions, in which 
pleasure and distress were reactions to present goods or evils, and appetite (or desire) and fear 
were reactions to future goods or evils (Tusculan Disputations III.25).
6
 More specifically, 
pleasure, distress, desire, and fear were judgments (IV.14) that came about through a loss of 
control (IV.22) and to which the mind assented voluntarily (III.61-6). Cicero himself summarizes 
these points powerfully in Book IV of the Tusculan Disputations: ―As far as I am concerned, the 
entire theory of emotion can be summed up in a single point: that they are all in our power, all 
experienced through judgment, all voluntary‖ (IV.65). In fact, knowledge of this ―single point‖ 
also constitutes the ―method of cure‖ for these ―sicknesses of mind‖ (IV.83). For Cicero, then, 
the emotions constitute mistaken beliefs that can be purged through the exercise of reason. 
 The Greek name for this kind of self-control is sōphrosunē, which Cicero renders as 
―temperance,‖ ―self-control,‖ or ―moderation‖ (temperantia, moderatio, and modestia; Tusculan 
Disputations III.16). Cicero suggests, however, that the best term for it might be ―frugality‖ 
(frugalitas), since it refers not only to ―restraint‖ and ―harmlessness‖ but to ―all the other virtues 
as well‖ (III.16). That is, frugality ―implies the three virtues of courage, justice, and prudence,‖ 
becoming in Cicero‘s system the fourth principal virtue, whose defining characteristic ―is that it 
                                                 
5
 English quotations from the Tusculan Disputations are from Graver‘s translations; Latin references are to the Loeb 
edition. 
6
 For an excellent diagram of this system, see Knuuttila 52; cf. Rosenwein 39. 
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regulates and placates one‘s impulses to act, and so preserves that well-regulated consistency 
which on every occasion is opposed to desire‖ (III.17). The language of regulation, justice, and 
economy is key here because it is central to both Stoic social ethics and fifteenth-century Iberian 
political thought. Later in the Tusculans, Cicero argues that pity is not a useful emotion: ―Why 
pity someone when you might assist him? Or are we incapable of being generous without pity? 
For our obligation is not to feel distress on account of others, but to relieve the distress of others 
if we can‖ (IV.56).7 Here, frugality is not the opposite of generosity – clearly marked as a social 
virtue – but a reasoned commitment to helpful action whenever possible. In other words, an 
abstract, apparently ―rational‖ duty replaces empathy as a spur to movement.8 This is, in a 
condensed form, the tradition against which the authors I discuss in chapters two, three, and four 
will elaborate their own political and ethical systems of collective affect. 
Seneca grounds his analysis of emotion in questions of reason and speech and a 
fundamental contrast with the animals. This is because, for Seneca, reason and speech define 
emotion: ―[W]ild animals are incapable of anger, as is everything, apart from man. Anger may be 
the enemy of reason. It cannot, all the same, come into being except where there is a place for 
reason … Without speech, animals are without human emotions, though they have certain 
impulses that are similar to them‖ (On Anger I.3.(4)-(6)). In On Anger, he goes further than 
Cicero in emphasizing the role of assent in his picture of emotion: 
If you want to know how the emotions begin, grow or get carried away, the first 
movement is involuntary, a preparation, as it were, for emotion, a kind of threat. The next 
is voluntary but not insistent – I may, for example, think it right for me to wreak 
vengeance because I have been harmed or for him to be punished because he has 
committed a crime. The third really is out of control; wanting retribution not just ―if it is 
                                                 
7
 Pity has earlier been defined along Aristotelian lines as ―distress over the misery of another who is suffering 
unjustly‖ (IV.18). 
8
 This does not mean that empathy is never useful. Those seeking to soothe the distress of others will, like good 
rhetoricians, adapt their consolation to the nature of the situation and of their audience: ―in soothing distress we must 
consider what sort of cure each hearer is able to accept‖ (III.79). 
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right‖ but at all costs, it has completely overcome the reason. The first is a mental jolt 
which we cannot escape through reason … The other sort of movement, generated by 
decision, can be eliminated by decision.
9
 (II.4.(1)-(2)) 
 
Seneca‘s account is notable because it marries a classically rigid Stoic idealization of apatheia 
with an equally strident affirmation of reason‘s place in emotion. In his system, reason and the 
passions do not battle to gain control of the mind (or soul), but to become it: ―It is not the case 
that the mind stands apart, spying out its affections from without, to prevent their going too far – 
the mind itself turns into affection … Reason and affection are the mind‘s transformations for 
better or for worse‖ (I.8.(2)-(3)). Reason and affection are thus conceived of as ontologically 
contrary states of mind. Their conflict was always an ethical one, but here it becomes the central 
fact of the soul‘s very existence.10 
 In echoing Seneca‘s affectus and choosing the term ―affect‖ to describe fifteenth-century 
notions of emotion, I am consciously invoking this tradition and this conflict, which remained 
dominant in Iberian thought. In addition to Stoic moral philosophy, I consider in the 
dissertation‘s first chapter classical rhetoric and patristic monasticism, traditions that were also 
highly influential in fifteenth-century Iberia, some for the first time directly. As I show in this 
chapter, these traditions all explore affect in fundamentally social – communal – contexts, and 
―affect‖ conveys, then, not only the marriage of ethics and psychology in their thought, but also 
this fundamental intersubjectivity. The ―passions‖ are associated with this view of affect, and I 
will use the term ―emotion‖ to indicate that I am not referring to this particular tradition.11 
For fifteenth-century writers, affect is not primarily important as an immediate 
experience of individual subjectivity; rather, its importance springs from the fact that it is how 
                                                 
9
 Cooper and Procopé note that this account is ―more articulated than anything to be found in our sources for early 
Greek Stoics‖ (45 n. 4). 
10
 In this way, it becomes a different version of ethics as first philosophy. 
11
 Lucía Díaz Mallorquín notes that by the sixteenth century, the term ―affect‖ was associated with high rhetorical 
style, whereas ―passion‖ was used ―with pejorative connotations, as foreign to the ethical sphere‖ (27). 
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we affect others and how they affect us. This is why I argue that the novel rhetorics of affect 
developed by the authors studied here are primarily concerned with community (social, political, 
religious). For these authors, the best way to effect change in a time of crisis would be to change 
not only the emotions of the members of a community, but their very attitude toward emotion 
itself. This possibility is also apparent because of the difficulty of pinning affect down 
theoretically – a difficulty with which these authors, I argue, were very familiar. Their self-
conciously novel modeling of innovative rhetorics of affect was at the heart of their texts, as they 
attempted to found new communities or disrupt or disperse those already around them. 
 My first chapter, ―City, Desert, Cloiser, Court: Reading and Writing Community in 
Fifteenth-Century Iberia,‖ traces the interrelated histories of community, affect, and rhetoric, 
showing how these concepts, as elaborated in traditions discussed above, were of central concern 
to fifteenth-century Iberian political and moral theorists. I demonstrate that in the affective, 
rhetorical, and hermeneutic theories most influential for these Iberian thinkers – those of 
Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, John Cassian, Augustine, Isidore of Seville, and Bernard of Clairvaux 
– the question of community arises persistently in dialectics of interiority and exteriority, the 
friend and the crowd or mob, and private and public virtue. I argue that the perceived conflict 
between reason, devotion, and the passions, coinciding perfectly with the central problematic of 
Iberia‘s newly resurgent courtly literature, gave rise to a multi-genre exploration of collective 
affect in public life. I argue that the focus on psychological unity in questions of governance in 
texts by important authors such as Alfonso de Madrigal, Alonso de Cartagena, Diego de Valera, 
and Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo, as well as in the anonymous Tratado de la comunidad, reveals 
that the traditional view of affect as sinfully destructive of both individuals and communities was 
shifting to one that recognized its politically unifying possibilities.  
11 
 
Chapter two, ―Ritual Mourning and National Nostalgia in Pedro de Corral‘s Crónica 
sarracina,‖ provides a case study of an early text (ca. 1430) that adopts courtly and chivalric 
tropes in effecting a political rehabilitation of collective affect. Corral‘s Crónica links the 
mythical lives of the Visigothic king Rodrigo, considered responsible for ―Spain‘s‖ fall to the 
Moors in 711, and Pelayo, the legendary first leader of the ―Reconquest.‖ I argue that in his text, 
Corral explores the unifying and isolating aspects of private and public grief, ultimately 
deploying a ritualized, collective literary mourning to rehabilitate the figure of Rodrigo, thus 
rendering reappropriable the national unity this legendarily fallen figure was thought to 
represent. Furthermore, Corral contrasts only a lingering, individual mourning with an expiatory 
collective mourning; his circumvention of melancholy (a concept fully available to medieval 
authors) illustrates an alternative reaction to loss that can inflect modern theories of political 
affect. In the Crónica, as past death becomes the central fact of community, politics becomes the 
suppression of individual affect and molding of collective affect through historical discourse. 
The collective good does not require individual sacrifice; rather, Corral‘s creative historiography 
portrays individual political subjectivity itself as a curse on the collective consciousness and an 
impediment to national self-realization. 
Chapter three, ―The Constable‘s Reward: Will, Discretion, and Compassion in the Sátira 
de felice e infelice vida,‖ deals with this early (ca. 1450) work of sentimental fiction by Pedro, 
Constable of Portugal. Written during the Constable‘s Castilian exile, the Sátira comprises an 
introspective narrative, with interspersed poetry, of the lovesick narrator‘s debates with his own 
Discretion and his cruel lady‘s Prudence, and over 100 self-penned glosses to this narrative. I 
argue that this complex structure represents a staged confrontation between the Stoic ideas 
prevalent in the Portuguese court of Avis and the courtly ideas typical of cancionero poetry. 
12 
 
Drawing on his uncle Duarte I‘s Leal Conselheiro (ca. 1430) and his father, the Infante Pedro‘s 
Livro da Virtuosa Bemfeitoria (ca. 1418-1430), the Constable elaborates in the glosses a four-
part theory of will that privileges a ―perfect will‖ purged of the passions and entirely subjected to 
the understanding. Meanwhile, the narrative articulates the courtly belief that – tragically – the 
passions will always triumph in their conflict with reason. I argue that the Constable attempts to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of these contrary but similarly binary affective systems through a 
forensic allegory in which the rhetoric of asceticism and courtly cruelty convicts itself; he 
thereby emphasizes the centrality of compassion to good governance, both private and public. 
My final chapter, ―Alone Together: Ausiàs March‘s Ethical Appeal for Shared 
Salvation,‖ is devoted to the Valencian poet‘s lyric representation of the conflict between reason 
and the passions, or the soul and the body. Often considered the best poet ever to have written in 
Catalan and one of the fifteenth century‘s most important poets in general, March (ca. 1397-
1459) emerges from the troubadour tradition only to announce his intention to break with it. I 
argue that his apparently systematic philosophical examinations of the troubadours‘ taxonomies 
of love are in fact an attempt to exhaust the poetic possibilities of those taxonomies, laying the 
groundwork for an alternative affective discourse in which individuals are linked to the 
community through both private erotic relationships and their public relationship with death. 
March is thus similar to the Constable in his rejection of the reason/will binary and to Corral in 
his identification of death as the central fact of community, but his communitarian thought goes 
farther than theirs in its articulation of a shared lyric subjectivity through moral self-scrutiny. His 
poetry suggests that what is most individual about us, our soul, can only be understood in 
intersubjective terms, articulating this shared subjectivity within an idiosyncratic context of 
confession and salvation.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
CITY, DESERT, CLOISTER, COURT: READING AND WRITING COMMUNITY IN 
FIFTEENTH-CENTURY IBERIA 
 
 
 
[Q]ui voluerit dare alicui politiae optimas leges, det eis leges monachorum. Quo quid stultius excogitari potest quam 
facere aliquam talem politiam? 
– Alfonso de Madrigal, el Tostado 
 
 
Concepts of community in fifteenth-century Iberian thought drew on two principal 
intellectual traditions: Stoicism and Christian monasticism. Both of these traditions, drawing on 
earlier Platonic and Aristotelian models, conceptualized moral deliberation as a conflict between 
reason and the passions. These models nevertheless recognized that the passions participated in 
some way in cognition; in fact, the passions were blameworthy to the precise extent that they 
involved judgment, rational assent. The fact that the passions were at least partly cognitive, in 
turn, implied that the use of rhetoric to manipulate them could have a place in ethics and politics 
that was not purely contemptible. Through rhetoric, the passions were linked to action and 
practical wisdom, such that medieval Iberians considered rhetoric a moral science. Still, the 
rhetorical tradition that was most influential at the end of the Iberian Middle Ages – the 
Ciceronian tradition – maintained Stoicism‘s stark affective asceticism. The passions were 
cognitive insofar as they constituted mistaken moral judgments. 
The monastic tradition adopted a great deal of Stoic thought on the passions, but sought 
to cultivate certain forms of shared affect – charity and compassion – as approaches to moral 
purification and divine contemplation. This cultivation of affect involved the development of an 
epistemology of compassion in which compassion became a key tool of both rhetoric and 
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hermeneutics. Monastic asceticism still involved a rejection of worldly passions as part of the 
commandment to love God, but the commandment to love one‘s neighbor, which had been key 
in the development of Benedictine monasticism in particular (White, Rule of Benedict xviii-xix), 
was progressively transformed into a set of discursive practices of community. 
These, then, were the traditions upon which fifteenth-century Iberian courtly writers – 
understood both as writers who participated in one way or another in court life, and as writers 
who were conscious participants in a literary tradition in which ―courtesy‖ was both an ethical 
and aesthetic ideal – could draw. These writers confronted a violently divided political and 
cultural landscape in which communities of all kinds – political, social, religious, even linguistic 
– seemed hopelessly ephemeral, prone to internal strife and dissolution. At the same time, new 
dynasties had recently been founded in Castile and Portugal (the Trastámara and Avis dynasties, 
respectively), while Aragon was in the midst of a process of Mediterranean expansion. As such, 
there was a need to articulate bases for unity in young, unstable, and rapidly changing political 
configurations. 
Faced with these circumstances, the courtly writers I will discuss in chapters two, three, 
and four of this dissertation tried to imagine new forms of affective community that went beyond 
the two traditions I have briefly outlined here and will shortly discuss in greater detail. In this 
first chapter, however, I want to outline the approaches to affective community manifested in a 
variety of fifteenth-century Castilian political and moral treatises, in order to frame that tradition 
and demonstrate more clearly how the courtly writers I study challenge it in proposing new 
communal configurations.
1
 In the Castilian treatise tradition, the psychological unity of political 
entities – sometimes cities or kingdoms, but most frequently the court – is figured mostly in 
                                                 
1
 Throughout the dissertation, I will also cite similar Portuguese and Catalan treatises when they are relevant to the 
literature being discussed; a survey of the political and moral literature of all three crowns is nevertheless beyond the 
scope of this chapter. 
15 
 
terms of friendship and mercy. In the first part of this chapter, then, I will explore the 
implications of taking the court as the main unit of political analysis, especially as this analytical 
foregrounding relates to the explosion of courtly literature in Castile toward the beginning of the 
fifteenth century. In the next section, taking Isidore of Seville‘s definition of rhetoric in the 
Etymologies as my starting point, I will explicate the classical background of rhetorical theories 
of empathetic participation. In the third section, I will discuss friendship and mercy as models of 
political unity in Castilian political and moral treatises, highlighting their grounding in Stoic 
thought. In the fourth and final section, I will trace the development in epistemological 
compassion in the monastic tradition to show how an emergent transition from mercy to 
compassion in political literature sets the stage for the farther-reaching explorations of communal 
affect that I will analyze in the dissertation‘s remaining chapters. 
 
Courtly Conflict, Courtly Literature 
 
What might it mean for conflict to be ―courtly‖? This is how Alonso de Cartagena, in a 
1444 letter, characterized Castile‘s volatile political circumstances, in contrast to the ―civil‖ 
conflicts at Rome: 
E recolegid, si vos place, en vuestra memoria los tienpos que pasaron d‘aquel Don Pelayo 
silvestre, en quien començó la real policía, so cuya sonbra en esta citerior España 
vivimos. Ca ante dél era la monarchía más larga e extensa, e a la presente non tan 
semejable, e claramente veredes muy poco aver durado el sosiego, e aun quando contra 
enemigos guerra non era; porque tanta es la animosidad e brío de la nobleça de España, 
que si en guerra justa non exercita sus fuerças, luego se convierte a las mover en aquellas 
contiendas que los romanos cibdadanas llamaban – porque sobre el estado del regimiento 
de su cibdat se movían, aunque después se extendían por diversas partes del mundo – e 
nos, propiamente fablando, podremos llamar cortesanas, pues sobre el valer de la corte se 
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mueven, aunque se extienden por las más provincias del reino.
2
 (―Respuesta‖ 1: 237-8; 
emphasis added) 
 
And recall, if you please, to your memory the bygone times of that wild Don Pelayo, in 
whom royal politics began, in whose shadow we live in this nearer Spain. For before him 
the monarchy was more extensive, and dissimilar to the present one, and you will see 
clearly that the calm lasted briefly, even when there was no war against enemies; because 
such is the animosity and spirit of Spain‘s nobility, that if it does not employ its energy in 
just war, it begins to employ it in those conflicts that the Romans called civil – because 
they arose from the state of the city‘s governance, although they later reached diverse 
parts of the world – and we, speaking properly, can call courtly, because they deal with 
the court‘s worth, although later they reach the kingdom‘s other provinces.3 
 
Cartagena was bishop of Burgos, and his letter‘s recipient was Íñigo López de Mendoza, 
Marqués de Santillana, one of Castile‘s most celebrated poets, to whom I will return in chapter 
three. Indeed, Cartagena was urging Santillana to continue writing despite Castile‘s ongoing 
crisis, which seemed likely to outlast both bishop and poet: ―si esperamos a que la fortuna nos dé 
tranquilidat e quiete, e en tanto que dura el tienpo turbado, tenemos la péñola queda, ¿non 
temeremos con grand raçón que por ventura passe nuestra vida ociosa, sin dejar de sí escriptura 
durable?‖ (237) ―if we wait for fortune to grant us peace and tranquility, and leave our quills 
quiet during conflictive times, will we not have great reason to fear that our lives will pass idly, 
leaving no lasting writings?‖ 
 Cartagena had reason for pessimism: in his estimation, it had been a rule of Castilian 
politics since the time of Pelayo that the unruly nobles would focus their inborn animosity on the 
monarchy whenever it was not directed toward an external enemy – generally speaking, of 
course, the Moors. It was the stagnation of the so-called Reconquest, along with unrelenting 
conflict between the nobility, one the one hand, and Juan II and his close advisor, Álvaro de 
Luna, on the other, that led many to consider the first half of the fifteenth century in Iberia a time 
                                                 
2
 For the letter‘s 1444 date, see Serrano 239. 
3
 All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. 
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of crisis, a view held by many modern historians as well.
4
 In contrast, Cartagena‘s view that 
writing was an appropriate, even necessary, activity for caballeros during times of conflict 
marked him as a cultural outlier: most Castilian thinkers believed that letters distracted knights 
from their central duties as defensores, and even those who defended letters as a knightly pursuit 
considered them a diverting pastime, not a culturally vital task (Russell 209). To what extent, 
then, can we read the ―diversion‖ of courtly poetry as a reflection of, or response to, Cartagena‘s 
―courtly‖ conflict? Perhaps we should move in the opposite direction, reading it not even as 
diversion, but as an escape from a cultural reality as distressing as it was intractable. 
The very magnitude of courtly poetry‘s rebirth in fifteenth-century Castile (and in the 
Castilian language) marks it as something more than a mere diversion: more than 400 different 
poets can be identified in the fifteenth century, of whom more than a third were members of the 
upper nobility (Boase 3-4). Roger Boase, the critic from whom these statistics are drawn, does 
indeed view this ―troubadour revival‖ as a conservative reaction to social change: 
[T]he troubadour revival in late medieval Spain was a conservative reaction to social 
crisis by those who belonged, or were affiliated, to a powerful, expanding and belligerent 
aristocracy; the crisis was produced by a discrepancy between social theory and social 
                                                 
4
 For example, Teófilo F. Ruiz‘s recent history of late-medieval Spain  is entitled Spain’s Centuries of Crisis: 1300-
1474. Ruiz explicitly links the period‘s cultural production to this turbulent context: ―Spain‘s cultural revival ... took 
place in the midst of wars and violent social, economic, and political transformations. The Spanish realms also 
responded to the disasters of the age with a firm commitment to aesthetics and to turning the daily horrors of life 
into the beautiful‖ (165). Without denying the period‘s violence, a number of historians have rejected the view that 
what was at stake in the conflict between nobility and monarchy was ―centralization.‖ Luis Suárez Fernández, for 
example, calls the image of Fernando and Isabel as persecutors and destroyers of the nobility a ―Romantic legend‖ 
and insists that ―there is nothing approaching centralism‖ even at the end of the fifteenth century (El proceso de la 
unidad española 8-10; all translations are mine unless otherwise noted). Others question the historiographic 
emphasis on this conflict among the others that marked late-medieval Castilian life; thus, Julio Valdeón Baruque 
writes that, while it was natural for conflicts of this nature to be central to royal historiography, and while attempts 
to strengthen the jurisdictional power of the monarchy did conflict with feudal customs, ―in the long-term the 
strengthening of the monarchy in no way constituted an obstacle for the expansion of the nobility as a social class; 
on the contrary, it was the necessary condition for the nobility to consolidate its economic interests and social 
preeminence, at the cost, of course, of recognizing that the basic sources of political power and jurisdiction were 
held by the Crown‖ (32-33). For my part, I think it is clear that fifteenth-century observers perceived conflict 
between the Crown and the nobility as a source of perpetual instability. The stability they sought in favoring a strong 
monarchy may not have taken the form of ―centralization‖ in the modern sense, but the term holds for their 
conception of the king as the nerve-center of the body politic (see the third section of this chapter). 
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reality which could never be resolved, because the theory was based on the belief in a 
divinely pre-ordained system of social stratification in which change was inconceivable. 
(7-8) 
 
From this point of view, the revival comes to look like a negative cultural phenomenon, its 
creativity stymied by political timidity and aesthetic traditionalism; to the political crisis of 
feudalism we must add the cultural crisis of feudalism‘s concomitant literary forms. Iberia‘s 
fifteenth century becomes a period of cultural transition, of ―proto-Humanism‖ (both Cartagena 
and Santillana are often described in just this way, as proto-Humanists). Critics who adhere to 
this view tend to oppose ―traditional‖ courtly poetry, with its rigid and inherited commonplaces, 
to emergent hybrid forms such as the sentimental romance, marked by classical erudition and the 
influence of Italian writers such as Boccaccio. This modern critical approach reflects a 
teleological reading of late-medieval texts in which literary creativity is understood as 
divergence from the tropes of courtly love. Without denying the novelty of the sentimental 
romance (or the novelties that emerge within Iberian cancioneros, cancioneiros, and cançoners 
as the fifteenth century advances), I want to suggest here that the hallmarks of Iberian humanism 
– the spread of lay literacy and the proliferation of vernacular translations of Latin texts, 
especially moral and didactic works, including rhetorical treatises (Lawrance, ―Lay Literacy‖ 80-
3 and 88-9; ibid., ―Vernacular Humanism‖ 66) – do not provide a contrast to the troubadour 
revival, but rather a crucial context for its understanding. 
 If, for the thinkers of the period, the paradigmatic conflict of late-medieval Castile is 
between monarchy and nobility, the paradigmatic conflict of courtly literature is between 
determined lover and reticent lady. This latter paradigm has come down to modern audiences 
most famously through Andreas Capellanus‘s Art of Courtly Love (1186-90), whose first two 
books comprise a manual for the aspiring courtly lover, a series of rhetorical jousts between 
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lovers and ladies of different social standings. Its third book, however, turns the tables on the 
first two, as Capellanus instructs his pupil to avoid worldly love altogether and turn toward the 
divine. The first two books‘ intersubjective conflict thus becomes an interior one between reason 
and the passions, and the Art itself becomes what Catherine Brown has called a ―logical 
problem‖: ―How is one to make sense of a text that poses the quaestio ‗the love of women is the 
source of all happiness, et contra, the source of all damnation,‘ and in response delivers a double 
verdict at once for and against each opposing side?‖ (96). Brown is reading the Art within the 
broader currents of medieval exegesis and logic, but in the more limited context of lyric poetry, 
the lover‘s frustration is not a problem at all, as María Rosa Menocal has argued: 
It is the disappointment itself, too often without logical reason, that is the subject of this 
poetry. The obstacles, when and if they are specified, are rarely if ever as significant as 
the simple fact of unfulfillment, which is clearly at the center of the poetry's concerns … 
It is hard to escape the tentative conclusion that this is poetry very much for itself and 
conscious of itself as its own principal pleasure and subject, and that the recurring theme 
of unsatisfactory love is a thematic vehicle particularly well suited to this sort of poetic 
narcissism. (107) 
 
Just as apparent contradictions in scripture drive the remarkable creativity of medieval exegesis 
and logical disputation drives Scholastic thought, the unresolved conflicts of courtly literature, 
both exterior and interior, constitute its condition of poetic possibility. Taking lyric for narrative, 
we see them as a chronological endpoint: the courtly poet narrates the failure (or, very 
occasionally, success) of his seduction and its painful aftermath. But in terms of Menocal‘s lyric 
pleasure, these explorations of unfulfillment are a creative motor; the pain of failure, real or 
imagined, gives way to wide-ranging lyric play involving all aspects of courtly life.
5
 
                                                 
5
 A further advantage of this hermeneutic standpoint is that the question of courtly love‘s historicity falls away, 
while other sociopolitical questions are not obviated but brought to the fore. For a concise summary and critical 
appraisal of modern approaches to courtly love with particular reference to the Art of Courtly Love, see Moi 12-20. 
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The tropes by which modern critics identify a ―courtly‖ text (and which were understood 
as tropes in the Middle Ages) – the lover‘s servitude of his lady, and his sickness and suffering at 
her hands, among others – are the shared affective vocabulary that construct, rhetorically, courtly 
love‘s creative unfulfillment. They are evidence that courtly writers constituted a community 
defined by this shared affective system. Indeed, Barbara H. Rosenwein has posited the existence 
of ―emotional communities‖ – ―groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional 
expression and value – or devalue – the same or related emotions‖ (2) – and has even noted that 
these communities may be ―textual,‖ ―created and reinforced by ideologies, teachings, and 
common presuppositions‖ (24-5). For Rosenwein, the existence of textual genres constitutes a 
danger for the historian of emotions: ―The constraints of genre admittedly pose a problem. Might 
not the well-meaning historian mistake a particular genre, with its rules of expression, for an 
‗emotional community‘?‖ (27). In other words, the historian attempting to discern actual 
historical attitudes toward emotion might be hoodwinked by what was self-conscious 
conventional play in medieval texts. Here, I want to argue that historical genres do not obscure 
―true‖ emotional communities; rather, we should see the concept of the emotional community – 
or ―affective‖ community, as I prefer, for reasons laid out in the introduction – as one of many 
possible definitions of ―genre.‖ Self-conscious, conventional play, whether it holds to or diverges 
from tropic norms, implies a community of readers and writers interested in exploring the 
affective system they have inherited. 
In arguing that courtly writers were defined, as a community, by their tropes, I am not 
arguing that they were therefore constrained by those tropes. They ―adhere to the same norms of 
emotional … value‖ not in that they value the same emotions equally – here, I differ 
substantially from Rosenwein – but in that they emphasize the same emotions, or emotional 
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conflicts, in their acts of poetic creation and disputation. The mere repetition of affective tropes 
in a genre tells only part of the story of the formation and development of genres:  
[T]he function of art in the process of this perpetual totalizing [i.e., the ―critical and 
dialectical reproduction of the past‖] can only come into view in its independence when 
the specific achievement of artistic form as well is no longer just mimetically defined, but 
rather is viewed dialectically as a medium capable of forming and altering perception, in 
which the ―formation of the senses‖ chiefly takes place. (Jauss 15-6) 
 
When viewed synchronically, genres seem to present stable rules of interpretation and 
composition. As Jauss argues above, however, we should always be aware of the dialectical 
processes active within genres; their conventions are reaffirmed or renovated as they are written, 
and they act on their cultural contexts as much as they are informed by them. This is especially 
true when we keep in mind that, as members of an affective community, writers are at once 
producers and consumers; sharing a vocabulary implies both speaking and listening. 
What is shared at the heart of this dialogue is, to borrow Michel Maffesoli‘s term, a 
―style‖: ―[S]tyle is the essential characteristic of a collective sentiment … an all-encompassing 
form, a ‗forming form‘ that gives birth to whole manners of being, to customs, representations, 
and the various fashions by which life in society is expressed‖ (5). The dialogic nature of this 
―collective sentiment‖ cannot be overstated: ―style is above all the fact of existing only and 
through the look or the word of the other‖ (16). Just as Menocal identifies ―pleasure‖ as courtly 
love‘s poetic spur, Maffesoli writes that creation itself ―may be less an action than a communal 
passion‖ (29). Maffesoli‘s notion of style is helpful in showing that cultural phenomena such as 
literary genres that may seem static – for example, in the perpetual unfulfillment of the courtly 
lover – are in fact dynamic. They are a ―passion‖ not in the sense that they passively record 
cultural developments, but rather in that the intersubjective dialogue that sustains them 
represents a form of productive affection. The key in the case of courtly love – and not only in its 
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Iberian manifestations – is that it is a communal passion about passion, in which the rhetoric that 
forms lyric subjects, collective and individual, revolves around the moral stakes of emotion, of 
passivity and activity, of inward contemplation and outward desire. How, then, did this particular 
conception of rhetoric develop? 
 
Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Classical Model of Empathetic Participation 
  
If we accept that what is at stake in fifteenth-century Iberian courtly literature is the 
formation of an attitude toward emotion, the next step, as good rhetoricians, is to investigate how 
emotions became a communal passion and why they might be seen as an instrument of literary 
rhetoric addressing both private morality and public life. In other words, how did affect come to 
be (seen as) the principal articulation between concepts of community and rhetoric in late-
medieval Iberia? We can begin by examining how rhetoric was defined by Isidore of Seville, 
Archbishop of Seville during the first decades of the seventh century, whose Etymologies (ca. 
630) were a fundamental source of information of all kinds for later medieval writers. Isidore‘s 
definition of rhetoric draws an instructive contrast with dialectic: ―While dialectic is indeed 
sharper for examining things, rhetoric is more fluent for those things it strives to teach. Dialectic 
sometimes appears in schools; rhetoric continually comes to the public forum. Dialectic reaches 
very few students; rhetoric often reaches the whole populace‖ (II.xxiii.2). The fundamental 
points of comparison here are instrumentality and audience. Dialectic finds the truth but 
communicates it to the few; rhetoric‘s relationship to the truth is undefined, but its capacity to 
reach the many is undeniable. This contrast draws, more or less directly, on both Platonic and 
Aristotelian discussions of rhetoric, and it is through a brief examination of those discussions 
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that we can see the implicit role affect plays here, and its implications for later discussions of 
affect‘s role in ethics and politics. In Plato‘s dialogues on rhetoric we find the seeds of debates 
about the relationship of reason to the passions, of rhetoric to truth and politics, and of orators to 
their audiences. In Aristotle, we find a practical analysis of this last relationship, with important 
implications for fifteenth-century attitudes toward the role of the passions in moral praxis. 
Emotion has always been implicated in the attempt to separate rhetoric from dialectic. 
Plato famously treats emotion and rhetoric together in the Phaedrus. Like all of Plato‘s 
dialogues, the Phaedrus was unknown in medieval Iberia, but the importance of its tripartite 
division of the soul in the development of later theories of emotion cannot be overstated. In 
allegorizing the soul as a charioteer (its rational power) and two horses (its concupiscible and 
irascible powers), Plato provided a fundamental model of the soul divided against itself. This 
paradigm of inner conflict was preserved even in later models whose underlying cosmology was 
entirely different.
6
 The fact that this is an inner conflict is also paramount here: they may be 
opposed, but cognition and affection are equally powers of the soul. Both those who would later 
condemn emotions as immoral or sinful and those who would defend their role in public 
deliberation seized on the fundamental point that emotions engage cognition, involving the 
willful exercise of judgment. 
In an anticipation of Capellanus‘s Art, which teaches courtly actors to pursue and reject 
love through rhetorical persuasion, Socrates asks Phaedrus, ―Isn‘t the art of rhetoric, taken as a 
whole, a certain guiding of souls through words, not only in the law courts and other places of 
public assembly but also in private?‖ (261a). For Socrates in the Phaedrus, the essence of this art 
is the erasure of difference: rhetoric ―enables someone to make everything similar to everything 
else,‖ in both public and private settings (261e). The moral stakes of rhetoric are thus set. The 
                                                 
6
 For this allegory, see 246a-254e; on the concupiscible and irascible parts in particular, see 253d-254b. 
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soul is divided against itself, and moral deliberation requires the clear perception of difference – 
that is, discretion. The reduction of difference opens the door to deception (262a). 
This reduction of difference is not the only way rhetoric closes distances in the Phaedrus. 
Just as doctors must understand the nature of the body, rhetoricians must understand that of the 
soul (270b); ―having classified the … kinds of soul and how these are affected, [the teacher of 
rhetoric] will go through every cause, aligning each type of speech to each type of soul‖ (271a-
b). This is an early iteration of one of rhetoric‘s key concepts, kairos, glossed by Rita Copeland 
as ―fitting persuasion to the right and appropriate circumstances of subject, audience, and 
moment‖ (19). Isidore, for his part, describes kairos in his advice on style (elocutio): ―[I]t will be 
correct to use what the matter, the place, the time, and the character of the audience require, 
ensuring that profane things are not mingled with religious, immodest with chaste, frivolous with 
weighty, playful with earnest, or laughable with sad‖ (II.xvi.1). Kairos is thus clearly an 
expansive concept, but for Plato, a rhetorician‘s success depends more than anything on 
knowledge of the audience‘s souls (277b-c). This knowledge is key in both public and private 
rhetoric, and the content of the persuasion in question is irrelevant. To use a later term, dispositio 
– the arrangement of a speech‘s formal aspects according to the audience‘s emotional 
disposition – is everything. But not in moral terms: here, rhetoric‘s promise lies only in its 
capacity to fortify discussions of the ―just, beautiful and good‖ with true knowledge of the soul‘s 
nature.
7
 In this sense, ―good‖ rhetoric becomes a kind of dialectic – in any case, a science – 
relying chiefly on the speaker‘s certain knowledge.8 Rhetoric can only be moral if it persuades its 
audience of something true. 
                                                 
7
 On the question of truth, see Scully (trans. and ed.), Phaedrus 68 n. 155. 
8
 As we will see, this anticipates certain early Christian attitudes toward the ―rhetoric‖ of Scripture. 
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 The question of truth is again taken up in Plato‘s most extended meditation on rhetoric, 
the Gorgias, when Socrates describes rhetoric as ―belief-inspiring but not didactic‖ (455a).9 For 
Socrates, speech cannot be truly didactic if its content is false. The Gorgias seems to reflect a 
more polemical attitude toward rhetoric, as Socrates engages three increasingly defiant 
interlocutors – Gorgias, the well-known Sophist; Polus, his student; and Callicles, a young 
politician – in a lengthy debate on its political and moral merits. In fact, as Seth Benardete points 
out, the very length of the dialogue and recalcitrance of Socrates‘s opponents represent one of 
the Gorgias‘s central mysteries (5). For Benardete, the mistakes in reasoning made throughout 
the text by Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, who tend to fall easily into Socrates‘s traps, constitute 
―the very mistakes of rhetoric that demonstrate its spuriousness‖ (7). By the end of the dialogue, 
there can be no doubt about Socrates‘s low opinion of rhetoric, and Benardete may be right that 
Plato‘s ultimate sympathies lie with Socrates as well. But what Plato dramatizes most 
consistently in the Gorgias is Socrates‘s attempt to separate rhetoric from dialectic cleanly, as his 
opponents persist in blurring this boundary. 
 Socrates‘s interlocutors in the Gorgias do not admit that dialectical reasoning leads to the 
truth. Rather, when they are led by Socrates toward undesirable conclusions, they characterize 
Socrates‘s victories as purely rhetorical, reliant on the manipulation of emotions such as shame 
that spring from social customs (see, for example, 461b-c). Furthermore, they frequently accuse 
Socrates of taking too much pleasure in his dialectical method, treating their engagement in 
dialogue as an indulgence of Socrates‘s will (510a; 513e; 514a; 516c). They perceive their 
dialogue to be a battle of wills, not reasons, and their indulgent attitude and condescending 
                                                 
9
 Isidore names Gorgias, Aristotle, and Hermagoras as the founders of rhetoric, and Cicero and Quintilians as its 
continuers in Latin culture (Etymologies II.ii.1). 
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references to Socrates‘s pleasure and wishes emphasize that Socrates‘s dialectic is more 
rhetorical – as a method – than the philosopher believes. 
 Rhetoric is primarily a public activity in the Gorgias, and pleasure is, in fact, key in 
Socrates‘s attempts to distinguish it from the ―true‖ politics in which he himself is engaged: ―I 
think that with a few Athenians – so as not to say myself alone – I put my hand to the true 
political art and I alone of the men of today practice politics, inasmuch as it is not with a view to 
gratification that I speak the speeches that I speak on each occasion, but with a view to the best, 
not to the most pleasant‖ (521d-e). But Socrates himself recognizes that his politics, bereft of 
pleasure, is likely to fail as a public endeavor; echoing Isidore, James H. Nichols, Jr. has written 
that Socrates‘s ―dialectical mode of speaking with one person at a time cannot work with the 
many‖ (Gorgias, ―Introduction‖ 13). Callicles, Socrates‘s most intractable interlocutor, is 
skeptical of philosophy as a mode of communication at all, asking Socrates, ―Couldn‘t you go 
through the argument yourself, either speaking by yourself or answering yourself?‖ (505d). The 
young politician suspects that philosophy, at least as Socrates practices it, is essentially an inner 
monologue, inappropriate for any kind of intersubjective deliberation. Experience – the term 
Socrates has used to dismiss rhetoric – is essential to politics (and to nobility and goodness) and 
anathema to philosophy, such that the philosopher seems ridiculous among politicians and vice 
versa (484c-e). It is here, dramatically, that Callicles chooses to remain: philosophy cannot 
bridge the gap between individuals, or between an individual and a crowd. When Socrates tries 
to use philosophy to persuade, he becomes nothing more than a rhetorician – and a ridiculous 
one at that. 
What Plato dramatizes, Aristotle systematizes. Early on in his Rhetoric, Aristotle 
addresses the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic, on the one hand, and rhetoric and 
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politics, on the other.
10
 His famous (and categorical) statement that ―Rhetoric is the counterpart 
of Dialectic‖ (1354a) is accompanied by the more ambiguous claim that a rhetorician, in addition 
to reasoning logically and understanding human character and goodness, must be able 
to understand the emotions – that is, to name them and describe them, to know their 
causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot 
of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be called political; and 
for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as 
political experts ... As a matter of fact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it. (1356a) 
 
Rhetoric is linked to ethics through the emotions, and thus seemingly through ethics to politics; 
but the latter is a science, whereas rhetoric and dialectic are merely ―faculties for providing 
arguments‖ (1356a). Rhetoric seems to be tied to practical wisdom because ―it is about our 
actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character‖ (1357a), 
but ―its status as a practical knowledge in Aristotle is debatable, since he compares it to dialectic 
as ‗an instrument of all sciences‘‖ (Copeland 15). 
 There can be no question, however, that medieval Iberians held rhetoric, in both its 
Aristotelian and Ciceronian models, to be a mode of practical wisdom. Indeed, Alonso de 
Cartagena argued, in the preface to his translation of Cicero‘s De Inventione, undertaken at the 
behest of Portugal‘s then-prince Duarte, that Aristotle‘s Rhetoric formed a moral trilogy with the 
Politics and Ethics (Rhetórica 30).
11
 Although Aristotle insists that rhetoric and political science 
are not one, the relationship of rhetoric to politics through emotion and ethics holds. It is 
emotional persuasion that ―come[s] through the hearers‖ (1356a), and, further, ―of the three 
elements in speech-making – speaker, subject, and person addressed – it is the last one, the 
                                                 
10
 The Rhetoric circulated in Latin translation in late-medieval Iberia, albeit not widely; Charles Faulhaber identified 
six manuscripts in his survey of Spanish libraries (48-9). 
11
 This translation was begun ca. 1421-2 during a diplomatic mission to Portugal (Rhetórica 10). It survives in a 
single manuscript held by the Escorial (MS. T.II.12). For the effects of Cartagena‘s embassy to Portugal on broader 
Iberian humanism, see Salazar. 
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hearer, that determines the speech‘s end and object‖ (1358a-b). Echoing Callicles subtly, Paul 
Ricoeur argues that rhetoric‘s fundamental intersubjectivity separates it from dialectic: 
In particular, the orientation of argument to a listener – evidence that all discourse is 
addressed to someone – and its adherence to contents defined by the topics, keep ―the 
persuasive as such‖ from turning into a logic of probability. Thus, rhetoric will remain at 
most the antistrophos (―counterpart‖) of dialectic, but will not dissolve into it. (33-4) 
 
In Aristotle‘s exposition, it is the hearer‘s predominance that gives rise to the well-known 
threefold division of rhetoric into the political or deliberative, the forensic, and the ceremonial or 
epideictic (1358b). Of these, political oratory is most concerned with action, oriented toward the 
future and aiming ―at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of 
action‖ (1358b). It is this focus on action, combined with the determinant role played by the 
audience, that makes emotion central to later discussions of public governance and virtue. 
Aristotle‘s advice, at the beginning of Book II of the Rhetoric, that the orator must 
understand the emotions in order to provoke them in the audience (1378a) is not far from 
Socrates‘s reasoning in the Phaedrus. Rather, what is revolutionary is Aristotle‘s association of 
emotion and cognition through judgment and belief, for example in his definition of anger as ―an 
impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed 
without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one‘s friends‖ 
(1378a). As W. W. Fortenbaugh has explained, 
By construing thought of belief as the efficient cause of emotion, Aristotle showed that 
emotional response is intelligent behaviour open to reasoned persuasion. When men are 
angered, they are not victims of some totally irrational force. Rather they are responding 
in accordance with the thought of unjust insult. Their belief may be erroneous and their 
anger unreasonable, but their behaviour is intelligent and cognitive in the sense that it is 
grounded upon a belief which may be criticised and even altered by argumentation. 
(Fortenbaugh 17) 
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Emotional appeals are thus not entirely unreasonable, not, as Fortenbaugh summarizes Gorgias‘s 
view, to be considered ―charms and enchantments‖ (17). An emotion is a kind of judgment – 
and, at least sometimes, a correct one.
12
 
 Another key element of Aristotle‘s definition of anger is that the perceived insult may be 
directed at either oneself or one‘s friends. The Rhetoric‘s definitions of the individual emotions 
are shot through with dialectics of the individual and collective, likeness and difference, 
proximity and distance. Anger is differentiated from hatred because the latter can be directed 
against ―classes,‖ whereas the former is ―always concerned with individuals‖ (1382a).13 Pity 
(which can be felt by the angry, but not the hateful) requires a judgment that the undeserved 
suffering we perceive could also befall us (1385b), especially when those suffering share our 
character or social standing (1386a). But some difference is required as well: when the sufferers 
are too like us, ―we feel about them as if we were in danger ourselves‖ (1386a). The multiple 
relationships of the individual to the community are thus definitive, and knowledge of them 
permits orators to reproduce feelings of closeness or distance in their audiences. 
 Emotions, as judgments, rely on perception, and it is important to note that Aristotle 
considered perception itself an ―affection‖ (pathos; De Anima 416b). The senses, as affections, 
function through a kind of perceptual participation in their objects: ―the sense faculty is like the 
actual sense-object – it is affected as being unlike but on being affected it becomes like and is 
such as what acts on it‖ (418a). Now, perception is only one activity that differentiates the souled 
from the unsouled; the other is movement (403b), and movement is spurred by desire rather than 
intellect (433a).
14
 Desire, in turn, depends on the ―rational and perceptive imagination‖ 
(phantasia; 433b). As such, movement and desire rely on perceptual participation, an ontological 
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 On this point, see Nussbaum, ―Aristotle on Emotions‖ 309 and Striker 297. 
13
 Here, Aristotle offers Socrates as an example of individuals against whom anger has been directed. 
14
 This is because, unlike the intellect, desire and imagination can be mistaken. 
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closeness between subject and object. Perception, an affection – that is, a passion – functions as a 
kind of epistemological empathy. In Aristotle, then, both sensation and persuasion are forms of 
affective participation, which therefore governs the epistemology and practice of public 
deliberation. Affective rhetoric begins and ends in community. 
 Although his influence was almost always mediated, Aristotle‘s theories of participation 
underlie fifteenth-century Iberia‘s political and moral discourse as it is manifested in both 
theoretical and literary texts.
15
 The chief mediators – whose mediation was, of course, far from 
transparent – were Roman Stoic thinkers such as Cicero and Seneca, on the one hand, and 
monastic thinkers such as John Cassian and Bernard of Clairvaux, on the other. Their ideas about 
the epistemological and even aesthetic potential – or necessity – of empathy mirror, at least 
through shared metaphors of closeness and distance, ideas about the rhetorical, practical, and 
communitarian potential of empathy. Stoic thought was particularly influential in Iberian theories 
of community and good governance, and it is to these intertwined traditions that I will now turn. 
 
Psychological Unity in Fifteenth-Century Castilian Political Thought: Friendship and Mercy 
 
As lay literacy spread in fifteenth-century Iberia, readers showed a marked preference for 
moral and didactic works. This preference may have been grounded in practical concerns; after 
all, ―for the new lay readership of the fifteenth century, classical literature provided almost the 
only available texts for a study of statecraft, warfare and secular ethics based on empirical 
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 Of course, these theories were taken up outside of Iberian (and outside of the Middle Ages) as well. Thus, Karl F. 
Morrison has traced a broad ―hermeneutics of empathy‖ in which ―[e]pistemology was expressed in the identity 
between knower and known (or subject and object), a proposition that ramified through doctrines affirming the 
identity of lover and beloved, actor and character (impersonation), and – a cluster of ideas that dealt with art – artist 
and work, subject and work, artist and subject, and beholder and work‖ (26). These doctrines ―taught a personal 
union achieved through the affects. Union progresses through stages of knowing, desiring, and enjoying or 
emulating the other. The arguments found their vindication in the esthetic closure of joy‖ (28). I will return to these 
questions in the last part of this chapter. 
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examples‖ (Lawrance, ―Vernacular Humanism‖ 67). Cicero was one of the dominant objects of 
this new interest; his De officiis, for example, was widely translated throughout Iberia, into 
Aragonese, Catalan, and Portuguese – along with Alonso de Cartagena‘s Castilian version 
(Morrás 12). Cartagena‘s translation differs from its Iberian counterparts, however, in that the 
bishop of Burgos considered Cicero‘s text a moral treatise, not a manual of good government 
(Morrás 12-3). In his prologue to De los ofiçios, Cartagena explains that he chose this text (Juan 
Alfonso de Zamora had made a broad request for him to translate some classical work, not even 
specifying Cicero as author) not only for its moral doctrine, but for its rhetorical qualities (Libros 
de Tulio 207).
16
 As I mentioned above, Cartagena (and he was not alone in this among medieval 
thinkers) considered rhetoric a primarily moral science, and it was the classical rhetorics – De 
inventione and Ad Herennium, then attributed to Cicero – that remained dominant (alongside the 
artes dictaminis) until the end of the Middle Ages in Iberia (Faulhaber 48-51). Cicero‘s thought 
on the emotions was also an object of interest: in the fifteenth century, nobleman Nuño de 
Guzmán commissioned an Italian translation of the Tusculan Disputations (Morrás 11). 
We should not be surprised to find Cicero‘s fingerprints on political texts produced 
during a time when the concept of the bien público or bien común was consistently exalted by 
the ruling dynasty, the Trastámaras (Nieto Soria 205). But just how was the ―common‖ 
understood in this literature? My answer will, by necessity, take the form of a survey, beginning 
with the anonymous Tratado de la comunidad, in which ―community‖ (―comunidat‖) is defined 
thus: 
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 Nieto Soria has noted the ―extraordinary diffusion‖ of Cartagena‘s works in the fifteenth century (Iglesia y genesis 
218), and Cartagena (whose 1420 embassy to Portugal has already been mentioned) was also active in royal and 
ecclesiastical politics. For Cartagena‘s 1441 attempt to mediate between the crown (and Álvaro de Luna) and 
rebellious forces, see Serrano 166-170; for a recent assessment of Cartagena‘s relationship with humanism, see 
Fernández Gallardo. 
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Comunidat es cosa bien regida e governada por un rey o príncipe, o por pocos omnes 
buenos e virtuosos, o por todo el pueblo si tal es que lo pueda fazer. La cual comunidat es 
ayuntamiento de gente por consentimiento de derecho e conplimiento de provecho, e es 
fecha de personas mayores e medianas e menores. Las quales quando son de un coraçón e 
voluntat, la comunidat es bien regida e governada. (87).
17
 
 
Community is something well governed by a king or prince, or a few good and virtuous 
men, or by all the people if they are capable of it. This community is a union of people by 
rightful consent and for their benefit, and it is composed of greater, average, and lesser 
people. When these people are of one heart and will, the community is well governed.  
 
There is a definitional link here between psychological unity and good governance; that 
is, psychological unity is the definitional goal of good governance, through monarchy, oligarchy, 
or democracy. Furthermore, in this definition‘s insistence on the community‘s ―one heart,‖ there 
may be an echo of Title I, Law V of the second of Alfonso X‘s Siete partidas, which states that 
just as the body‘s unity springs from its one heart, the members of a community should be loyal 
in service to their one king (7). In this law, the king is compared not only to the heart, but also to 
the soul and head: as the soul resides in the heart and gives it life, justice resides in the king, 
giving life to his land, and as the body relies on the head‘s senses for guidance, so the people rely 
on their king. The Tratado‘s definition does indeed extend the metaphor of the body politic: 
―Que como el cuerpo natural, las partidas del qual sirva la una a la otra, e la una encubre el 
fallimiento de la otra, e la otra defiende a la otra, e la una endereça e basteçe la honrra de la otra, 
así las partidas de la comunidat se deven amar e querer e ayudar e defender las unas a las otras‖ 
(87) ―Like the natural body, the parts of which serve each other, one making up for the other‘s 
failing, one defending another, one sorting out and shoring up the other‘s honor, thus the parts of 
the community should love and help and defend each other.‖ Communal life becomes here a 
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 The Tratado, whose one fifteenth-century manuscript is held by the Escorial (MS &-II-8), is based largely on Juan 
García de Castrojeriz‘s Glosa castellana al “Regimiento de príncipes” (10). It is bound with several other didactic 
works; for a list, see 10-11. 
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kind of self-love whose intersubjective manifestation, will, in turn, be conceptualized through a 
Stoic model of friendship based on identification – indeed, as the Tratado‘s anonymous author 
later explains, ―amigo‖ means ―ygual de mí‖ (127). 
The Tratado may also have been drawing on the Siete partidas for its definition of 
friendship. In fact, many of the concepts central to fifteenth-century Iberia‘s communitarian 
debate – debt, concord, equality, communication – are present in this section (Partida IV, title 
xvii) of Alfonso X‘s encyclopedic legal code, and they are drawn explicitly from classical 
authority. Friendship is initially conceptualized as a kind of loving debt: ―Amistad es cosa que 
ayunta los corazones de los homes para amarse mucho; ca segunt dixieron los sabios antiguos, et 
es verdad, amor pasa todos los debdos‖ (IV.xxvii) ―Friendship is something that joins men‘s 
hearts so that they love each other greatly; for as the wise men of Antiquity said, and it is true, 
love surpasses all debts.‖ It is not, however, the same as love, and it is also different from 
beneficence (bienquerencia) and concord, because it is necessarily mutual and symmetrical. 
Love and beneficence may not be reciprocated, and concord is possible without friendship 
(IV.xxvii.1). Cicero is named specifically as the authority for the claim that when friends 
communicate, it is as if they were talking to themselves (IV.xxvii.3), and a reference to 
Augustine confirms the absolute equality among friends (IV.xxvii.5). 
Mutual debt, love, and equality are all figures for empathetic participation, and they are 
all identified as important elements of broader forms of community. Parents and children feel 
natural friendship toward each other, as do spouses and fellow countrymen; this natural 
friendship is inferior, however, to that felt between men who have shared pure goodwill (bondat) 
for a long time (IV.xxvii.4). Although the cited authority for this distinction is Aristotle, the Siete 
partidas appear to be echoing Cicero‘s discussion of human community in On Obligations. 
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Cicero‘s analysis moves from broad to narrow, and then from narrow to broad. He begins by 
seeking a natural basis for universal human unity: 
It seems necessary, however, to probe deeper into the fundamentals of community and 
human fellowship ordained by nature. First comes that which we see existing in the 
fellowship of the whole human race. The bond which unites them is the combination of 
reason and speech, which by teaching, learning, communicating, debating, and evaluating 
endears men to each other, and unites them in a kind of natural alliance. This more than 
anything separates us from the nature of the beasts. We often concede that animals such 
as horses and lions have courage, but lack justice, fairness, and goodness. This is because 
they lack reason and speech.
18
 (I.50) 
 
The communitarian potential of pedagogy and debate to ―endear men to each other‖ thus gives 
speech – and rhetoric, as a key subset thereof – definitional importance. Rhetoric is the point at 
which definitions of the human and of human community converge.
19
 From this broad base of 
universal human fellowship, Cicero traces a set of ever-narrower levels: from those united by 
―race, nation and tongue,‖ to those from the same city-state, friends and business associates, and, 
finally, family members (I.53). In analyzing the inner workings of the family, however, Cicero 
broadens the picture once again. The universal urge to procreate leads to the primary bond of 
marriage and the secondary bond between parents and children. As these bonds expand (between 
brothers and sisters, first and second cousins, through marriage), they cannot be contained in a 
single household: ―From such procreation and resultant offspring states have their beginnings‖ 
(I.54). It would seem, then, that the family structure is both the end and beginning of human 
community. 
 This is not, however, Cicero‘s conclusion. As in the Siete partidas, friendship, not family, 
is key: ―Of all bonds of fellowship, however, none is more pre-eminent or enduring than the 
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 Walsh notes that this doctrine is adopted from Aristotle (136 n. 50). 
19
 See chapter three for a discussion of Cicero‘s related account of the origins of human community in his youthful 
rhetorical treatise De inventione. 
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friendship forged between good men of like character‖ (I.55). ―Likeness‖ here manifests itself as 
a kind of ethical attraction that, in the end, verges on participation: 
True, every virtue attracts us towards it, and causes us to feel affection towards those in 
whom we observe it, but justice and generosity induce this response most of all. Nothing 
inspires greater affection or intimacy than decency of character which is shared. When 
two people have the same ideals and aspirations, they take the same pleasure in each 
other as in themselves. (I.56) 
 
On Obligations is a moral treatise in which Cicero sets out to establish a rational basis for human 
community; the virtues of wisdom, justice, generosity, and magnanimity, which constitute the 
sources of obligation, are analyzed with particular regard to the role they play in ―communal 
adherence‖ (I.20). Here, the mechanism by which justice and generosity effect ―communal 
adherence‖ becomes clear. When an ethical outlook is shared, it generates a kind of friendship, 
or affection, that manifests itself empathically as communal pleasure. Individual virtue and 
friendship represent processes that reinforce each other through speech – a case in point is On 
Obligations itself, dedicated, as it was, to Cicero‘s own son. Speech guides individual ethics and 
defines the broadest possibilities of human fellowship. 
This conception of friendship as communication was extensively developed, and its 
political implications explored, by Alfonso de Madrigal (ca. 1410-1455), also known as ―el 
Tostado‖ (possibly owing to his dark hair). Madrigal was professor of moral philosophy at the 
University of Salamanca; he was friendly with Juan II, dedicating several texts to him, and it was 
Queen Isabel herself who instigated the printing of Madrigal‘s collected works (El gobierno 
ideal 15 and 36). At Salamanca, Madrigal was the instigator of a movement for ―moral 
renovation‖ along broadly Aristotelian lines (Castillo Vegas 11), but he diverged from Aristotle 
in emphasizing ―the necessity that social life, as human, must engender friendship among 
citizens‖ (Belloso Martín 99). For Madrigal, in his Breviloquio de amor y amiçiçia (ca. 1437-
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1441), friendship should be conceived of in terms of both communication and debt. Thus, he 
writes that ―... el acto de los amigos es comunicar e syn comunicaçion nunca fue causada alguna 
amiçiçia‖ (cited in Belloso Martín, 100 n. 3) ―the act of friends is to communicate and without 
communication no friendship was ever caused‖ and, furthermore, ―[t]oda comunicaçion tiene 
entre sy algun debdo o obligaçion e al debdo, neccesario es que se consigna amor‖ (cited in 
Belloso Martín, 100 n. 5) ―all communication contains in itself some debt or obligation, and to 
this debt some love must be consigned.‖20 This form of friendship, which anticipates certain 
contemporary theories of community to be discussed later in this dissertation, such as that of 
Roberto Esposito, is such a powerful force of political unity that it obviates the need for law 
itself (Belloso Martín 108). This ―communicative‖ force comes to be known as ―civil 
friendship‖: 
Sin comunicación no es posible la amistad, ―syn comunicaçion nunca fue causada alguna 
amiçiçia.‖ No se trata de un simple intercambio de ideas o de sentimientos. Se trata de 
algo más hondo que produce el amor en perfecto grado. Son amigos los ―comunycantes‖ 
que ―obran entre sy enteramente cosas de amygos‖ ... Esto eleva en grado sumo la 
amistad que se da ―entre los çibdadanos.‖ Es la amistad que [Madrigal] llama política o 
civil, ―la amiçiçia llamada politica o çivil.‖ No se reduce a una convivencia ordenada que 
permite a cada miembro su personal desarrollo y perfeccionamiento. Es, en este sentido, 
una sublimación de la comunidad asentada sobre las bases de la justicia y del derecho. 
(Belloso Martín 112-3) 
 
Without communication friendship is imposible, ―without communication no friendship 
was ever caused.‖ This is not a simple exchange of ideas or feelings. It is something 
much deeper that produces the most perfect degree of love. The ―communicants" are 
friends who ―fashion among themselves only friendly things‖ … This elevates to the 
highest level the friendship that ―arises among citizens.‖ It is the friendship that Madrigal 
calls ―political‖ or ―civil.‖ It cannot be reduced to an orderly coexistence permitting its 
members their own personal development and perfection. It is, in this sense, a 
sublimation of the community founded on the bases of justice and law. 
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This friendship is produced by what Madrigal calls the ―concordia de las obras,‖ ―concord of 
works,‖ whose function is ―to create and unite friends‖ (Belloso Martín 114). Affection and 
action are unified through speech among citizen-friends; the classical function of rhetoric has 
thus been, in a way, democratized.
21
 It remains to be seen, however, what kind of political entity 
arises from the united efforts of these friends. 
The question of united human effort is central to De optima politia (The Ideal 
Government), a repetitio delivered by Madrigal at Salamanca in 1436 that has come down to us 
incomplete.
22
 Public psychology and political unity are tied together in a surprising way in De 
optima politia, in which Madrigal aims to explicate and then reject certain arguments found in 
Book II of Aristotle‘s Politics (129). Following Aristotle, Madrigal defines government as a 
―form of participation‖ (quaedam communicatio; 129), in a close parallel to classical (and his 
own) conceptions of friendship. Because cities are the basic unit of classical politics, he almost 
immediately begins a lengthy digression about the founding of the first cities – a digression that 
relies heavily on literal (that is, historical) biblical exegesis. If we accept Cartagena‘s point that 
the court, and not the city, is the correct structural analytic for fifteenth-century Castile‘s 
predicament, Madrigal‘s approach seems hopelessly anachronistic. Where Cartagena has reduced 
the scope of politics from city to court, and from empire to kingdom, Madrigal returns the city to 
its place of honor and analyzes it in the context of universal history. Madrigal‘s reasons become 
clearer, however, when we take into account his understanding of united effort as the basis of 
civil concord: his exegesis in De optima politia focuses on the Babel episode as the paradigmatic 
collective work. 
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 Madrigal has indeed been praised for his proto-democratic tendencies as a conciliarist; see, for example, Castillo 
Vegas 19-20. 
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 For an overview of Madrigal‘s repetitions at Salamanca, see Carreras Artau. 
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In his analysis of the Babel episode, it also becomes clear that Madrigal accepts the 
reduced scope of worldly politics, while recognizing affect‘s crucial place therein. For Madrigal, 
what is at stake in the famous episode is not the confusion of languages; in fact, he concludes 
that this was ―most healthy‖ for the human race. Rather, Madrigal asks what the crime of Babel 
was, framing the question, perhaps ironically, as a dispute between the Hebrew and Latin 
versions of the episode. He begins by discussing the Tower‘s original purpose: 
The most true cause of this tower consisted, according to what is expressed in the text of 
chapter 11 of Genesis, in the fact that men, now multiplied, were thinking of spreading 
throughout the different parts of the world; in order that something great and admirable, 
made by the entire human race, would remain, they began to build that great tower and a 
greatly fortified city. And that intention seemed sufficiently honest, at least superficially, 
so that, supposing that men would later produce many works, at least none would be as 
excellent as the one that the entire human race had built together.
23
 (140-1; my 
emphasis) 
 
This ―superficially honest‖ intention is, according to Madrigal, the one expressed in the Vulgate, 
but it is here that the Hebrew text differs: 
The Hebrew texts presents itself in another way, that, let us make a name for ourselves, 
so that we will not be separated throughout the lands. Which certainly constitutes a very 
different claim, namely, that the men of that time wanted to live together, since they were 
relatives and loved each other because of their similarity as a species. (141) 
 
In the Hebrew version, the Tower was not to be a mere monument to human unity, but an actual 
beacon allowing the peoples of the Earth to reunite – a mechanism for literally achieving 
absolute human unity again at some future point (90). This is truly scandalous, justifying divine 
condemnation, and Madrigal therefore prefers the Hebrew text: 
In my opinion, the Hebrew text is more appropriate that ours. For, looking at our text, one 
cannot see the reasonable cause for which God should have been moved to act against 
those building such a tower. However, looking at the Hebrew text, which I have now 
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 For this and my other translations from De optima politia, I have consulted Nuria Belloso Martín‘s Castilian 
translation. 
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followed, God was appropriately moved to punish them by destroying their tower. For, if 
as they wanted, they had built such a high tower and a city where all people could live, 
God did not want that. For it would have caused many problems. It was even most 
healthy for the human race that the unity of language was destroyed there, which had 
existed since the beginning of the human race. (141) 
 
For Madrigal, then, nostalgia for human unity is divinely sanctioned; absolute human unity is 
divinely prohibited.
24
 Civil unity through friendship is the only practical political ideal, and it is 
not easily attained. In fact, the Siete partidas describe a kind of friendship particular to Spain: 
―Et aun hi ha otra manera de amistad, segunt la costumbre de España, que posieron 
antiguamiente los fijosdalgo entre sí, que se non deben deshonrar nin facer mal unos á otros‖ 
(IV.xxvii.4) ―And there is yet one more kind of friendship, according to Spanish custom, 
established long ago among the hidalgos, that they should not dishonor or harm each other.‖ By 
the fifteenth century, experience had placed the viability of this ―noble‖ ideal into great doubt, a 
fact to which Cartagena‘s letter, cited above, attests. 
 Perhaps it is for this reason that other fifteenth-century treatises subject friendship to 
other political ideals of psychological unity. Placed under the heading of loyalty, friendship is 
only one of the qualities according to which a community should be governed according to the 
Tratado de la comunidad; the others are justice, concord and unity, good advice, good customs, 
and ―ordenada e derecha entinçión‖ (87). Without the latter, the others are worthless: ―Las cosas 
susodichas non son bastantes a buen regimiento de la comunidat si las partidas de aquélla non 
tienen una mesma entinción‖ (90) ―The things said above are not enough for the good 
governance of the community if its parts do not share the same intention.‖ Intention is one of the 
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 The Babel episode in the Siete edades del mundo (ca. 1416-8), a universal history in verse by Pablo de Santa 
María (Alonso de Cartagena‘s father, a former chief rabbi of Burgos who converted to Christianity and became 
bishop of the same city), provides an interesting counterpoint to Madrigal‘s version. While Santa María is never 
explicit about the sin of Babel, it appears to be pride, and its punishment, the confusion of the languages, is central 
to the episode‘s narrative (Sconza 66-7, stanzas 53-7). For a recent study of Santa María‘s poem, see Szpiech. 
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key terms of Seneca‘s De beneficiis, indispensible for judging the virtue of a gift or favor.25 If 
Cicero‘s political works were sometimes taken to be moral treatises, the opposite is true in the 
case of Seneca, or ―nuestro Séneca,‖ as Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo, Juan II‘s secretary, called 
the Cordovan philosopher in the dedicatory epistle of his Suma de la política (31), a text to 
which I will return shortly. In the legendary versions of Seneca‘s life prominent in Iberia until 
the end of the Middle Ages, he is not a moralist – as he was generally considered to be in the 
West – but a political adviser (Blüher 82). Thus, De clementia was read as a mirror of princes, 
and De beneficiis as a ―treatise on the Liberalitas of kings‖ (Blüher 65; see also 102). In the early 
Middle Ages, Seneca‘s texts were not widely available in Iberia, but in the fifteenth century, 
Seneca becomes ―an author whose production is widely read and easily accessible not only in its 
original Latin text, but also in numerous translations‖ (Blüher 113) – some of them, as in the 
case of Cicero, carried out by Cartagena.
26
 
The Tratado‘s invocation of intention seems to indicate, then, that the king‘s generosity 
is at issue, as it is throughout, for example, the Secreto de los secretos, a mirror of princes guided 
by a taxonomy of royal generosity (71-2).
27
 It is royal mercy, however, that is most strongly 
recommended in the Tratado: 
El prínçipe deve ser misericordioso e begnino, que razonable cosa es quel padre de la 
tierra sea piadoso e begnino … Que el rey segunt umanidat non es mayor que aquél 
sobrel qual él quiere usar de poder absoluto o echar su saña; que los reyes e prínçipes son 
omnes e deven begninamente usar de su señorío sobre aquéllos que son de su natura. (91) 
 
The prince should be merciful and benign, for it is reasonable for the land‘s father to be 
pious and benign … For the king is not greater in humanity than him against whom [the 
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 See, for example, De beneficiis I.6.(1). 
26
 For a list of Iberian translations of Seneca from the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries, see Blüher 597-601. 
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 Translations of this text, thought to be Syrian in origin and to date from the eighth century, are to be found 
throughout medieval Iberia; the earliest is a Castilian translation, known as the Poridat de las poridades, from the 
thirteenth century, upon which Jaume I of Aragon drew heavily in the production of his own Llibre de saviesa/Llibre 
de doctrina (Secreto 2-6). There are also several Portuguese translations; this Castilian version, which is a 
translation of the longer ―Eastern‖ version of the text, dates from the late fourteenth century (Secreto 47).   
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king] wants to use absolute power and cast his anger; for kings and princes are men and 
should benignly use their lordship over those who are of the same nature. 
 
The appeal to shared humanity, a natural basis for mercy, is striking. It is paired, however, with a 
more traditional Stoic appeal to reason. The benignity that should exist between ruler and ruled 
is, in turn, paired with a loyalty that will also foster friendship (―amistad o bien querençia‖) 
among subjects (89). The anonymous author mentions that this political virtue was highly 
esteemed by classical thinkers (―los antiguos‖), but that it is also, sadly, hard to come by in the 
court: ―Que verdadero amor es en aquéllos que han verdadera caridat, que verdadera amistança 
apenas es fallada en aquéllos que están en grant onrra, e much[o] yerra el que busca amigo en la 
corte; porque cada uno de aquéllos siguen la corte más por provecho que por amor de otro, que 
cara cosa es amor‖ (115) ―For true love is in those who possess true charity, and true friendship 
is hardly found among those who enjoy great honor, and he who seeks a friend in the court is in 
great error; for they all follow the court more for their own benefit than for the love of another, 
since love is a costly thing.‖ Cartagena‘s diagnosis thus finds its echo in this political treatise. 
When the Tratado‘s author referred to classical thinkers who held mercy in high esteem, 
he was likely thinking of Seneca, who, like Cicero, deemed certain ―reasonable‖ affective 
phenomena to be virtues. Thus, in On Mercy (dedicated, ironically, to Nero), mercy represents 
both the central characteristic of good governance and also the most ―humane‖ virtue of man, ―a 
social animal born for the common good‖ (I.3.(2)). Pity, on the other hand, is a moral failing, 
irrational because it ignores causes: ―Pity looks at the plight, not at the cause of it. Mercy joins in 
with reason‖ (II.5.(1)). A wise man assists the community not out of pity, but out of the 
realization that he was born ―to … promote the common good‖ (II.6.(3)). 
 In what way is mercy reasonable, especially on the part of a ruler? Seneca answers this 
question with a metaphor that we have already encountered in both the Tratado de la comunidad 
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and the Siete partidas, and that will be variably interpreted throughout medieval Iberia (it will 
also be familiar to any modern student of politics, albeit perhaps from a different source). The 
ruler is conceived of as part of a civic body, construed alternately as its mind or head. In the first 
case, the relationship is one of command: 
Compare the way in which the body is entirely at the service of the mind. It may be ever 
so much larger and more impressive. The mind may remain hidden and tiny, its very 
location uncertain. Yet hands, feet and eyes do its business … In the same way, this vast 
multitude of men surrounds one man as though he were its mind, ruled by his spirit, 
guided by his reason; it would crush and shatter itself by its own strength, without the 
support of his discernment. (I.3.(5)) 
 
In the latter case, the relationship is one of mutual dependence: ―He [the ruler] needs the 
strength, and the commonwealth needs a head‖ (I.4.(3)). The case for mercy is clear: cutting off a 
limb (that is, a citizen) may sometimes be necessary, but it will (and should) always be painful. 
Or, in Seneca‘s words: ―You are sparing yourself, when you appear to spare another‖ (I.5.(1)). 
The metaphor of the ruler as mind or soul thus brings together two ethical controversies. The 
conflict between reason and the passions is definitively resolved in favor of reason, and the 
politics of fellow-feeling – whose potency was never denied by even the most rigid Stoic – are 
rescued through a figure of absolute psychological and physical unity. It is impossible – indeed, 
a categorical error – to distinguish between private and public virtue.28 
 This fusion of private and public was worked out in Iberian texts in terms of the 
relationship between ruler and subject. For example, Diego de Valera (1412-1488), a Castilian 
nobleman and tutor for the powerful Stúñiga family, wrote a series of texts intended for the 
                                                 
28
 Curiously, one of Seneca‘s strongest arguments for mercy comes toward the end of ―On Anger,‖ in the metaphor 
of the bull and the bear: ―We regularly see, in the morning show at the amphitheatre, the match between bull and 
bear tied together; when the one has worn down the other, the slaughterer awaits them both. Our act is the same; we 
assail an opponent who is tied to us, while the end, and that right early, looms alike over victor and vanquished‖ 
(III.43.(2)). Here, the previously important distinction between the human and the animal is overshadowed by the 
assertion of absolute human unity in death. What is left unclear is whether this ―tie‖ could bear a positive ethical 
program, or merely an ethics of, at best, tolerance, and at worst, indifference. 
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moral instruction of princes.
29
 His Doctrinal de príncipes (dedicated to Fernando el Católico and 
thus posterior to 1474) makes explicit reference to the Siete partidas passage describing the king 
as head, soul, and heart of the kingdom (174), and both the Doctrinal and the earlier Exortación 
de la pas (ca. 1448; see Penna, Prosistas CXXII) make use of the argument that the king‘s 
subjects, as members of the king‘s own body, should be treated mercifully (Doctrinal 187 and 
Exortación 82-3). In the Doctrinal, Valera praises Alfonso I of Asturias (693-757) for his 
vigorous Reconquest activity, only to note that the king received the nickname ―El Católico‖ for 
his ―merciful works‖ and ―humanity‖ (176). In this way, Valera links mercy with political 
rebirth, just as Cartagena traces the roots of Castilian discord to Alfonso I‘s father-in-law, 
Pelayo. Mercy begins to emerge as an antidote to Castile‘s fractious political culture. 
In his Suma de la política (ca. 1454-5), Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo notes that many 
books have been written about politics, ―en tal manera que fazen e constituyen una entera 
sciencia llamada política, avnque subalternada a la scientia moral‖ (32).30 He thus follows 
Aristotle rather than Cicero in asserting that the primary goal of civil society is to allow citizens 
to live virtuously, not to protect their property (109). The preeminence of the moral is also 
reaffirmed when Sánchez de Arévalo identifies the management of public affect through mutual 
love as the prince‘s key task: ―Primeramente, todo rey o príncipe deue amar sus súbditos, e, 
amándolos, fazer entre ellos gran vnjdad e paz e concordia, lo qual fará si procurare que entre 
ellos sea amjcicia uerdadera, lo qual el tirano no faze‖ (93) ―First, all kings and princes should 
love their subjects, and, loving them, foster among them great unity and peace and concord, 
which they will do if they promote true friendship among them, which a tyrant does not do.‖ The 
counterpart to the cultivation of friendship is the avoidance of conflict: ―E por quanto el principal 
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 For an analysis of a poem by Lope de Stúñiga, see chapter three. 
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 The Suma survives in a single manuscript held by the Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid (Ms. 1221). 
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jmpedimento que corrompe toda çibdad o república es la diuisión e jntestina discordia de los 
çibdadanos e súbditos, por ende es muy cumplidero a todo príncipe e buen político escusar las 
tales discordias e diuisiones, e trauajar porque la çibdad o reyno sea mucho vnida e concorde‖ 
(111) ―And to the extent that the principal impediment that corrupts any city or republic is 
division and internal discord among the citizens and subjects, it is therefore very appropriate for 
all princes and good politicians to avoid such discord and division, and to work so that the city or 
kingdom will be very united and harmonious.‖ 
Now, the principal cause of these divisions has already been identified as affective strife: 
―Onde si los çibdadanos en su çibdad han mengua e angustia de cosas delectables e solazes, 
necessario es que jnjurien a los otros uezinos de qujen temen auer tristezas e pesares‖ (57) 
―Where the citizens in their city suffer the lack and anxiety of delightful things and relaxation, it 
is necessary that they injure their other neighbors whom they fear as sources of sadness and 
sorrow.‖ Sánchez de Arévalo proposes public entertainment as a solution to this problem: the 
prince should hire ―maestros de prosas e famosos cantores para delectable armonja, e poetas e 
otros ministros, ordenando avn ciertas representaciones e juegos públicos en días sennalados 
para alegría e consolación de los abitantes en la tal çibdad‖ (58) ―masters of stories and famous 
singers for delightful harmony, and poets and other ministers, ordering certain public 
performances and games on certain days for the joy and consolation of the city‘s inhabitants.‖ 
These public poets will be, however, the emissaries of a hidden prince who loves his subjects 
from a safe distance: 
[T]odo rey e príncipe no ha de ser mucho familiar a las gentes, pero puesto que no se 
comunjque a todas las gentes, deue fazer los fechos de todos, onde dize el nuestro Séneca 
en el primero De Clemencia al emperador Nerón, que el rey es assí como el ánjma en el 
cuerpo vmano, a la qual todos los mjembros siruen e con gran lealtad la obedecen, puesto 
quel ánjma esté encerrada, e en lo oculto no cessan de la serujr e obedecer avnque la non 
uean nj la acaten nj sepan en dónde se asconde, e todos siempre, las manos e los pies, los 
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ojos e los otros mjembros, la siruen, e las cosas que ella manda en lo ascondido, ellos las 
cumplen el lo público. (94) 
 
Kings and princes should not be very familiar with their people, but although they should 
not communicate with all the people, they should do the tasks of all, whence our Seneca 
says in the first book of On Mercy to the emperor Nero, that the King is like the soul in 
the human body, served and obeyed by all the body‘s members with great loyalty, 
although the soul is enclosed, and while it is hidden they do not cease to serve and obey it 
although they neither see it nor observe it, nor do they know where it is hidden, and they 
all, the hands and feet, the eyes and other members, always serve it, and the things that it 
orders while hidden, they carry out in public. 
 
Sánchez de Arévalo cites Seneca as the source for his metaphor of the prince as the city‘s soul. 
We have seen, however, that for Seneca, this was a metaphor of the city‘s obedience; here, the 
central political advice is about the prince‘s public (or, rather, private) persona. Where other 
texts have stressed unity between ruler and subjects in matters of the soul – that is, in intention, 
will, sorrow, and joy, concepts whose psychological reality was often, although not always, 
located in the soul – the Suma de la política emphasizes the need for affective distance (―[T]odo 
rey e príncipe no ha de ser mucho familiar a las gentes‖). Royal authority is clandestine like that 
of the soul in the body, and this hiddenness is the basis for the virtues of loyalty and obedience. 
Public affective interactions are crucial to political unity, but they are also the immediate task of 
poets, not princes.
31
 
 
From Mercy to Compassion: the Epistemology of Monastic Community 
 
In his De optima politia, Alfonso de Madrigal proposes a civic ontology of stability – ―las 
ciudades y cualquier otra cosa, cuánto más se unen son más ser y más estables‖ (El gobierno 
ideal 142) – that leads him to favor monarchy, since a single ruler is more ―unified‖ (144). Like 
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 It should be noted that the Suma also contains a more traditional image of the ruler as the city‘s ―heart‖ (127). 
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an orator, this single legislator must consider the nature of his subjects while crafting laws: ― ―the 
legislator, in promulgating laws, has to consider, not only how to craft simply the best law, but 
the law most consonant with the concrete form of the government. For, perhaps, the people upon 
whom this law is imposed are imperfect and thus cannot bear a most perfect law‖ (145). This 
―most perfect law‖ would be monastic law, but asking citizens to conform to a monastic rule 
would be politically untenable: 
Given that the best form of government is that which greatly discourages evil and incites 
and inspires virtue above all, and given that there exists no law or constitution better for 
this purpose than the monastic rules in which each offers a vow of obedience, chastity, 
and poverty, whosoever wishes to provide a political regime with the best laws should 
impose those of the monks. But, who could think of something more foolish than such a 
politics? God, in imposing imperfect laws upon the Hebrews, did not give them the best 
law, but one that contained some deficiencies in relation to the perfect law. And this was 
nevertheless the most appropriate law for that people. (145) 
 
It has been remarked that Madrigal the exegete focused maniacally on literal interpretation 
(Belloso Martín 38). We have already seen this tendency in his solution to the riddle of Babel; 
here, the ruler as legislative rhetorician is put in the place of God, crafting Scripture. The idea 
that Scripture‘s obscurity is a reflection of humanity‘s fallen nature has been called, by Catherine 
Brown, ―mimetic Scripture‖: 
Scripture seems dark, then, not because it is so different from human thinking but 
because it is such a precise imitation of it … Mimetic Scripture thus fits both mind and 
world, and by doing so, assures a mysteriously adequate match between word, audience, 
and teaching. A fit as perfectly matched to the human condition as that of the incarnate 
Christ, ―who saw fit to make himself congruous with such infirmity as ours‖ ... becoming 
for humanity both flesh and book. (24; the quotation is from Augustine‘s On Christian 
Doctrine) 
 
Just as exegesis is not an everyday activity, monastic life is not, for Madrigal, a practical model 
for civil life. Rulers who seek to achieve peace and concord through communication must foster, 
first and foremost, common works. However, in comparing the ruler-as-lawgiver to God, who 
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fits His laws to his people, Madrigal unintentionally suggests Christ as a model for political 
thinkers. Monastic thinkers from the Desert Fathers to the Cistercians, taking Christ‘s 
compassion as their starting point, developed an epistemology of compassion that grounded their 
communal and moral life, and this tradition is crucial for understanding emerging trends of 
communitarian thought in fifteenth-century Iberian literature. 
It is important to keep in mind that throughout this period, ―political science‖ was still 
dominated by elements of theology and law (Penna xxxvi). Many of Castile‘s principal political 
theorists, as we have already seen, were ecclesiastics or held chairs of theology. Furthermore, 
although the well-known concept of Sacred Monarchy was not dominant in Iberia – in Teófilo F. 
Ruiz‘s pithy phrase, ―Those who ruled and those who wanted to rule had, more often than not, 
one body instead of two‖ (―Unsacred Monarchy‖ 131) – the Trastámaran dynasty was deeply 
involved in ecclesiastical politics, and its kings did not shy away from promoting themselves 
through religious imagery.
32
 The most common form of royal portrait during the Trastámaran 
reign was that of the ―rey orante,‖ and liturgical ceremonies played a much wider role in 
Trastámaran propaganda than they had in that of previous dynasties (Nieto Soria, ―Rey oculto‖ 
18, 22). Private devotion was also a political matter; thus, the royal confessor played an 
increasingly important role in the Castilian court, and was often a key liaison between the Crown 
and the confessor‘s monastic order (Nieto Soria, Iglesia y genesis 141). The Franciscans were 
particularly involved in Castilian political culture, to the extent that Álvaro de Luna was buried 
in a Franciscan monastery (Nieto Soria, Iglesia y génesis 245). Although it initially faced 
resistance from the Galician pactual monastic tradition, broadly speaking, from the thirteenth 
century on, Benedictine monasticism in its various forms was dominant in Iberia (Bishko 41). It 
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 For an overview of ecclesiastical involvement in fifteenth-century Castilian politics, see Nieto Soria, Iglesia y 
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is worthwhile, then, to examine briefly the intellectual heritage of this tradition as it relates to 
ideas of mercy and compassion, which necessarily shaped the Iberian inheritance of Stoic ideas 
about the same concepts. 
Early Christian thinkers took many cues from the Stoics, particular in their identification 
of affect as the central problem of ethics and theological virtue. At the same time, their 
commitment to caritas and compassion as elements of Christian dogma changed their ethical 
approach to questions of affect; thus, Thomas Dixon has written of a ―Christian desire to say 
both – against the Stoics – that some human feeling or affection is proper and necessary to this 
life, but also that God, the angels and perfected humans are free from the turmoil and 
perturbations of sin and the passions‖ (61). The emotion of pity was one of the key pivots of 
these changes, as these thinkers revised Stoic ideas about pity (some of which were discussed 
above) in order ―to avoid a disastrous scenario in which pity‘s moral intelligence degenerated 
into a fallacious logic of justice unbecoming of the gospel‘s injunctions of undiscriminating love 
of neighbor‖ (Blowers 8). In this revision, ―the higher goal was the christocentric reconstruction 
of pity and empathetic mercy as theologically virtuous emotions, deifying emotions‖ (Blowers 
27; emphasis in original). In other words, Christ himself and Christ‘s Passion became the models 
for the rehabilitation of pity as compassion. As the Middle Ages progressed, the ascent implied 
by this ―deification‖ took on increasingly epistemological tones, as compassion became not just 
an ethical obligation but a tool for exegesis and the rhetorical composition of prayer in monastic 
settings.  
Early Christian monastics sought impassibility, their own apatheia, but they did so in 
communities. Through an examination of how they codified the emotions, or ―thoughts,‖ as 
deadly sins, it will become clear how compassion and empathy became central concerns of 
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hermeneutics, which itself took on increasingly rhetorical characteristics as the Middle Ages 
progressed. The use of ―thoughts‖ for what we would call ―emotions‖ is telling here. Ultimately, 
the Desert Fathers and their medieval followers bent the cognitive elements of emotion toward 
the pursuit of divine knowledge through affective prayer and contemplation. It should be 
remembered, of course, that as this transformation took place, affect never lost its preeminent 
role in theories of vice and virtue. 
It was Evagrius of Pontus (ca. 345-399 CE), an early Desert Father from the town of 
Ibora in Helenopontus, who first identified ―eight thoughts‖ that troubled monks: gluttony, 
fornication, avarice, sadness, anger, acedia, vainglory, and pride.
33
 The model of how these 
thoughts overcome a monk in his ―Treatise on the Practical Life‖ owed much to Stoic theories 
that emphasized assent or decision: ―Whether or not all these thoughts trouble the soul is not 
within our power; but it is for us to decide if they are to linger within us or not and whether or 
not they stir up the passions‖ (97-98).34 Evagrius also accepted Plato‘s tripartite division of the 
soul, arguing that the practical life purified its two passionate parts (110). Thus, in its early 
forms, monastic thought internalized both Platonic and Stoic models of soul and emotion, 
seeking, through a shared holy life, an ―impassible‖ tranquility from which to practice divine 
contemplation.
35
 
At the same time, affect played an increasingly important role in monastic prayer. In his 
Conferences, one of the most important texts of the early monastic tradition, John Cassian (ca. 
360-ca. 430 CE) adopts Evagrius‘s ideas on the ―thoughts‖ and assent (1.17.1), but he also 
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 On Evagrius‘s life and thought in general, see Sinkewicz xvii-xl. These eight thoughts, reduced to seven and 
lightly modified, would eventually be codified by Gregory the Great as the Seven Deadly Sins (Knuuttila 141-2). 
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 Richard Sorabji has noted the similarity between Evagrius‘s doctrine and the Stoic doctrine of unavoidable ―first 
movements‖ that become emotions only with reason‘s assent (359-60). 
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 As Geoffrey Galt Harpham has noted, early cenobites were well aware that they could not achieve divine 
impassibility, and so the ascetic practices meant to facilitate divine contemplation constituted ―a quest for a goal that 
cannot and must not be reached, a quest with a sharp caveat: ‗seek but do not find‘‖ (43). In this way, they are 
similar to the courtly lover‘s erotic quest, whose unfulfillment, as I argue above, is its condition of lyric possibility.  
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consistently associates prayer with the tears provoked by a feeling of compunction, saving 
sorrow. Forced tears are discouraged because, like Evagrius‘s demonic thoughts, they ―drag 
down the mind of the person praying, to lower it, submerge it in human concerns, and displace it 
from that heavenly height whereon the awed mind of the one praying should be irremovably 
stationed‖ (9.30.1-2), and the sources of compunction are many and varied, but the power of 
compunction to move the heart to prayer (and thereby to contemplation) is not condemned as 
necessarily contaminated with sinful passions or carnal desires. 
Cassian goes farther in carving out a productive role for affective participation in his 
recommendation of contemplating and memorizing the Psalms. Repetition of the Psalms leads to 
identification with the prophet, and an initial feeling that the repeated words are ―daily borne out 
and fulfilled in [the monk]‖ (10.11.4). This phenomenon is developed into a broader paradigm of 
empathetic hermeneutics: 
Thriving on the pasturage that [the Psalms] always offer and taking into himself all the 
dispositions of the psalms, [the monk] will begin to repeat them and to treat them in his 
profound compunction of heart not as if they were composed by the prophet but as if they 
were his own utterances and his own prayer. (10.11.4) 
 
Interpretation and composition are melded here in a process parallel to the empathetic melding of 
prophet and monk through compunction.
36
 Eventually, ―experience‖ becomes the monk‘s guide 
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 Knuuttila has noted a similarity here to Schleiermacher‘s hermeneutics (150), although one of the German 
theologian‘s recent editors has rejected this ―empathetic‖ reading (Bowie xxix). Schleiermacher held that every 
utterance must be understood as both ―derived from language‖ and ―a fact in the thinker‖ (8). The first 
understanding leads to ―grammatical interpretation,‖ whereas in ―psychological interpretation,‖ ―every utterance is 
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utterances better than their original speakers did (23). But Schleiermacher‘s method proceeds through critical self-
abnegation: ―To the extent, therefore, that one wants to understand completely one should free oneself from the 
relation of what is to be explicated to one‘s own thoughts, because this relationship precisely does not at all have the 
intention of understanding, but instead of using as a means that which in the thought of the other relates to one‘s 
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to the meaning of the Biblical text: ―When we have the same disposition in our heart with which 
each psalm was sung or written down, then we shall become like its author, grasping its 
significance beforehand rather than afterward‖ (10.11.5). This passage‘s move from audience 
and interpreter to author suggests the close relationship that will develop between rhetoric and 
hermeneutics in the later Middle Ages, and it is no coincidence that affect serves as their 
articulation, allowing for the temporal jump to the moment before meaning is enunciated. This is 
crucial not only for scriptural interpretation but, as Cassian suggests, for the broader project of 
communal pedagogy represented by the monastic movement. The experience of shared affect is 
the best hermeneutic for grasping ―the very nature of things‖ – worldly and divine. 
 Two important phenomena are forming here. The first involves the status of praxis in the 
―hermeneutic spiral,‖ in which, as Douglas Burton-Christie has argued, ―interpretation both 
derived from and led toward praxis‖ (165). In the desert, ―Scripture was seen as the source of 
praxis; praxis acted as an organizing principle which sent one to search for particular texts; these 
texts in turn deepened and purified praxis and clarified its purpose and meaning‖ (171-2). This 
belief led to a kind of experiential hermeneutics of personification: ―The ultimate expression of 
the desert hermeneutic was a person, one who embodied the sacred texts and who drew others 
out of themselves into a world of infinite possibilities‖ (300; emphasis in original). This 
hermeneutics, in turn, leads Cassian to emphasize judgment and community in discussing 
discretion, which is achieved through humility, submission to the elders‘ exemplarity. Those 
who lack discretion trust disastrously in their own judgment: ―Whoever lives not by his own 
judgment but by the example of our forebears shall never be deceived, nor shall the crafty foe be 
able to take advantage of the ignorance of a person who does not know how to hide all the 
                                                                                                                                                             
own thoughts‖ (135). Cassian‘s empathetic monk does not vanish in becoming prophet; rather, we could say in 
Senecan terms that the monk‘s mind becomes the prophet‘s affection. 
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thoughts coming to birth in his heart‖ (2.10.2). Those seeking to avoid temptation consulted 
exemplary figures in hopes of receiving a ―word,‖ such that ―[t]he words of elders and of 
Scripture constituted a double tradition of authority for those living in the desert‖ (Burton-
Christie 110). This lays bare how at least one form of ―authority‖ implied the necessity of 
community for interpretation; communal experience and example are the best hermeneutic for 
the sinful temptation of the affective thoughts whose source, more often than not, is demonic.
37
 
The outcome of willful individual affect is misinterpretation. Courtly authors in fifteenth-century 
Iberia will become conscious of themselves as members of an affective interpretive community, 
and their moral literature will reflect this consciousness. 
The affective rhetoric of this courtly literature will reflect a second important 
phenomenon involving the productivity of affect (compunction) for both interpretation and what 
Mary Carruthers has called the ―craft of thought.‖ Carruthers takes as her starting point the 
Desert Fathers‘ concept of mneme theou, ―memory of God‖ (2), noting further, however, that for 
the Desert Fathers, ―memory‖ means something closer to ―cognition,‖ ―the construction of 
thinking,‖ such that ―[m]onastic meditation is the craft of making thoughts about God‖ (2). It 
was for this reason that monastic rhetoric emphasized ―invention‖ and was thus ―practiced 
primarily as a craft of composition‖ (3) whose main material was phantasiai, mental images that 
were ―emotionally laden‖ (14). Contemplation based on these images is thus tied, through affect, 
to rhetoric‘s productive inventio and to its central place in practical wisdom: ―The matters 
memory presents are used to persuade and motivate, to create emotion and stir the will … 
Though it is certainly a form of knowing, recollecting is also a matter of will, of being moved, 
pre-eminently a moral activity rather than what we think of as intellectual or rational‖ (67-68). 
As Carruthers later notes, the compunction provoked by this process was both ―the beginning of 
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 Mary Carruthers has noted the intensely rhetorical nature of this model of sin (107-8). 
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prayer‖ (96) – as a process of rhetorical invention – and an essential element of monastic reading 
practices (100). The productive space carved out for compunction by the Desert Fathers thus 
brought rhetoric and hermeneutics into very close contact, and this space of contact was morally 
charged through concepts of praxis, example, and sin.
38
 
It was Augustine who, entering into this morally charged space, began to develop an 
epistemology of compassion. In the final and most openly rhetorical book of On Christian 
Doctrine, Augustine takes a scriptural approach, adopting Cicero‘s doctrine of teaching, giving 
pleasure, and moving audiences (4.17.34) and illustrating it through examples from the gospels.
39
 
This last method, when used by a teacher, leads to a collapse of speaker and audience, teacher 
and learner similar to that described by Cassian for monks reading the Psalms: ―For so great is 
the power of sympathy, that when people are affected by us as we speak and we by them as they 
learn, we dwell each in the other and thus both they, as it were, speak in us what they hear, while 
we, after a fashion, learn in them what we teach‖ (First Catechetical Instruction 12.17). These 
models of reading and preaching illustrate how, as Copeland has written, ―medieval exegesis 
replicates rhetoric‘s productive application to discourse‖ (64). Compassion, a step in the 
individual ascent toward divine knowledge through correct interpretation, becomes a 
pedagogical tool for the preacher, who is also, through the practice of charity, purifying his own 
will. 
Christ‘s example is pivotal in this pedagogical approach since exegetical mysteries can be 
explained as the result of concessions to our human condition, concessions that were also 
reflected in the Incarnation (Brown 24). In later monastic thought, then, Christ-like purification 
through compassion becomes an explicit epistemological model. This is especially true in 
                                                 
38
 It should also be notified that the medieval theory of the four levels of meaning ―received its definitive 
formulation‖ from Cassian (Grondin 31). 
39
 This doctrine is also taken up by Isidore in his Etymologies (II.xvi). 
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Bernard of Clairvaux‘s ―On the Steps of Humility and Pride‖ (ca. 1124), which takes as its 
starting point Benedict‘s chapter on humility. Here, Bernard elaborates a three-step approach to 
Truth through humility: ―For we seek truth in ourselves, in our neighbors, and for its own sake ... 
We seek it in ourselves in judging ourselves (1 Cor 11:31), in our neighbors by suffering with 
them (1 Cor 12:26), and in itself by contemplating it with a pure heart (Mt 5:8)‖ (III.6). Bernard 
echoes Augustine when he writes that the merciful will have ―hearts purified by brotherly love‖ 
(III.6). Experience again plays a crucial role in this compassionate ascent, with Christ‘s Passion 
as a key example: 
But to have a heart which is sad because of someone else‘s wretchedness you must first 
recognize your neighbor‘s mind in your own and understand from your own experience 
how you can help him. We have an example in our Savior. He wanted to suffer so that he 
should know how to suffer with us (Heb 2:17), to become wretched so that he could learn 
mercy, as it is written, ―He learned obedience from the things he suffered‖ (Heb 5:8). He 
learned mercy in the same way. It is not that he did not know how to be merciful before. 
His mercy is from everlasting to everlasting (Ps 102:17). But what he knew by nature 
from eternity he learned from experience in time. (III.6) 
 
Christ‘s entrance into time was the scandal of early Christianity (Cullmann 24), and here, 
Bernard makes the potentially scandalous claim that Christ learned something – mercy – during 
his time as a man. Conversely, mercy becomes here an explicitly ―deifying‖ emotion, as we 
emulate Christ‘s example and, in doing so, make contemplative progress. Christ‘s suffering also 
raises the question, alluded to by Blowers above, of divine impassibility: 
I do not doubt that [God] was impassible before he emptied himself and took the form of 
a servant (Phil 2:7), for just as he had not experienced wretchedness and subjection, so he 
had not known mercy or obedience by experience. He knew by nature, but not by 
experience ... He lowered himself to that form in which he could suffer and be in 
subjection, for, as it is said, what he could not suffer in his divine nature he learned by the 
experience of suffering: mercy, and to be obedient in subjection ... Yet by that experience 
there grew, as I have said, not his knowledge but our faith, when by this wretched mode 
of knowledge he who had gone far astray brought himself near to us (Eph 2:13). When 
should we have dared to approach him if he had remained impassible? ... But now, with 
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the Apostle‘s encouragement, we are urged to come in faith to the throne of his grace 
(Heb 4:16), for, as it is written elsewhere, we know that he bore our weariness and grief 
(Is 53:4), and we can be sure he will have compassion on us because he has suffered 
himself (Heb 2:18, 4:15). (III.9) 
 
Bernard answers the objection that the impassible divine cannot truly suffer by attributing to the 
incarnate Christ a similar rhetorical motive to the one that accounts for mysterious scriptural 
passages: 
He did not intend to remain wretched among them, but to free those who were wretched 
as one made merciful. ―Made merciful‖ (Heb 2:17), I say, not with that mercy which he 
who remained happy had had from eternity (Ps 102:17), but with that mercy which he 
discovered as a mediator who was one of us. The work of his holiness, which began at 
the prompting of the first mercy, was completed in the second; not because the first 
mercy was not enough, but because only the second kind could fully satisfy us. Both 
were needed, but the second kind fitted our condition better. (III.12) 
 
The Incarnation becomes here a kind of divine kairos: Christ‘s suffering is fitted to our 
condition, not God‘s, and therefore it is our faith, not Christ‘s knowledge, that it feeds. Not just 
our faith, however – our knowledge, as well. Bernard admonishes his audience that if they are 
not merciful, neither will they be good teachers (IV.13). Mercy is a pedagogical and pastoral 
necessity. 
 Mercy remains, however, key to spiritual ascent as well. Bernard analyzes the three steps 
of the ascent (humility, compassion, and contemplation) to the Persons of the Trinity, and 
explains that the first step is achieved through reason, the second through affection, and the third 
through purity (VI.19). Through this epistemological model based on compassion, Bernard 
resolves the conflict of reason and the passions. The Son empowers our reason, whose judgment 
makes us humble; the Holy Spirit empowers our compassion, which purifies the will. The Father 
then gathers this soul purified in reason and will to himself, allowing for divine contemplation 
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(VII.21). Affective participation, possible everywhere but fostered in monastic communities as a 
devotional practice, fosters both individual virtue and divine wisdom. 
The concepts of affective participation developed in monastic thought left an impression 
on fifteenth-century Iberian conceptions of political community. Alfonso de Madrigal, for 
example, defines love of one‘s ―tierra natural‖ as piety, following a common definition 
according to which piety is the virtue directed toward those on whom we depend: our country, 
our parents, God (Belloso Martín 111). For Alonso de Cartagena, in his Oracional (ca. 1454), 
ostensibly a work of private, intimate devotion, our dependence on God can also be conceived of 
as a kind of friendship, based as it is on a kind of communication: 
[La] propia amistad ... es quando el uno ama al otro e el otro a el; e este comun amor 
proçede de la comunicaçion que han los omnes en uno. E commo del onbre a Dios aya 
alguna comunicaçion segund que El por su infinida clemençia comunica con nos su 
bienaventurança, convenible cosa es que commo sobre la comunicaçion de los omnes 
unos con otros se funda la amistad humana. E asi sobre la comunicaçion que es de Dios a 
los omnes desçiende alguna amistad mas alta. E esta es la caridat que es aquel amor e 
amistad que es del omne a Dios e de Dios al omne. (58) 
 
Proper friendship … is when each loves the other; and this common love procedes from 
the communication that the men have as one. And since between man and God there is 
some communication according to which He in his infinite mercy communicates with us 
his grace, it is an appropriate thing that human friendship be founded upon 
communication among men. And thus from the communication between God and man a 
certain higher friendship is derived. And this is charity which is that love and friendship 
that is between man and God and God and man. 
 
Here, human communication leads to the ―common love‖ of friendship, whereas divine 
communication (that is, prayer) leads to friendship as caritas. This charity is itself based on 
divine mercy (―clemençia‖). Later in the Oracional, Cartagena will insist that charity cannot be 
the basis of political community, precisely because we are commanded to feel charity toward all 
of humanity (86). Piety, on the other hand, is linked inextricably with patria: 
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[L]a virtud que se llama piedad estrechamente tomada consiste en fazer honrra e ayuda 
razonable a los padres e a otros asçendientes e parientes segund su grado e proporçion e a 
la tierra de su naturaleza e a los çibdadanos [e amigos] della. E aun podemos esto 
considerar acatando el vocablo que lo paresçe mostrar. Ca dezimos piedat commo sy 
dixiesemos patriedat que es por respecto a los padres e patria e non enbarga a esto que 
comunmente dezimos piedad a la conpasion. Ca esto es generalmente fablando e aun 
respectivamente a debdo e parentesco alguno porque entre todos los omnes se puede 
dezir que ay algund debdo. (86) 
 
The virtue that is called piety taken narrowly consists in giving honor and reasonable help 
to our parents and other ancestors and relatives according to their degree and proportion 
and to our native land and its citizens. And we can even consider this by observing the 
word that seems to show it. For we say piety as if we said patrimony, which has to do 
with parents and the fatherland [patria], and this does not prevent us from commonly 
referring to compassion as pity [piedad]. For this is a general way of speaking, and [can 
even be said] with regard to some debt and relationship because there can be said to be 
some debt among all men. 
 
The semantic link between piedad and compasión is not coincidental and does not contradict that 
between piedad and patria.
40
 Rather, Cartagena argues that usage here reflects the debt men feel 
toward one another, which, although Cartagena describes it as ―general,‖ is immediately 
contrasted with truly universal charity, since we feel the ―debt‖ of compassion more acutely 
toward those who are in some way closer to us (86). Cartagena thus goes further than Madrigal 
in his assessment of the political potential of essentially religious virtues. His clemençia, like 
Seneca‘s, can be a civic virtue, but unlike Seneca‘s, is a cosmological fact. Divine mercy was not 
limited to monastics, so its potential as a model for unity through communication and friendship 
extended to political communities.  
 Concepts of affective community were thus dominant terms in the political 
thought of Castile in the first half of the fifteenth century. Political theory was subjected to moral 
                                                 
40
 As José Antonio Maravall has noted, in the Middle Ages, patria was often used to refer to all of humanity, 
whereas nación almost always implied some form of plurality (1: 459). Cartagena‘s use is odd, then, in that the 
association of patria with piedad implies plurality in the latter term‘s contrast with caridad. As Maravall goes on to 
note, the universalist understanding of patria would eventually give way as a new association between patria and 
príncipe consolidated itself (1: 462). 
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thought, and as such, a certain Stoic affective asceticism was present in discussions of political 
virtue. At the same time, Stoic concessions to virtues such as mercy were not preserved in their 
purely rationalist forms; Christian valorations of mercy and love as deifying emotions were 
creeping into political thought as well. However, Iberia‘s courtly writers, having embraced a 
tradition of shared literary affect, would go further than the foregoing thinkers in rehabilitating 
shared affect as a political force as well, undoing the traditional opposition, still frequent even in 
monastic thought, between reason and the passions. Before addressing two attempted resolutions 
of this moral-political problem, however, I want to show how one writer, Pedro de Corral, in his 
Crónica sarracina, pointed to shared affect as a solution to Castile‘s political turmoil even as he 
narrated, in pseudo-historical prose, the danger that private affect could pose to national unity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
RITUAL MOURNING AND NATIONAL NOSTALGIA IN PEDRO DE CORRAL‘S 
CRÓNICA SARRACINA 
 
 
Muerto es el que todo su cuydado es dolerse de los muertos. 
– Enrique de Villena, Tratado de la consolación  
 
 
From the outset, the questionable historicity and generic ambiguity of the Crónica 
sarracina have provoked wildly different readings.
1
 While some authors considered it a reliable 
historical source, Fernán Pérez de Guzmán referred to it as a ―trufa o mentira paladina‖ and to its 
author as a ―liviano e presuntuoso onbre‖ (60). The problem of historicity also framed early-
twentieth-century philological debate, but focus soon shifted from condemnations of Corral‘s 
overactive imagination to the exploration of his historiographical intentions. In particular, critics 
analyzed Corral‘s treatment of what Ramón Menéndez Pidal referred to as ―the old theme of the 
Goths‘ fierce blood‖ (Floresta XCVII).2 Corral was embellishing and thus breathing new life 
into the myth of continuity between the last Visigothic king and Pelayo, legendary beginner of 
the Reconquest, a myth that began in tenth-century Asturias and gained steam in the 
historiographical work of Lucas de Tuy and Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada (Cacho Blecua 44).
3
 
Critics working in this vein began to study the literary invention underlying the historiographic 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version of this chapter appeared as ―Ritual Mourning and National Nostalgia in the Crónica sarracina‖ 
in La corónica 37.2 (2009): 107-32. I am grateful to La corónica‘s editor, Sol Miguel-Prendes, for granting 
permission to include this chapter here. 
2
 Menéndez Pidal‘s text includes an indispensable detailed summary of the development of the Rodrigo legend in 
the chronistic tradition. For a briefer summary, see Menéndez Pidal, Romanceros 3-12. 
3
 For the continuity between Rodrigo and Pelayo as a narrative construct, see Pardo 21. 
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project.
4
 At the same time, another avenue of research was opened up, as critics, sometimes the 
same ones, began studying not the divisions the Crónica provoked, but those it embodied. In 
particular, work continues to be done on the text‘s interweaving of history, hagiography, epic, 
and chivalric fiction.
5
 The Crónica‘s generic complexity makes its presence known even in 
studies of which it is not the explicit object.
6
 
A number of scholars have noted in passing the Crónica‘s sense of nostalgia, tragedy, or 
loss. In his account of the Visigothic empire in Iberia, Corral projects the unity he desires for the 
present into a distant past – a clear case of national nostalgia in a period in which the project of 
the Reconquest has been interrupted by civil wars between the nobility and a distracted king, 
Juan II.
7
 Corral seeks to compress historical distance through a series of structural tactics in the 
narrative, such as the framing mentioned above. Thus, Menéndez Pidal argued that by tying 
together the deeds of Rodrigo and Pelayo, Corral ―gave his novel national value and tragic 
greatness‖ (Floresta XCIII). The work‘s historiographical compression is hortatory in that it 
seeks to stir up a more unified national feeling, but it also raises the problem of Rodrigo‘s guilt 
in the fall of ―Spain‖ to the Moors. How, in other words, can the perceived unity of the 
Visigothic past be reappropriated without the present‘s falling victim to the taint of Rodrigo‘s 
sins? It is in this context that scholarly attention has constantly returned to the scenes of 
Rodrigo‘s sin and redemption, but this focus has, in turn, led to a broad disregard for the 
chivalric action that makes up the bulk of the narrative. However, an analysis of the work‘s 
almost unending battles and jousts reveals the centrality of the theme of mourning – in both its 
                                                 
4
 In addition to Cacho Blecua, see Lauzardo 106-11. 
5
 See, for example, Drayson 194. 
6
 Thus, Israel Burshatin‘s important essay, ―The Moor in the Text: Metaphor, Emblem, and Silence,‖ takes into 
account problems of ―chivalric, epic, and courtly‖ configurations of time and space, and of Rodrigo‘s failure as an 
interpreter of emblems (see, in particular, 104-109). 
7
 For an account of the stagnant state of the Reconquest during Corral‘s time, see O‘Callaghan 213. 
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ritualistic and affective manifestations – to Corral‘s literary-national project; it is also a focal 
point around which the Crónica‘s different genres revolve. Mourning is an integral structural 
element of Corral‘s battle narrations, coming up again and again, almost compulsively, in 
innumerable plantos throughout the text. At the same time, it explains the early emphasis on 
Rodrigo‘s siege of Córdoba and the anachronistic placement of Rodrigo‘s penitence and burial 
only after the narration of Pelayo‘s early triumphs. In composing his Crónica, Corral sought, 
through a ritualistic narrative of mourning, to explore grief as a social rather than personal 
phenomenon with the potential either to divide or to unite the populace. At the same time, by 
exploiting the communal elements surrounding penitence and burial during his era, he sought to 
rescue Rodrigo from historical condemnation in order to render reappropriable the cultural unity 
represented by the last Visigothic king. 
 
Mourning as a Source of Division and Unity 
  
The Crónica, when it is familiar to modern readers, is known mostly through a handful of 
famous scenes, such as Rodrigo‘s violation of the Tower of Hercules and his rape of La Cava, 
daughter of the traitorous Count Julián. The Tower scene has been studied in light of its probable 
Eastern origin and its similarity, as a ―sealed shrine,‖ to certain typical elements of hagiographic 
narrative (Burshatin, ―Narratives‖ 16-7), while La Cava has been of interest because the 
ambiguity of her guilt (she is ―both victim and victimizer‖) raises important questions about the 
writing of history (Brownlee 126). Almost exclusive attention to these few scenes is not a purely 
modern phenomenon; they are the scenes that captured the popular imagination even at the time, 
a fact reflected in their overwhelming prominence in the romancero tradition. The Crónica‘s 
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final act, Rodrigo‘s penitence, in which La Cava reappears in the form of a demonic temptation, 
was also important romancero material, and it has drawn increasing critical attention, most 
notably in Drayson‘s 2005 article, in which she argues that the scene‘s sensuality intentionally 
undermines its ostensible Christian didacticism.
8
 
It is interesting to note, then, that the so-called popular tradition – and the critical 
tradition after it, with the important exception of Gloria Álvarez-Hesse
9
 – for the most part left 
behind the most classically popular element of the text, the chivalric action that makes up its 
bulk.
10
 Mourning is fundamental to the Crónica‘s opening episode, in which the nobles of 
Córdoba oppose Rodrigo‘s coronation on the grounds that he was only supposed to be regent 
while the sons of the fictitious king Acosta grew up. Inés de la Flor Cramer points out that the 
emphasis on this episode is new in the history of Rodrigo‘s legend; for her, this new emphasis is 
possibly meant to show the harmful effects of partisan conflict on a nation (70). Also, Álvarez-
Hesse has argued that Rodrigo‘s coronation reveals his arrogance, ―the first failing of the king‘s 
chivalric spirit‖ (85). What is most startling about this episode, however, is its sheer number of 
apostrophic plantos, which inaugurate the affective frame that is fundamental to the entire work. 
An example of these plantos, in this case in the mouths of the ―dueñas e donzellas‖ of Córdoba, 
can be found in chapter fifteen: 
— ¡Ay Señor Dios!, ¿cómo te plaze que la tierra se yerme de la noble gente que la 
honrava e sostenía en aquella honra que merescía?, que ya son muertos en estas batallas 
más de doze mil cavalleros, tales que si el mundo todo fuese perescido por ellos se 
cobraría; e ora se pierde la flor del mundo ...  
                                                 
8
 For an early assertion of the importance of the Crónica‘s penitential theme, see Satorre Grau 169. 
9
 Álvarez-Hesse‘s study carefully traces the presence of chivalric themes and topoi, such as courtly love and the 
joust, in the Crónica; the text‘s chivalric philosophy is also analyzed as exemplified by a series of antithetical 
characters. 
10
 Satorre Grau emphasizes the importance of the scenes of the Tower and La Cava, despite their relative brevity: 
―They are not important for their length. On the contrary, there are briefly developed plots (Tower of Hercules: two 
chapters; amores of the King and La Cava: eighteen very short chapters), whose significance in the whole is much 
greater than that of other longer plots‖ (169). 
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 E dezían otros: 
 — ¡O España!, ¡cómo te vas apocando de los buenos que en ti avía!, ca si esta 
plaga mucho te dura no quedarán otras gentes sino los labradores e gentes viles por donde 
gentileza perescerá. E creemos que apenas se fallará bondat ninguna entre las gentes que 
quedarán, pues que de cada día fallescen del señorío los fijos dalgo que todavía la tierra 
sostovieron en grande honra. 
 E las donzellas dezían: 
 — ¡Ay mezquinas!, e ¿qué será de nosotras?, que ora por fuerça, ora por grado, 
avremos de entrar en religión e ser de orden, pues la tierra se despuebla de la noble gente, 
e Dios nunca quiera que nosotras vengamos en poder de las gentes pastoras e nescias por 
que nos señoreen. (1: 132-3) 
 
— O Lord! How can it please you that the land grown barren of the noble people 
who honored it and maintained it in the honor it deserved? For already these battles have 
killed more than twelve thousand knights, so worthy that if the entire world perished, for 
them it could be regained; and now the flower of the world is lost … 
And others said: 
 — O Spain! How you are losing the good men you once possessed! For if this 
plague lasts for long, none will remain but laborers and vulgar people, and gentility will 
perish. And we believe that goodness will barely be found among the remaining people, 
since every day more of the noblemen who maintained the honor of the land are lost. 
And the maidens said: 
— O unfortunate! And what will become of us? For either by force or willingly, 
we will have to enter orders and become nuns, since the land is emptying of noble people, 
and may God never wish that we fall into the hands of the foolish rural folk so that they 
rule over us. 
 
The apostrophic objects are god, Spain, and the women themselves (―ay mezquinas‖); the planto 
thus expresses an overwhelming mourning that touches each aspect of the world in a trajectory 
from the transcendent to the most personal and interior. The women do mourn the deaths of so 
many good knights, but if the emphasis on their loss presages military defeat, that is not what 
preoccupies the mourners, who instead lament a domestic, social crisis: the decadence of a 
system of values, the absence of honor, the danger that they will lose their privileged status 
among the nobility. Their cries of despair even reach an ironic note when they worry that the 
lower classes will wind up lording it over them – their fear of domineering peasants is, of course, 
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woefully misplaced. Crucially, it is at the moment when their mourning turns inward that it 
becomes a divisive force. Meanwhile, the interiority of the crisis is underscored by the epitaphs 
inscribed on the graves of the fallen: ―Cavalleros somos de España naturales, que por defender 
nuestras honras entrados somos en cárceles; no morimos en las camas, antes en las batallas 
campales. Los godos nos mataron que non gentes de otras partes‖ (1: 133; my emphasis) ―We 
are natural-born Spanish knights, who for defending our honor have entered prisons; we did not 
die in bed, but on the battlefield. The Goths killed us, not people from other places.‖ The 
epitaphs stress the civil nature of the war, which leads to the strange third-person reference to 
―the Goths.‖ Mourning is thus established as a way to explore collectivity and division at the 
same time: it is verbalized by a community that speaks in unison, but they are revealed to be 
speaking about civil conflict that goes beyond the battlefield. Cultural unity, and the power of 
mourning to foster or destroy it, will be what is at stake throughout the Crónica‘s first part. 
 The contemporary (for Corral) stakes of mourning are emphasized in another lengthy 
stretch of chivalric action that has received little critical attention, the episode of the knight 
Sacarus and the Duchess of Lorraine. The Duchess inherited her husband‘s lands when he died, 
on the condition that she maintain her chastity and not remarry for two years. Her brother-in-law, 
Lembrot, advised by two malicious uncles, decides that he should have inherited the land and 
begins to take it by force. However, the Duchess and Lembrot call a truce and take the matter 
before the Emperor, where Lembrot falsely accuses his sister-in-law of having broken her 
chastity and offers to prove the truth of his accusation in battle. When no one in the Emperor‘s 
court will take up her cause, the Duchess is given three months to find a champion. She travels to 
Rodrigo‘s court, which is holding tournaments in celebration of Rodrigo‘s coronation, and a 
knight named Sacarus offers to battle Lembrot. Lembrot arrives and is defeated by Sacarus, but 
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the conflict does not end there: the Duchess and Lembrot return to their lands, where hostilities 
are renewed and Sacarus takes charge of the Duchess‘s armies. There follows a series of bloody 
battles, during which Rodrigo, curious to know how many knights have died since he took 
power, asks each city in Spain to put down in writing the names of its dead knights and send 
them to the king. Rodrigo discovers that between the siege of Córdoba and the current fighting, 
he has lost 57,466 knights; as a result, he orders that those sons of the dead knights who are at 
least fifteen should receive their fathers‘ full pay, while the younger ones should receive half. 
The narrator explains that the people appreciated the king‘s gesture, since it took away some of 
their sadness:   
Ca ciertamente podedes creer que en la mayor parte del tiempo que el Rey don Rodrigo 
reinó, nunca fue año que en España no oviese duelos y tristezas, e perdimientos de 
cavalleros de tal guisa que nunca fue tierra al mundo que tanto pesar de los moradores 
della biviesen a tan luengo tienpo. E de estonces en adelante todos los cantares que en 
España se fizieron, las razones, e los sones, o de muertes, o de grandes pesares como si 
de alegría. Ca tanto les duró los perdimientos de las gentes que les quedó por costumbre 
los cantares pensosos. E aun creo que para sienpre lo usarán. (1: 387) 
 
For you can certainly believe that for most of the time that King Rodrigo reigned, a year 
never passed without mourning and sadness, and such loss of knights that there was never 
a land in earth whose inhabitants spent more time in great sorrow. And from then on, all 
the songs made in Spain, the stories, and the tunes, were of deaths and great sorrows 
rather than joy. For the loss of people lasted so long for them that they acquired the 
custom of pensive songs [cantares pensosos]. And I even believe that this will always be 
their custom. 
 
The narrative voice thus points out that Rodrigo‘s reign provoked not just a political loss, but 
also an extended mourning that dictates the subject-matter of a wide variety of genres. The 
speaker‘s focus on custom and what is usual (―lo usarán‖) draws attention to the social nature of 
this affective state. It is clear that the Crónica itself fits comfortably into the ―pensive‖ artistic 
tradition thus defined by its author (that is, the tradition formed by the ―razones,‖ ―sones,‖ and 
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―cantares pensosos‖ in the above passage), who by drawing attention to the tradition – not just 
through this planto, but through sheer repetition – seeks to change or even end it. At the same 
time, the mourning described here, rather than working to console the mourners, is extending 
indefinitely into the future. The preliminary objection may be raised, then, that despite Corral‘s 
words, the Crónica really presents a case not of mourning, but of melancholy.
11
 
 Indeed, in Stanzas, Giorgio Agamben reminds us of the historical link between the 
melancholic and poetic temperaments, a link towards which the passage from the Crónica seems 
to gesture (12). According to Agamben, the acedia, or sloth, that preyed on cloistered monks was 
regarded as both a vice, world-weariness, and also a virtue, saving sorrow, desire for God (7). 
Acedia became associated with melancholy because the latter was also bivalent: the melancholic 
pined for some lost, desired object, but also had a marked tendency toward inward withdrawal 
and contemplation (12).
12
 This disorderly play of outward desire and inward withdrawal leads 
Agamben to define medieval melancholy as ―that which would possess and touch what ought 
merely to be the object of contemplation‖ (18). 
 Agamben now turns to Freud‘s ―Mourning and Melancholia,‖ noting that in the case of 
the Freudian melancholic, it is unclear what, if anything, has actually been lost; the libido merely 
withdraws into the subject in a narcissistic gesture. It is here that Agamben sees a parallel with 
medieval melancholy: 
As, in the case of acedia, the withdrawal is not from a defect, but from a frantic 
exacerbation of desire that renders its object inaccessible to itself in the desperate attempt 
                                                 
11
 Indeed, in a study of melancholy in Early Modern Iberia, Roger Bartra describes melancholy as a ―mal de 
frontera,‖ a suffering common to displaced peoples living the ―fragile life of people who have suffered forced 
conversions and confronted the threat of great reforms and mutations of the religious and moral principles that 
governed them‖ (31). Of course, in the period studied by Bartra, this described the life of the moriscos better than 
that of the Christians. 
12
 It should come as no surprise, then, that Miguel de Unamuno, writing in the aftermath of the decline of Spanish 
empire, should describe acedia as a national characteristic; in Spain, even the worthy and the brave were frequently 
attacked by a ―civil or secular‖ form of the sadness brought about by the ―collective poverty‖ left behind in the wake 
of imperial decline (755 and 757). 
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to protect itself from the loss of that object and to adhere to it at least in its absence, so it 
might be said that the withdrawal of melancholic libido has no other purpose than to 
make viable an appropriation in a situation in which none is really possible. From this 
point of view, melancholy would be not so much the regressive reaction to the loss of the 
love object as the imaginative capacity to make an unobtainable object appear as if lost. 
(20; my emphasis) 
 
This last sentence seems a perfect description of Corral‘s pseudo-historical gesture: an 
unobtainable, indeed imaginary unity in ―Spanish‖ history – still seemingly unobtainable in 
Corral‘s conflictive present – is made in the Crónica to seem merely to have been lost (and, 
therefore, to have existed in the first place). The appropriation of Visigothic unity as a direct 
antecedent to hypothetical Castilian unity is made possible through Corral‘s imaginative gesture, 
which creates the past it seeks to absorb. 
 To begin to answer this objection, it is important to point out that while Agamben‘s study 
focuses on melancholy, there are some elements of Freud‘s original analysis of mourning that are 
directly relevant to the case of the Crónica, and in particular to the guilt attributed to Rodrigo for 
entering the Tower of Hercules and for raping La Cava. For Freud, ―where there is a disposition 
to obsessional neurosis the conflict of ambivalence casts a pathological shade on the grief, 
forcing it to express itself in the form of self-reproaches, to the effect that the mourner himself is 
to blame for the loss of the loved one‖ (161). This self-critical element – again, for Freud, a part 
of mourning‘s transformation into melancholy – is clearly visible in Rodrigo, a figure who in his 
bravery and arrogance encapsulates both the virtue and the vice of his ―fuerte sangre goda‖ and, 
as king, stands in for an entire people. It is thus that when Rodrigo is overcome by what could be 
called a desire to touch and possess what should only be contemplated – the Tower of Hercules 
and La Cava – his bad actions condemn all of Spain, as symbolized by the spreading of the 
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Tower‘s ashes by ―little black birds‖ over the heads of those who would die in the Moorish 
invasion, an element added to the legend by Corral (Menéndez Pidal XCII-XCIII): 
E a poco de ora llegaron unas avezillas negras e anduvieron por de suso la ceniza, e tantas 
eran que davan tan grande viento de su buelo que se levantó toda la ceniza e esparcióse 
por España toda quanto el su señorío era, e muy muchas gentes sobre quien cayó los 
tornava tales como si los untasen con sangre. E eso acaesció todo en un día, e muchos 
dixieron después que a todas las gentes que aquellos polvos alcançaron morieron en las 
batallas que adelante oiredes de quando España fue conquistada e perdida. (I: 181) 
 
And after a Little while there arrived some little black birds that passed over the ashes, 
and they were so many that their flight raised such a great wind that it swept up all the 
ash and spread it throughout all of his kingdom in Spain, and it was as if many of the 
people upon whom it fell had been anointed with blood. And that happened in just one 
day, and many said later that all of the people touched by the ash died in the battles, of 
which you will soon hear, in which Spain was conquered and lost. 
 
Was Corral, then, mistaken – did he mean ―melancholy‖ when he wrote ―mourning‖? Notice in 
the above passage that while the event of the spreading of the ashes is recounted as historical 
fact, its ominous interpretation is attributed to popular tradition (―muchos dixieron‖) – the same 
popular tradition accustomed to ―cantares pensosos.‖ It is this collective element that melancholy 
misses. Mourning is deployed in Corral‘s Crónica not only through an affective tone, but 
through its collective, ritualistic nature, which characterizes the battles and jousts that run 
throughout the text, often preceding the plantos. 
 In the first part of the Crónica, the question of collective sin and collective mourning also 
arises in scenes that do not involve Rodrigo directly. The twin ideas of penitence and punishment 
emerge from the interplay between the plantos placed directly in the mouths of the people and 
those of the authorial voices (that of the narrator, but also those of the Crónica‘s fictive 
historians). If the Córdoban ladies‘ planto cited above demonstrates an ironic ignorance of the 
devastation to come, the following one expressed by the narrator is remarkably sophisticated in 
its treatment of national destruction: 
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¡O tierra desaventurada!, ¡cómo has contraria ventura que así eres robada e destruida de 
tan buena cavallería como oy en este día muere, por donde a todo el mundo verná grand 
daño e pérdida! ¡O España atribulada!, ¡cómo la tu planeta es oy abaxada e echada de las 
alturas donde sea e será escondida por grandes tiempos!; ¿quál fue el pecado que tanto 
mal por él es venido en el mundo que más de diez mil cavalleros de ambas partes mueren 
oy en este día que grand mengua verná por ellos en España? … ¡O cruel nación!, ¿cómo 
no avedes piedad unos de otros, que todos sodes de una sangre e de un señorío, e todos 
venidos del alto linaje de los godos (1: 150-151). 
 
O unfortunate land! How unlucky you are, to be robbed and destroyed of such good 
knights as die today, whereupon great harm and loss will come to all! O troubled Spain! 
How your planet is brought low today, tossed from the heights to where it is and will be 
hidden for a long time! What was the sin that brought such evil into the world, that ten 
thousand knights of both sides should die today, whose great lack will be felt in Spain? 
… O cruel nation! How can you not take pity on one another, when you are all of one 
blood and domain, and all descend from the noble lineage of the Goths. 
 
Here, the apostrophic trajectory is from ―tierra‖ to ―España‖ to ―nación‖: the national concept 
(represented by its name) is tied to both the physical world and the population. At the same time, 
national unity is understood as both kinship and political cohesion (―todos sodes de una sangre e 
de un señorío‖). The rueful division among the people is also lamented as an eventual division 
between the land and its name, the integrity of the national concept undone by invaders. Sin is 
introduced here as a possible underlying cause of the invasion, but the introduction is tentative, 
accomplished through a question that fails to suggest a sinful actor; the implication is that the 
sin, too, belongs to the nation.  
The planto‘s closing link between pity and kinship is significant in the context of 
fifteenth-century mourning practices. The right of the bereaved to grieve openly for the dead 
may seem uncontroversial, but in fact, gestures of mourning were a site of theologically-charged 
and classically-informed polemic in fifteenth-century Iberia. In a study of Castilian conciliar and 
synodal records throughout the Middle Ages, Ariel Guiance has documented a recurring 
preoccupation with exaggerated mourning gestures. In brief, Guiance shows that the Church, 
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following especially Leviticus 20, prohibited excessive gestures of mourning, and that members 
of the clergy in particular were forbidden from manifesting their grief; lay authorities often 
joined in this prohibition (42-4). Guiance goes on to argue that the persistence of these gestures, 
evidenced by the repeated need to prohibit them, differentiates Iberia from the rest of medieval 
Europe (44). In any case, of note here is that specific provisions were made for clergymen to 
mourn their kin (43); thus, the Church recognized the necessity of mourning this special class of 
loss. The Crónica‘s rhetorical emphasis on lineage and shared blood, then, does more than 
conjure up images of past glory. It legitimizes the affective frame of grief and insulates the text 
from charges of a lack of faith. 
The other charge an excessively mournful text might have faced would be that of 
effeminacy; as Laura Vivanco has noted, the traditional gestures of mourning were, by the 
fifteenth century, identified mainly with women (155). This attitude is present, for example, in 
Enrique de Villena‘s Tratado de la consolación (1423-4), in which he advises his former 
secretary, who has lost his entire family to the plague, to leave such gestures to women, since 
they are not becoming to a ―constant‖ man, who should react to death with song rather than tears 
(52). In fact, Villena‘s text, heavily influenced by the Stoic and early-Christian genre of the 
consolatio, rehearses a variety of classical reasons to avoid excessively emotional responses to 
death.
13
 Villena cannot avoid, however, recognizing the social nature of mourning, even if he 
does so in a negative context: 
Estas tristezas que los omnes fuera de mesura toman de la usança que tienen desde 
pequeños en ver a los con que se crían dolerse tanto por los parientes amisos e muertos, 
fazen sigan aquella vía non de razón dictada, e la usança dello confirma la vana obra, ca 
estas dos cosas tiran a su natura e la desvían del ordenado curso. (110) 
 
                                                 
13
 For a brief introduction to the consolatio as a genre and to its reception in Iberia, see Derek C. Carr‘s introduction 
to the Tratado, particularly  LCXXIV- LXXXVI. 
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These sadnesses that immoderate men take from the custom they have from youth of 
seeing those with whom they are raised grieve for distant and deceased relatives, make 
them follow that path not dictated by reason, and the custom of it confirms the vanity of 
the act, for these two things tear at their nature and divert it from the ordained path. 
 
Here, Villena posits mourning as an unnatural and irrational behavior learned mimetically in 
youth; his focus on habit and custom (―usança‖) in the development of mournful behavior echoes 
Corral‘s description of how Castilian culture came to be overwhelmingly ―pensive.‖ Of course, 
in discussing the Visigothic period Corral could, from his own perspective, be said to be 
narrating Spain‘s youth. Thus, even one of mourning‘s staunchest fifteenth-century opponents 
recognized it as a social phenomenon and not just an individual failing, while the Church went 
further in establishing its validity in certain circumstances. In fact, Guiance notes that at times 
when Reconquest activity was particularly high, the Church issued many fewer mourning 
prohibitions (47). The Church‘s temporary silence on the issue can be read as an implicit 
recognition of mourning‘s essential role in the Reconquest effort – a recognition, shared by 
Corral, that becomes increasingly explicit throughout the first part of the Crónica. 
In the Crónica, mourning is by no means associated exclusively with women, but gender 
is a fault line in the work‘s exploration of divisive grief. As the siege of Córdoba drags on, public 
measures must be taken to control the women‘s behavior: 
Fue ordenado que ese día ninguna dueña ni donzella ni otra muger no saliese de su casa, 
ni fuese a la honra destos cuerpos, ca tanto era el duelo e el llorar e los alaridos que davan 
que los coraçones de los ombres no los podían sofrir. E con pesar que avían ívanse a las 
armas, e querían salir a los de fuera, e no curavan de estar por las treguas, e dezían que 
más querían ser muertos que sofrir tantas penas. Esto dezían ellos por lo que las dueñas 
fablavan; ca estrañamente maltraían a los que avían quedado bivos, ca ellas en esa ora 
todos los ombres del mundo quiseran que fueran muertos, e no los podían mirar tanto les 
parecían de mal. (1: 165) 
 
It was ordered that on that day no lady, maiden, or other woman should leave her home 
or go to honor those bodies, for such were their grief and sobbing and cries that the hearts 
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of the men could not bear them. And with their sorrow they went to arms, and wanted to 
attack those outside, and paid no heed to the truce, and said that they would rather die 
than suffer such pain. They said this because of the ladies‘ conversation; for they 
mistreated terribly those who had survived, wishing in that hour that all the world‘s men 
were dead, and they could not look at them, so lowly they seemed. 
 
The Cordoban men prefer physical violence and even death to the affective (and not purely 
verbal) violence of the women‘s mourning. The women, for their part, would prefer to give 
themselves over wholly to mourning, so that both genders agree that the men would be better off 
dead. This popular fatalism ties in to the public frame given to this episode, in which the law 
(―fue ordenado‖) seeks to reassert itself in the face of overwhelming affect. This struggle is made 
clear in the desire of the overwhelmed men to fight and die despite a temporary truce that has 
been established (―no curavan de estar por las treguas‖). The affective mechanism by which 
political unity can be dissolved is thus exposed, as the will of men to remain ―constant‖ before 
excessive emotion is shown to be lacking. The mechanism by which the land itself is made 
subject to affect is laid bare in a later episode in which a field is renamed after a particularly 
bloody battle: ―e aquel llano llaman el Canpo de Bar … e después que estas gentes fezieron ende 
su batalla e morieron en él, todos los de la tierra le llamaron el Canpo del Lloro‖ (1: 423) ―and 
that plain was called the Field of Bar … and after these people had their battle there and died on 
it, everyone from that land called it the Field of Tears.‖ The event that causes the popular 
renaming of the field is not the battle itself, but the mourning that followed it.
14
 Thus, if national 
unity implies a government, people, and land unified under a common name, each element of 
that unity, including the name itself, is shown to be susceptible to division or disruption through 
affect. 
 
                                                 
14
 I am grateful to Simone Pinet for pointing out this detail to me. 
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Individual Combat as Ritual Mourning 
  
It is important to remember that Rodrigo‘s decision to crown himself despite having been 
named regent, not king, is what sparks the Crónica‘s first military conflict. In contrast, the 
tournaments he orders to celebrate his coronation seem at first to be the antithesis of the 
mourning provoked by the siege of Córdoba; they are celebratory and successful in that many 
great knights participate in them. In fact, however, the many tournaments throughout the text 
complement rather than contradict the many battles, sharing a fundamentally symmetrical 
narrative structure that maintains thematic stability. In the tournaments‘ jousts, two characters 
unfamiliar to us in all but their names engage in individual combat that runs through repetitive 
steps familiar to readers of epic literature, such as the breaking of the lance and the piercing of 
the loriga. The epic trope of individual combat is infused with ritualistic character in the context 
of the tournaments, and this recontextualization of its repetitive structure extends that ritualistic 
character to the battles as well, since the latter closely mirror the former in terms of narrative 
structure. In this sense, the Crónica‘s jousts, battles, and mourning come together in their 
embodiment of ritual. The jousts do so explicitly, at the level of plot, since they are narrations of 
what is already ceremonial. In the cases of battle and mourning, however, the ritual takes place at 
the level of the text itself, as the prose takes on (and draws the reader into) the codified rhythms 
of ritual practice. 
As Marina Brownlee has noted, this conflation of battle and tournament may reflect 
Corral‘s historical circumstances, in which ―ceremonial jousting had replaced true chivalric 
combat‖ (121). These three ritual elements are only signs of societal decadence, however, insofar 
as they are attempts to reverse it through a self-conscious appeal to the past and to national 
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sentiment.
15
 As conceived by Émile Durkheim, ritual unifies a community, providing stability in 
troubled times: 
When a society is going through circumstances which sadden, worry or irritate it, it 
exercises a pressure upon its members to give evidence, by various significant actions, of 
their own sorrow, anxiety, or anger. It imposes upon them the duty of weeping, groaning 
or inflicting wounds upon themselves or others, for these collective manifestations, and 
the moral communion which they show and strengthen, restore to the group the energy 
which circumstances threaten to take away from it, and thus they enable it to become 
settled. (236-7) 
 
Reinforcing a sense of shared identity often implies, of course, the creation of a hostile exterior 
force; in the Crónica, this is famously accomplished through the figures of the Moors, whose 
conquest of the peninsula is recounted, along with the suffering and grief it provoked, in the 
beginning of the second part. However, the portrayal of the Moors themselves is unexpectedly 
dispassionate, neither particularly detailed nor hostile except in the most general of terms. 
Satorre Grau perceived the same lack of intensity in the conquest scenes despite their length, 
arguing that they function merely as a narrative bridge between Rodrigo and Pelayo (171). But in 
fact, the suffering staged in the conquest scenes ties in to Durkheimian ritual: ―It is this 
experience which men interpret when they imagine that outside them there are evil beings whose 
hostility, whether permanent or temporary, can be appeased only by human suffering. These 
beings are thus collective states objectified; they are society itself seen under one of its aspects‖ 
(237).
16
 This is not a case, then, of radical otherness, but rather of the exteriorization of an 
internal discomfort, a projection. The exterior force (the Moors) is not ―imagined‖ because it 
does not exist materially or historically, but rather because it has been imbued with 
autochthonous values and fears. Thus, although Corral‘s Crónica has (justifiably) served until 
                                                 
15
 In this way they are similar to the attempt to close historical distance by interweaving and, in a sense, unifying the 
figures of Rodrigo and Pelayo.  
16
 Durkheim notes that a similar process is undergone in the case of celebratory rituals: ―We know, moreover, that 
the benificent powers are formed in the same way; they, too, result from the collective life and express it‖ (237). 
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now as a source of information about fifteenth-century Castilian attitudes toward Muslims, the 
role of the Moors in the text reveals much more interior disquiet than hatred of the invaders. 
Mourning, jousts, and battles are narrative rituals that, just as Durkheim describes them, 
objectify the preoccupations of an author who tries to purge them through their very 
objectification and through the obsessive, expiatory repetition of literary suffering throughout the 
text.
17
 
The generic studies of the Crónica that have been carried out up to now have not taken 
into account this element of the jousts‘ meaning. De la Flor Cramer sees in the jousts, for 
example, nothing more than another opportunity to lament, ominously, the noble deaths they 
produce (49), and Menéndez Pidal asserts the influence of mozarabic and Arabic historiography, 
which turned the legendary material away from epic and toward the novel (Floresta LXXXIX). 
But generic traditions do not constrain or exhaust the meaning of the chivalric and epic elements; 
rather, they broaden it. The jousts and battles – characterized structurally, again, by repetition, 
symmetry, and chaining-together – reveal the fundamental narcissism behind the supposed 
intercultural conflict. This inward focus is reflected even in the image of two knights charging 
each other on horseback and is another manifestation of Corral‘s overall preoccupation with 
internal, rather than external, strife. The following example, taken from a battle between 
Christians and Moors, illustrates the ritualistic tone taken on by the prose in descriptions of 
individual combat: 
                                                 
17
 Also relevant here is David Nirenberg‘s discussion of the integrative, rather than merely destructive, possibilities 
of ritual violence. These integrative possibilities are not just inter-, but also intracommunal; for example, he argues 
that ―Holy Week violence served to reinstitute differences and emphasize boundaries while displacing violence from 
the interior of the community. By alluding to and containing the original act of vengeance at the foundation of 
Christian-Jewish relations in the diaspora, Holy Week attacks flirted with but ultimately avoided the repetition of 
that violence in contemporary society‖ (218). As I am arguing in the case of mourning, Nirenberg argues that ritual 
violence in medieval Iberia ―made possible both stasis and explosive historical change‖ (230). 
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E Mahomet, cormano de Muça, vio a Arlistas, hermano de Polus, que fazía mucho mal en 
sus gentes, tomó una lança bien azerada, e fue para él. E así como se estava combatiendo 
con Amalec, primo de Tárif, vino por las espaldas, e diole un golpe tan mortal que 
armadura que toviese no le prestó cosa, e cayó luego en tierra desuso de su cavallo. 
 E Tomedus que esa ora llegava allí, e vio que Arlistas era muerto, tomó una lança 
a un donzel suyo … E tomó su lança en la mano, e non paró ojo como iva, o si estava 
cerca dél quien lo acorriese, e da de las espuelas a su cavallo e pone los ojos en Mahomet, 
e no paró fasta que le dio tal golpe con su lança por el costado derecho que gela echó de 
la otra parte. E Mahomet cayó muerto en tierra. (1: 507) 
 
And Mahomet, Muça‘s brother, saw Arlistas, Polus‘s brother, who was doing great harm 
to his side; he took a sharp lance and went at him. And because [Arlistas] was doing 
battle with Amalec, Tárif‘s cousin, [Mahomet] came from behind, and dealt him such a 
mortal blow that no armor would have protected him, and he fell to the ground below his 
horse. 
 And Tomedus, arriving at that moment, saw that Arlistas was dead and took a 
lance from one of his squires … And he took his lance in hand, paying no heed to what 
was around him or who might charge him, and he spurs his horse and sets his eyes on 
Mahomet, and he did not stop until he dealt him such a blow with his lance on the right 
side that it pierced through to the other side. And Mahomet fell to the earth dead. 
 
Tomedus, in the next paragraph, dies in a similar manner. In this borrowed element of epic 
narrative, death comes at the end of a series of codified narrative actions – but the code here has 
been altered in the mixing of the epic and chivalric genres. Rituals do not depend on concrete 
people, but rather on established roles that wait to be filled; even in the text itself, these almost 
anonymous deaths rarely provoke personal emotional reactions beyond desire for revenge, which 
is seen in the above excerpt to be one of the codified (chaining-together) elements of the ritual 
battle narrative. On the other hand, these deaths consistently provoke collective mourning – the 
Crónica‘s battles are punctuated by plantos, which bring each scene to a close. Taken together, 
these elements represent an invented, literary suffering, an attempt to respond to intolerable 
circumstances with a ritual expiation that will eventually unify Corral‘s society. And just as in 
the case of that society and its internecine conflicts, the author has not truly been able to focus on 
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the exterior; intercultural conflict in the Crónica is a background against which internal suffering 
is portrayed. To return for a moment to an earlier question, this is emphatically not a case of 
Freudian melancholy – the interiorization of an imaginary desired object that provokes self-
criticism – but rather its opposite, the external objectification of an internal disquiet that requires 
rituals of sacrifice. 
 Whose are the sins that must be expiated? Rodrigo‘s are the clearest: the violation of the 
Tower of Hercules and the rape of La Cava. However, in the case of the Tower, the guilt is 
spread symbolically to a large portion of Rodrigo‘s subjects, and Juan Manuel Cacho Blecua has 
argued that, in fact, the entire Spanish population has sinned and must do penance (48). What‘s 
more, there are several other possible guilty parties in the legend and even in this particular 
version of it: La Cava, who may have seduced rather than merely succumbed to Rodrigo 
(Brownlee 126); her vengeful uncle, Julián, whose anger may have been righteous but whose 
betrayal of Spain to the Moors most certainly was not; Julián‘s duplicitous ally, Orpas; and, of 
course, the Moors themselves, who could have been portrayed as greedy or fanatical aggressors. 
It is Rodrigo himself who, speaking to himself as he escapes clandestinely from the disastrous 
battle of Guadalete, resolves this ambiguity: ―porque digo que no fue la fuerça del Conde don 
Julián, ni el ardimiento de Muça, nin el saber de Tárif so la traición de Orpas que España fuese 
vencida e sus cavalleros despedaçados e muertos. Antes digo que esta destruición es mía, e 
aquestos vencimientos e asolaciones son míos, e yo lo he fecho‖ (1: 637) ―because I say that it 
was not Count Julián‘s strength, or Muça‘s courage, or Tárif‘s knowledge from Orpas‘s betrayal 
that caused Spain‘s defeat and the dismemberment and death of its knights. Rather, I say that this 
destruction is mine, and these defeats and devastations are mine, and I have caused it.‖18 Here, 
                                                 
18
 Rodrigo‘s acceptance of full responsibility is in keeping with the rules for confession laid out in the Breve 
confesionario, a didactic treatise published together with the Arte de bien morir by Pablo Hurus in 1479-1484: ―se 
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the apostrophic trajectory is outward, from the king to ―Spain‖ as a kingdom and as a people. 
Rodrigo prescribes two courses of action: 
¡O España, mortiguada e decepada del triumpho eres puesta a recebir el yugo de la 
servidumbre! ¡O amigos e vasallos españoles e compaña mía, cesen vuestros lloros que 
sostenedes por las crueles andanças de mí, triste rey, e desaventurado!; fazed justicia 
cruel sobre mí que toda esta cruel persecución he merescido, e comiencen vuestros ojos 
a llorar el vencimiento del grand triumpho de las nobles cibdades de España, e la 
sojuzgación della de que yo fue la ocasión. (1: 638; my emphasis) 
 
O Spain, dimmed and cut back from triumph, you are set to receive the yoke of servitude! 
O Spanish friends and vassals and my companions, cease crying for my cruel fate, sad 
and unfortunate king! Judge me cruelly, for I have deserved all of this cruel persecution, 
and let your eyes begin to cry for the defeat of the great triumph of Spain’s noble cities, 
and its subjugation, which I caused. 
 
On the one hand, Rodrigo directs the people away from fruitless mourning for his personal 
suffering and toward a unifying, national mourning (note the emphasis on an already 
―triumphant‖ Spain that has fallen), while on the other, he calls for his own punishment, ―fazed 
justicia cruel sobre mí.‖ This juridical language, which cannot, of course, be wholly separated 
from a theological worldview, frames the Crónica‘s grandest historiographic gesture. National 
greatness cannot be recuperated through the unification of Rodrigo and Pelayo if Rodrigo 
himself remains irrecoverably stained with sin. The figures of Rodrigo and Pelayo may be 
structurally intertwined in the narrative, but Rodrigo‘s penitence and burial represent the real 
work of Corral‘s revisionism. 
 
Participatory Penitence and the Judgment on Rodrigo 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
requiere confessión de la boca, sus pecados enteramente confessando, a sí mesmo redarguyendo, e a ningund otro, si 
puede buenamente, acusando‖ (133) ―verbal confession is required, confessing his sins completely, condemning 
himself, and, if possible, accusing no one else.‖ Rodrigo will need to keep this latter admonition in mind when the 
devil, disguised as Julián, tempts him with vainglory (see below). 
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In the final chapter of the first part of the Crónica, the stakes of grief are set. On the one 
hand, grief can unite: ―Al pueblo doloroso es fuerte e dulce cosa fartarse en lloros, ca dulce cosa 
es llorar e gemir en los lloros a la gente que ha compañía de mucho pueblo que continúan 
semejante dolor e llanto a gemido complido‖ (1: 647) ―For a grieving people, it is a powerfully 
sweet thing to have its fill of tears, for crying and moaning is sweet to those accompanied by 
many others carrying the same grief and tears to their end.‖ On the other, grief is a stagnating 
force in isolation, and this is the true risk of the invasion: 
¡Ay tristes nosotros españoles!, ca non nos alegraremos de aqueste remedio de los 
miserables dolorosos, ca como la multitud de los bárbaros se moverá por toda España, e 
la desmanpararán, los unos irán a un parte, e los otros a otra, segund las sus fortunas; esa 
hora departirá la tierra a la nuestra triste compañía, e cada uno llorará por sí mismo. (1: 
648; my emphasis) 
 
O we sad Spaniards! For we will not take heart in this remedy for the miserably grieving, 
for as the barbarian multitude moves throughout all of Spain, and the people abandon it, 
some will go to one place, and others to another, according to fortune; in that hour the 
land will divide our sad company, and each will cry for himself. 
 
If the land and people are divided, collective mourning will be impossible; thus, by the end of the 
first part, the fears about internecine conflict intersect with the theme of grief and mourning. The 
second part of the Crónica begins with the narration of the Moorish advance, and it is in this 
context that the exploration of collective grief reaches its apogee. Betrayal, a theme raised in the 
first part through the figures of Julián and Orpas, is a central element of the second part‘s moral 
economy: the narrator decries both the Jews who betray Toledo and the Christians who fight 
alongside Muça, the Moorish commander. In this environment conditioned by betrayal, 
mourning, the only unifying ritual left to the Christians, who can no longer fight and have 
nothing to celebrate, becomes a duty and even a calling: ―ca entre ellos no avía grande ni 
pequeño que a otro conortase, antes le ponía mayor lástima en el coraçón, e si alguno dexava de 
80 
 
llorar todos eran con él e lo maltraían, e dezían que no guardava bien lo que Dios le avía dado 
por compañía que eran los grandes duelos e aborrencias de bevir‖ (2: 281) ―for among them no 
one old or young comforted another, but rather each provoked more pity in all, and if one of 
them stopped crying the rest berated him, saying that he did not respect what God had given 
them for company, great grief and abhorrence of life.‖19 Mourning becomes the constitutive 
element of life itself: ―E agora dexemos los lloros que llorando nascimos, y en duelo fue nuestra 
vida, e llorando nos partimos deste mundo; quiera Dios no nos acaesca tal en el otro‖ (2: 303) 
―And let us now leave crying behind, for we were born crying, and our life was passed in 
mourning, and we abandon this world crying; pray God such will not be the life of the other.‖ 
And in fact, after the hopeful recounting of Pelayo‘s youthful exploits up to the battle of 
Covadonga, Corral presents Rodrigo first as a focal point for collective mourning, through his 
penitence, but then as a way to leave mourning behind, through his burial and the discovery of 
his tomb. 
Rodrigo, wandering away from the battle of Guadalete, comes upon a hermitage and, 
weeping, begins confessing his sins to a crucifix hanging there. The hermit who lives there, and 
who is going to die in three days, writes out a rule by which Rodrigo can live in order to do 
penance. After the hermit‘s death, the devil appears to Rodrigo in the guise of a holy man, 
tempting him first with vainglory and then with comforts denied him in the hermit‘s penitential 
rule. What follows is a series of brief chapters (CCXLIIII-CCXLVIII) in which the devil, in 
various guises, attempts to convince Rodrigo to abandon his penitential lifestyle, while Rodrigo 
                                                 
19
 In his Tratado, Villena condemns this pernicious social pressure to mourn: ―el que pierde los parientes, ge lo 
ternán a mal las gentes entre quien bive sy non muestra por ello grant sentimiento. Non cuidarían esto si biviesen 
entre gentes muy virtuosas, de quien tal non podrían esperar reprehensión, e por esto más se muestra doler que non 
se duelen‖ (111) ―he who loses his relatives will be condemned by those among whom he lives if he does not show 
great feeling because of it. This would not worry them if they lived among very virtuous people, from whom they 
would not expect such condemnation, and for this reason they appear to grieve more than they actually do.‖ 
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insists on maintaining it. This dialogic structure is very similar to that of the Arte de bien morir, 
composed in Latin by an anonymous Dominican monk between 1414 and 1418 (there are several 
surviving fifteenth-century manuscripts and incunables of the Castilian translation of the Arte).
20
 
The Arte, a step-by-step guide for the laiety on achieving a good death, notes that the dying man 
(Moriens) faces more temptations on his deathbed than ever before: ―E es de saber, que en el 
artículo de la muerte los que han de morir han mayores e más graves temptaciones del enemigo 
que jamás ante uvieron‖ (84) ―And it should be known that those in the moment of death face 
more and graver temptations from the enemy than ever before.‖ The text then lays out, in 
alternating chapters accompanied by woodcuts, the five demonic temptations and their respective 
angelic refutations (in chapter CCXLIX, Rodrigo is visited and encouraged by the Holy Spirit). 
Critics who study this portion of the Crónica tend to focus on the moment when the devil 
disguises himself as La Cava.
21
 However, the devil first assumes the form of count Julián, 
tempting Rodrigo away from penance by assuming all of the guilt for the Moorish conquest and 
by calling on Rodrigo to return to the battlefield: 
Señor, como yo sea aquel que te haya errado de aquella manera que ombre traidor a su 
señor, e lo oviese fecho con grand ira e saña que al mi coraçón vino con ayuda e esfuerço 
del diablo. E como Nuestro Señor Dios es poderoso ovo piedad de la mi ánima, e no 
quiso que yo me perdiese ni que España fuese destruida, ni tú, señor, abaxado de la tu 
grand onra e estado ni del tu grand señorío que en España tienes; hame mostrado por 
revelación cómo estavas aquí e esta hermita faziendo penitencia de tus pecados, porque te 
digo que fagas justicia de mí, e tomes de mí vengança como de aquel que te lo meresce, 
ca yo te conosco que eres mi señor, e así mismo la grand traición en que te caí; por ende, 
señor, te ruego e pido por un solo Dios que tomes el poder de España que allí está 
esperándote, e que vayas a defender la fe del Salvador. (2: 388-389) 
 
Lord, as I am the one who failed you as a traitor, and I did so with great anger and fury 
that came to my heart with the devil‘s help and effort. And as our Lord is powerful, he 
                                                 
20
 For more information on the manuscript tradition of this text in Iberia, see Francisco Gago Jover‘s introduction to 
his edition of Pablo Hurus‘ 1479-1484 impression of the Arte (31-36). 
21
 See, for example, Drayson 198-200. 
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took pity on my soul, and did not wish that I be lost nor that Spain be destroyed, nor that 
you, lord, be lowered from your great honor and estate, or the dominion you have in 
Spain; he has revealed to me that you were here in this hermitage doing penance for your 
sins, so I ask you to judge me, and take deserved vengeance on me, for I recognize you as 
my lord, and I recognize the great betrayal into which I fell; therefore, lord, I pray and 
ask by the one God that you take power in Spain, for it is there awaiting you, and that you 
go to defend the Saviour‘s faith. 
 
The devil, as Julián, cleverly tempts Rodrigo with both spiritual and wordly vainglory: he 
attempts to undermine Rodrigo‘s penitential guilt by insisting on the role of his treason in the fall 
of ―España‖ while also calling Rodrigo back to his position of temporal power – a power that he 
wielded, Julián reminds him, by the grace of God.
22
 At the same time, Julián closely echoes 
Rodrigo‘s own penitential language in calling for Rodrigo to judge him; he thus tempts Rodrigo 
back toward the path of personal vengeance and away from the collective responsibility that 
Rodrigo has taken on. In short, Julián seeks to return the two figures to their traditional, 
complementarily culpable places in the story of Spain‘s fall – Julián the traitor, Rodrigo the 
arrogant and power-hungry. Rodrigo, however, meets this temptation (as he does the many 
others) with silent tears: ―E el Rey en todo esto no fazía sino llorar e nunca les fabló cosa 
ninguna‖ (II: 390). The penitential tears that represent Rodrigo‘s simultaneously collective and 
person guilt are the way forward, and the way to leave Julián behind. 
My purpose here is not to suggest that Corral was drawing specifically on the Arte while 
writing the scenes of Rodrigo‘s penitence, but rather to show that, as the ideas and practices of 
individual confession and Christian conscience gained ground in Western Europe, there was a 
popular textual tradition in which the communal aspect of penitence was maintained.
23
 In fact, 
                                                 
22
 In the Arte, by devil tempts Moriens with vainglory by arguing that ―mucho te deves gloriar porque non eres assí 
como los otros que han fecho e cometido males sin número‖ (105) ―you should glory greatly in your difference from 
others who have committed innumerable sins.‖ 
23
 One of the Arte‘s final recommendations is to seek out a faithful deathbed companion, a difficult task given that 
many of Moriens‘ friends and family will only be seeking to gain possession of his worldly goods (118-119). 
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public expressions of grief – that is, collective mourning – were part of everyday life in the 
Iberian Peninsula from the very beginning of the Middle Ages.
24
 At the same time, the 
penitential theme of the Crónica‘s closing act is one of its clearest examples of the influence of 
hagiography (Drayson 197). But the conflation of hagiography and historiography was not new 
in Corral‘s time, and was in fact relatively commonplace in the portrayal of royal deaths in 
Castilian chronicles.
25
  
Thus, Corral‘s revisionist invention of the scenes of Rodrigo‘s penitence do not 
necessarily lead him so far away from the historiographic tradition invoked by the term 
Crónica.
26
 The role of the law in its tension with social affect –already raised in the case of the 
siege of Córdoba – is also crucial to the question of revisionism in the similarity of historical 
judgment to a legal sentence. In the case of Rodrigo, whose express desire to be judged already 
reflects well on him, new evidence (his penitence and ultimate self-sacrifice) is introduced that 
mitigates his guilt. In an analysis of the close relationship between historiographic practice and 
trials – or, as he puts it, between the historian and the judge – Paul Ricoeur argues that one 
important goal of a trial is the reappropriation of the crime itself, achieved through memory and 
mourning: 
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 For example, the penitential aspect of the Visigothic end-of-life liturgy was public and participatory: the priest 
invited the crowd to express its grief (through shouts and tears) in order to help the person who was dying achieve 
―los frutos de la penitencia.‖24 Public grief as a crucial element of penitence would later become part of the royal 
funeral ceremony in Castile (Guiance 51), and José Manuel Nieto Soria has argued that the pain displayed at the 
king‘s death served to justify the need for dynastic continuity (100-101). 
25
 Guiance shows that like saints in medieval Castilian hagiographies, many kings have a presentiment of their 
deaths in medieval chronicles from the 13
th
 century on, and there is also a chronistic preoccupation with the 
exemplarity of kings‘ good or bad deaths, although the representation of good deaths does not necessarily imply 
sacralization (297-299). 
26
 For Alfonso X‘s rhetorical manipulation of the llanto, see Tudorica Impey. Corral‘s Crónica does defy Hayden 
White‘s (admittedly broad) definition of the chronicle as a historiographic form lacking a narrative ending: ―The 
chronicle … often seems to wish to tell a story, aspires to narrativity, but typically fails to achieve it. More 
specifically, the chronicle usually is marked by a failure to achieve narrative closure … the chronicle represents 
[historical reality] as if real events appeared to human consciousness in the form of unfinished stories‖ (9; emphasis 
in original). White links the desire for narrative closure to a desire to find moral meaning in historical events (24), 
and Corral, in his Crónica, certainly seems to be providing just such a moral interpretation of putatively historical 
matter. 
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[T]he trial puts on stage a reconstructed time of the past, in which the facts that are 
targeted have themselves already constituted tests of memory: in addition to the physical 
harm inflicted on persons defined by their own history, the breaking of contracts, the 
disputes over the attribution of goods, positions of power and authority, and all the other 
infractions and crimes constitute so many wounds inflicted on memory that call for a 
work of memory inseparable from a work of mourning, with a view toward the 
reappropriation of the infraction, of the crime, by all the parties despite its essential 
strangeness. (319) 
 
The crime must be reappropriated so that it is not completely destructive of the public order; in 
the same way, for Corral, Rodrigo‘s crimes cannot be allowed to stand outside of Spanish history 
as instigators of a historical annihilation. Similarly, the historical verdict against Rodrigo cannot 
be left intact. The most daring revision would have been to erase the crimes completely, but 
Corral opts instead for two practices that Ricoeur, citing Ernst Nolte, identifies as central to 
historical revision: ―temporal widening of the context‖ and ―comparison with similar 
contemporary or earlier facts‖ (328). Corral widens the historical context by including – 
inventing – the scenes of Rodrigo‘s penitence; at the same time, through a contrast of burials, he 
compares the penitent Rodrigo favorably to the treacherous Julián. 
 Indeed, another area in which medieval Iberian hagiography and historiography come 
together is their shared emphasis on entombment. Just as the discovery of saints‘ tombs and 
recovery of their remains was an important motif in hagiography, chronicles placed increasing 
emphasis not just on kings‘ geographic place of inhumation, but also on their manner of 
interment (Guiance 122, 309-18). While the late-Roman tradition recorded in Gothic histories 
tends not to include the location of the tomb, from Alfonso II on, the locations were 
systematically indicated since the tombs represented ―the secular and uninterrupted succession of 
the kings and their tutorial protection of the kingdom‖ (Mattoso 83). In fact, just as Corral does 
in his own Crónica, Jiménez de Rada went so far as to invent tombs for a number of late-
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Visigothic kings. The veneration of royal tombs was a key element of the sacralization of 
monarchy – and its chronistic representation was thus an important form of royal propaganda 
(Mattoso 83-84). 
José Mattoso has argued that public participation in royal funerals, ―the lamentations and 
crying of the multitude,‖ allowed the collective assumption of the fact of death in order to 
―vomit‖ it back out of the community (88). This is not the case, however, in Corral‘s Crónica; in 
fact, Rodrigo‘s penitence and burial allow his reappropriation by the Spanish nation. His death, 
no longer an interruption, becomes instead an element of continuity. This recuperation of 
Rodrigo through the discovery of his tomb is in keeping with Ricoeur‘s concept of 
historiographic sepulcher. For Ricoeur, history can be recounted either as a past that has already 
occured (a ―being-no-longer‖) or as a patrimony or inheritance (a ―having been‖) (363). The 
―having been‖ predominates when we recognize our debt to the past – that is, our status as its 
inheritors. However, since the recounting of the past tends to become a long meditation on those 
who have died (364), there is a risk that readers will come to view history as merely a 
―suspended sentence of death‖ (365) from which we can only escape by ―considering the 
historiographical operation to be the scriptural equivalent of the social ritual of entombment, of 
the act of sepulcher‖ (365). This act of historical sepulcher is akin to mourning and the 
construction of material tombs in that it restores contact with the lost object by transforming it 
into an ―inner presence‖ (366). 
Corral does not produce, of course, a physical monument to Rodrigo, but creates for him 
a literary sepulcher at the same time that he suggests, through the supposed historicity of the 
Crónica, that the monument really exists. It is a way of rescuing Rodrigo and the past he 
represents, of tying it definitively to Pelayo, of possessing it again as an ―inner presence.‖ The 
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long process of narrative ritual mourning carried out by Corral ends, then, with a literary 
entombment that attempts to liberate the author and Christian Spain from their death sentence. In 
this context, it is important to remember that the penitence and burial of Rodrigo are preceded by 
another, failed act of burial: Alarbot, Julián‘s son, cannot escape his own death sentence at the 
hands of the Moors by hiding in the tomb of La Cava. The denial of mourning for Julián himself 
is the theme of Rodrigo‘s epitaph: ―Aquí yaze el Rey don Rodrigo, el postrimero rey de los 
godos. Maldita sea la saña del traidor Julián ... amargo es el su nombre … e pesar faze la su 
remembrança en el coraçón de aquel que lo mienta‖ (2: 405) ―Here lies King Rodrigo, last king 
of the Goths. Damn the fury of the traitor Julián … his name is bitter … and his memory 
provokes sorrow in the heart of him that mentions him.‖27 The prohibition of mourning for Julián 
takes the form of a curse, ensuring that he will remain part of elapsed history and not part of the 
expiated Gothic patrimony that will be the basis of the victory to come. 
 Corral, desiring to link the present moment of civil strife with a supposedly 
glorious past of national unity, needed to find a way of reinscribing the fall of that past into a 
trajectory toward victory. This reinscription begins with the unifying rituals of mourning in the 
jousts and battles that predominate in the first part of the text. In the second part, the tension 
between collective and divisive mourning is resolved through the presentation of Rodrigo‘s 
penitence and entombment; grief can be manifested as participatory penitence, and the tomb 
allows the final reabsorption of Rodrigo into the continuity of Spanish cultural strength and 
unity. The entire process ends with the literal inscription of Rodrigo‘s epitaph, which separates 
the Gothic patrimony of Rodrigo from the betrayal of Julián. The entombment of Rodrigo is 
necessary to emerge from the ―pensiveness‖ that has engulfed Castilian culture, harnessing 
collective grief only to release it so that the project begun by Pelayo can reach its end. 
                                                 
27
 This epitaph is also the epigraph of Juan Goytisolo‘s 1970 novel, Reivindicación del conde don Julián. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
THE CONSTABLE‘S REWARD: WILL, DISCRETION, AND COMPASSION IN THE 
SÁTIRA DE FELICE E INFELICE VIDA 
 
 
 
Quen en carçel sole biuir 
en carçel deseia morer. 
– ―Cantiga de Maçias para su amiga‖ 
 
 
 
The galardón, a Castilian relative of the Provençal tradition‘s bel accueil, is one of the 
most easily identifiable tropes of the courtly lyric, likely to figure in even the most cursory 
overviews of the poetic genre. As such, it is a site at which critical faculties are often shut off: 
having established the conventionality of a given line or phrase, the critic moves on to more 
original territory. This is particularly true in medieval studies, where the foreignness (temporal if 
not geographic) of medieval literary practices, with their dominant aesthetic of thematic 
variation, makes their apparent conventionality stand out. But then as now, conventionality was 
both relative and pliable, and scholars must pay attention to recontextualizations and 
juxtapositions of conventions in seeking to understand medieval texts. A case in point is Pedro, 
Constable of Portugal‘s Sátira de felice e infelice vida (ca. 1450-53), a text that exemplifies the 
structural and discursive complexity of the nascent genre of sentimental fiction.
1
 The Sátira 
comprises three literary modes, sentimental prose, courtly poetry, and encyclopedic glosses, and 
numerous cultural traditions, especially Stoic and ascetic moralism (deeply rooted in the 
Portuguese court of the Aviz dynasty) and courtly literature. The result, however, is hardly 
syncretic. Rather, the text is characterized by both open and clandestine polemic: the narrator 
                                                 
1
 For a discussion of the Sátira‘s date of composition, see Gascón Vera 75. 
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debates allegories of his own Discretion and of his cruel lady‘s virtues, and the dispassionate 
glosses (authored by the Constable himself) are a stark counterpoint to the exaggerated sentiment 
of the almost eventless narrative. The one constant feature of this fractured text is a rejection of 
cruelty in favor of compassion, an insistence on the moral possibility and necessity of the 
galardón. In the Sátira, the Constable rejects the traditional links between the passions and sin, 
on the one hand, and the passions and suffering, on the other, stripping away the tropic 
stylization of the compassionate galardón.
2
 The Sátira‘s staged confrontation between 
emotionally ascetic moralism and courtly sentimentality is an attempt to make a space for 
compassion – a central space – in ongoing debates about princely education and good 
governance. To the binary of reason and will, common to moral philosophy and courtly 
literature, the constable seeks to add an axis of compassion and cruelty. 
 The Castilian version of the Sátira (claimed by the Constable to be based on an earlier 
Portuguese version, now lost) was produced while the Constable (1429-66) was in Castilian 
exile. His father, the Infante Pedro, Duke of Coimbra, was the brother of Duarte I (r. 1433-38) 
and served as regent during the minority of Afonso V after Duarte‘s death.3 When Afonso V 
took control of the kingdom, Pedro soon fell out of favor, touching off a series of events that 
culminated in Pedro‘s death at the Battle of Alfarrobeira (1449) and in the Constable‘s exile to 
Castile from 1449-56. Even before this period of exile, the constable had met several of Castile‘s 
leading literary figures, chief among them the Marquis of Santilla (it is likely but uncertain that 
he knew Juan de Mena as well) – in fact, he is still perhaps most famous as the recipient of 
Santillana‘s ―Prohemio e carta.‖ He returned to Portugal in 1456, participating in domestic 
                                                 
2
 Throughout this chapter, I will refer to the Sátira‘s author as ―the Constable,‖ to avoid confusion with the 
Constable‘s father (and namesake), the Infante Pedro. 
3
 In the modern world, the most famous brother of this so-called Ínclita Geração is certainly the Infante Henrique, 
Duke of Viseu (1394-1460), better known as Prince Henry the Navigator. 
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politics and in several expeditions to northern Africa. It was during one such expedition, to 
Morocco in 1463, that he received an invitation to become king of Aragon and Catalonia, which 
were enmeshed in civil war. The invitation was occasioned by the fact that the Constable‘s 
mother was the daughter of the last Count of Urgel, whose own aspirations to the Aragonese 
crown were dashed in the Compromise of Caspe (1412). The Constable proved to be an 
ineffectual ruler (he is remembered as the ―Intruder King‖), and he died of natural causes in 
1466.
4
 
The Castilian influence on the Sátira is not merely linguistic; rather, the text reflects and 
responds to several trends in early-fifteenth-century Castilian culture, many of them important in 
recent scholarly debates, alluded to in chapter one, about the status of that century as, on the one 
hand, resolutely medieval, or on the other, ―proto-Humanist‖ or ―pre-Renaissance.‖5 The Sátira 
opens with a dedicatory letter to the constable‘s sister Isabel, wife of Afonso V.6 The sentimental 
narrative then begins in the prison of love, where the lovesick narrator holds a conversation with 
cruelty and lodges a complaint against fortune before being scolded by his own Discretion, to 
whom he responds silently, with tears and sighs (43).
7
 The narrator then leaves the prison, only 
to be confronted by the seven virtues; Prudence and Pity engage him in debate, praising his lady 
and defending her from his accusations. The narrator eventually wins the debate (at least in his 
                                                 
4
 For a full biography, see Adão da Fonseca, O Condestável; for a good condensed version, see Gascón Vera 7-32. 
5
 On this debate in general, see (in chronological order) Boase (1-8), Russell, Maravall, Lawrance (1985 and 1986), 
and Weiss (11-24). The debate turns for the most part on the attitudes of the social and intellectual elites of Castile 
and Aragon, who were often resistant to Italian humanism (Julian Weiss notes the influence of France and Burgundy 
as well [12]). A famous case in point is the polemic between Leonardo Bruni, translator of Aristotle‘s Ethics into 
Latin, and Alonso de Cartagena, who believed that the former‘s ―insistence on the rhetorical value of Aristotle‘s 
work would obscure the true purpose of the Ethics‖ (Pagden 306). Although this debate is not of central relevance to 
my argument, I tend to agree with P. E. Russell that, far from a forward-looking and culturally revolutionary 
phenomenon, Castilian humanism ―was rather a classicizing humanism preoccupied with widening and revitalizing 
that part of medieval culture that descended from the classical tradition‖ (229). A similar debate has taken place 
among Portuguese critics and historians with respect to the writings of Duarte and Pedro (see below). 
6
 I will return to this letter and each of the following plot points later in this chapter. 
7
 Throughout this chapter, I use capital letters when referring to explicitly allegorized characters in the text 
(Discretion, Prudence) and lower-case letters when referring to the broader concepts these characters represent. 
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estimation), and there follows a poem exhorting the lady to pity and warning her of the risks of 
her cruelty. The sentimental narrative closes as the desperate narrator tries to decide whether to 
kill himself or live on, suffering, in the dubious hope that his beloved will eventually grant him 
the galardón of her pity (174). Accompanying this narrative are 102 glosses, comprising mainly 
explanations of the constable‘s numerous classical allusions, but also a number of miniature 
treatises on crucial concepts of moral philosophy, such as the will.
8
 Thus, in its courtly setting, 
staging of the conflict between reason and love, preoccupation with feminine virtue, and 
ostentatious display of erudition in the service of moral exemplarity, the Sátira embodies many 
of the cultural complexities typical a period widely recognized, even at the time, as one of crisis 
and flux. 
It was perhaps that feeling of crisis that led Castilian humanism to have a ―dominant 
concern for the education of the statesman‖ (Weiss 12). As Jeremy Lawrance has shown, in the 
fifteenth century, ―[r]eading became not merely a means to an end for a professional minority, 
but an end in itself for a whole privileged section of society‖ (―The Spread‖ 80). As I described 
in chapter one, this new readership sought out vernacular translations of classical authors, 
eschewing the lyric poetry, satire, and drama that would become popular later in favor of 
didactic and moral works. The understanding of classical allusion as a primarily didactic mode 
suggests the contexts of princely education and theory of statecraft for the Sátira, and indeed, 
Luís Adão da Fonseca, in his introduction to the text, characterizes the constable as a resolute 
patriot: ―the Constable valorizes the necessity of a link between the subject and society, in which 
the love of the ‗pátria,‘ the citizen‘s responsibility, and the urgency of an attitude oriented 
toward serving the community are constant references‖ (XI). On the other hand, this point of 
view stems from an almost exclusive emphasis on the Sátira‘s glosses, whose relation to the rest 
                                                 
8
 The Constable claims that there are only 100 glosses (12). 
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of the text is in fact a contentious point.
9
 After all, the sentimental narrative, while still 
overwhelmingly concerned with virtue, is focused almost entirely on the narrator‘s inner life, 
leading Gascón Vera to claim that for the Constable, ―man‘s duty is to himself, dedicating his 
activity to the pursuit of individual virtue‖ (55). This dual tension, between, on the one hand, 
interiority and exteriority, and on the other, the disparate structural elements of the Sátira, can 
best be approached initially through an examination of the genre to which it belongs, that of 
sentimental fiction, itself often adduced as evidence of nascent Castilian humanism. 
 
Structure and Introspection in Sentimental Fiction 
 
There are several relationships to untangle here: that of the structural elements of the text 
(prose, poetry, gloss) among themselves; that of private and public virtue; and, from the broadest 
perspective, that of interiority and exteriority, of dramatized sentiment and historical example. 
This group of tensions is present, to various degrees and in various forms, throughout the genre 
of sentimental fiction, whose very existence has been grounds for vigorous scholarly debate. 
Those who accept its critical validity tend to identify two axes around which the genre is said to 
spin: structural hybridity and the predominance of psychological action.
10
 In this vein, Alan D. 
Deyermond summarizes the genre‘s main characteristics thus: ―brevity, the predominance of 
psychological interest over external action, a tragic vision of love, autobiographism (first-person 
narration, or a narrator who is also a character), and the inclusion of letters or poetry (or, often, 
                                                 
9
 In fact, Antonio Paz y Meliá‘s 1892 edition of the Sátira, included in his Opúsculos literarios de los siglos XIV á 
XVI, includes only a small selection of the glosses. 
10
 For those interested in the existential debate surrounding sentimental fiction, a good starting point is Keith 
Whinnom‘s The Spanish Sentimental Romance, 1440-1550: a Critical Bibliography, since it establishes a canon of 
twenty-one works belonging to the genre (of which the Sátira is the third, chronologically). A good recent summary 
of the debate is found in Cortijo Ocaña (7-18). Other important texts are Brandenberger, Blay, the various essays in 
Gwara and Gerli (Studies), Rohland de Langbehn (La unidad genérica), Deyermond (Tradiciones), and recent 
special issues of La corónica (29.1) and Ínsula (651). 
92 
 
both) in the narrative‖ (Tradiciones 47).11 Structural factors such as brevity and the inclusion of 
letters or poetry are adduced alongside psychological ones such as a tragic vision of love, and 
they are not always presented as merely complementary. For example, E. Michael Gerli relates 
the genre‘s psychological focus to its roots in cancionero poetry: 
The sentimental romance seeks to be lyrical through narrative. Like the courtly lyric from 
which in large part it doubtless developed, the sentimental romance sets out to express 
intimate experience, to create mood and sympathy before explaining or justifying the 
origins of those feelings ... Through the exploitation of verse, epistles, and allegory, the 
romancers sought to create the aesthetic effect of poetry in order to represent and 
investigate in detail the hidden world of emotion and motivation. (―Poetics‖ 476) 
 
Gerli goes further, arguing that sentimental fiction‘s focus on emotion to the detriment of 
―battles and thrilling adventure‖ was a crucial step in the development of the novel (480).12 On 
the other hand, the representation of emotion in sentimental fiction is not necessarily 
recognizable from a modern point of view as psychological realism (Varela 11), and a focus on 
emotion is not necessarily an end in itself, but can be a polemical claim: ―a vociferous 
reaffirmation of sentiment as a faculty and noble, trustworthy form of human perception‖ (Varela 
32). As such, the critical debate around sentimental fiction reproduces, in its own way, the 
tensions already present in the works themselves: emotion can be an escape from fantasy or from 
reality; it can transfer ―poetry‘s function as a timeless and spaceless medium of self-analysis‖ 
(Gerli, ―Poetics‖ 477) to the realm of prose or make an epistemological claim valid for both the 
interior and exterior world; poetry, letters, and glosses can be present as vestiges of a medieval 
past or harbingers of a modern future. In the end, what the critical debate highlights is the need to 
move away from panoramic or synchronic views (while not ignoring the relationships among 
                                                 
11
 Deyermond also lists the four main sources of the genre: books of chivalry, Italian fiction (especially Boccaccio‘s 
Fiammetta), Ovid‘s Heroides, and cancionero poetry (49). 
12
 In this sense, Gerli‘s article is also an entry in the debate on the modernity of fifteenth-century Iberian culture. 
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individual texts) – that is, away from what Jauss calls the ―rule-and-instance‖ conception of 
genre (80) – and toward a hermeneutic that considers individual authors‘ recontextualizations 
and structural juxtapositions from a wider, but fluid, perspective. This chapter represents an 
attempt at analysis according to this hermeneutic. 
Identifying sources and conventions is important from this perspective – but only as an 
analytical starting point. When employing this methodology, scholars often place too much 
weight on the past and even present of a work, ignoring the ―socially formative‖ function of 
literature (Jauss 45). Writers working within a contemporarily identifiable tradition may evoke 
for readers a ―horizon of expectations,‖ but they are not obligated merely to validate those 
expectations. Rather, what at first seems familiar in a new text, the apparent ―rules of the game,‖ 
―can ... be varied, extended, corrected, but also transformed, crossed out, or simply reproduced‖ 
(Jauss 88). It is this possibility of transformation rather than reproduction that can be socially 
formative: 
The horizon of expectations of literature distinguishes itself before the horizon of 
expectations of historical lived praxis in that it not only preserves actual experiences, but 
also anticipates unrealized possibility, broadens the limited space of social behavior for 
new desires, claims, and goals, and thereby opens paths of future experience (Jauss 41). 
 
The question, then, is not what change the Sátira effected, but what change it could have effected 
(and it is precisely this counterfactual formulation that makes it and other medieval texts relevant 
to contemporary debates). The Sátira‘s combination of sentimental prose, courtly poetry, and 
encyclopedic gloss is certainly, in retrospect, exemplary of the modern category of sentimental 
fiction. But the concept of exemplarity fails to give a full account of the work (of any work), and 
not only because of its unique characteristics, such as its single-minded focus on the 
compassionate galardón. Rather, the Sátira must also be analyzed as a rhetorical document, 
since rhetoric‘s aspirational quality brings the future into analytical focus. This is true for any 
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text, but is of particular relevance to the Sátira, which bears the formal mark of medieval rhetoric 
(a point to which I will return shortly) and seeks to take advantage of the classical relationship 
between rhetoric and affect. 
 Thus, it is not sufficient explanation to show, as Guillermo Serés has indeed convincingly 
shown, that the Sátira‘s main sources are, for the sentimental narrative, Juan Rodríguez del 
Padrón‘s Siervo libre de amor (―Ficción‖ 38),13 and for the glosses, Alfonso de Madrigal‘s Las 
diez qüestiones vulgares (39), and then dismiss the Constable as a typical noblemen – and a 
young one at that – eager to show off his second-hand erudition:  
The Sátira is thus a product typical of the mode of composition employed by most of the 
―caballeros‖ interested in approaching the auctores and demonstrating a certain degree of 
erudition; in both cases, however, they do not manage to escape from encyclopedic 
culture, which, in this case, is represented by the bishop of Ávila [i.e., Alfonso de 
Madrigal]. (Serés, ―Don Pedro‖ 982) 
 
If nothing else, the very juxtaposition of Rodríguez del Padrón and Madrigal is novel and in need 
of some explanation; beyond that, it is hard to see how a work that is part of a nascent genre can 
be dismissed as conventional. In fact, some revolutionary claims have been made on the Sátira‘s 
behalf: not just that it is a stepping-stone on the way to the novel, but, as Marina S. Brownlee has 
argued, that it subverts both ―the amorous discourse which it purports to valorize‖ (475) and 
allegory and gloss themselves as heuristic modes (481-85).
14
 To understand (and evaluate) the 
grounds for these claims, it will be necessary to enter into the work itself through an analysis of 
the Constable‘s introductory letter, wherein he explains his own didactic intentions and the role 
the glosses play in furthering them. 
 
                                                 
13
 The constable makes explicit reference to Rodríguez del Padrón in the Sátira (137), although it is to his Triunfo de 
las donas, not to the Siervo. 
14
 On the ambiguous relationship of the Sátira‘s glosses to medieval notions of auctoritas, see Agnew. 
95 
 
Reprehensión 
  
Toward the beginning of the letter, the Constable offers a definition of ―sátira,‖ one that 
holds none of the comedic connotations now associated with satire: ―quiere dezir reprehension 
con animo amigable de corregir; e aun este nombre satira viene de satura, que es loor, e yo a ella 
primero loando, el femineo linage propuse loar, a ella amonestando como siervo a señora, a mi 
reprehendiendo de mi loca thema e desigual tristeza‖ (5) ―it means scolding [reprehension] in a 
friendly, corrective spirit; and this name ‗satire‘ comes from ‗satura,‘ which is praise, and I, 
praising her first of all, set out to praise the entire feminine lineage, admonishing her as a servant 
to his lady, and scolding myself for my mad theme and unequaled sadness.‖ This definition is not 
original to the Constable: similar ones are found in Santillana‘s Comedieta de Ponça, Mena‘s 
Coronación, Diego de Valera‘s Defensa de las virtuosas mugeres, and Enrique de Villena‘s Los 
doze trabajos de Hércules and Eneyda, and the definition originates in Saint Isidore (Serés, 
―Ficción‖ 36). That said, the first point to be noted here is that the Constable fails to carry out 
this ―satirical‖ program, triumphing in his debate with the personified virtues and thus making 
his lady, and not himself, the ultimate object of moral critique. More important is the use of 
reprehensión to describe the Sátira‘s central project. Reprehensión is not just a moral practice, 
but a rhetorical one. Or rather, rhetoric is itself part of moral philosophy: in his Cinco libros de 
Séneca, Alonso de Cartagena writes that ―la rhetorica se trabaia en loar lo honesto & reprehender 
lo torpe, segund que por los libros della asi de aristotiles com(m)o de tulio paresçe‖ (cited in 
Kohut, ―Der Beitrag‖ 194 n. 37) ―rhetoric is exercised in praising the honest and admonishing 
the misguided, as can be seen in the books of Aristotle and Cicero dedicated to it.‖ Furthermore, 
we have already seen, in chapter one, that Cartagena considered Aristotle‘s Rhetoric the final 
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part of a moral trilogy comprising the Ethics and Politics as well (Rhetórica 30).
15
 In the 
Constable‘s cultural milieu, then, rhetoric was understood as an instrument and constitutive 
element of moral philosophy. Cartagena‘s translation also includes a slightly different definition 
of reprehensión: ―Reprehensión es aquella por la qual argumentando omne o destruye o aflaca o 
adelgaza la confirmaçión de los adversarios‖ (92) ―Reprehensión is that through which the 
debater either destroys, weakens, or narrows the claim [confirmación] of his adversaries.‖ This 
understanding of reprehensión as rebuttal reveals the extent to which the structure of debate 
characterizes the entire Sátira – it not only includes dialogic debates, but is polemical to its core, 
an extended moral refutation. But just what is condemned in the text, if, as I claim, it is not the 
Constable‘s passionate love? 
 The dedicatory letter also explains the presence of the glosses, comparing them to the 100 
eyes of Argus, himself said to represent prudence (12). As eyes take in light and guide the body, 
the glosses will guide the reader, clarifying the text‘s obscure points. However, as Brownlee 
points out, Argus – who failed to protect Io when Hermes lulled all of his 100 eyes to sleep – is 
an astoundingly bad choice as prudence‘s representative (478). For Brownlee, this inapt allusion 
is part of the text‘s subversive program. But Argus‘s death at the hands of Hermes is not the end 
of the myth, nor of the Constable‘s retelling thereof: ―porque en la narraçion preçedente dize la 
piadosa Juno, de conpasion movida, la cabeça de Argos muerto trasmutar en la fermosa cola de 
pavon, la qual muchos ojos grandes e pequeños possee‖ (13; emphasis added) ―because as the 
foregoing narrative relates, the pious Juno, moved by compassion, transformed the dead Argus‘s 
head into the peacock‘s beautiful tail, which has many eyes, large and small.‖ Thus, compassion 
itself is placed at the mythic origin of the glosses, and it is also, therefore, placed in an 
                                                 
15
 Readers should recall that the translation of Cicero‘s De Inventione where this claim appears was undertaken at 
the request of the Constable‘s uncle Duarte. 
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epistemologically primary position, an originary element of the enlightenment (and adornment) 
the glosses provide. If Argus‘s eyes are a figure for perspectival instability, the multiple 
perspectives they represent are nonetheless rooted in Juno‘s compassionate gesture. The 
Constable offers compassion, not prudence‘s failure, as the hermeneutic key to the Sátira. And it 
is the moral and epistemological privileging of dispassionate prudence – along with discretion 
and reason – that is the target of the constable‘s reprehensión. 
 The next, and more difficult, question is to whom the confirmaçión of prudence, 
discretion, and reason should be attributed. There was, of course, a long tradition of poetic 
debates between the will (representing the passions) and reason; one example, in which the will 
emerges as the eventual victor, can be found in the next (chronological) work of sentimental 
fiction, the Triste deleytaçión (3-18).
16
 One of the chief features of the TD‘s debate is Reason‘s 
wariness of the Will‘s rhetorical ability. Thus, Reason says of the Will, ―[V]uestras fengidas 
razones con alguna color de verdat reçitadas no dan a mí causa de alguna neçesidat uviese de dar 
fe en ellas‖ (4) ―Your feigning arguments, recited with a certain color of truth, give me no 
necessary reason to believe them.‖  ―Color‖ here recalls the rhetorical ―colors‖ or techniques 
found in medieval rhetorics.
17
 Rhetoric is thus aligned with the passions against the truth (as it 
had been in Plato‘s dialogues). Cartagena, again in the introduction to the Rhetórica, also draws 
attention to the link between rhetoric and affect – although without condemning the latter as false 
– when he writes that the ―princes of eloquence‖ did not just write composition guides, ―mas 
dieron sus generales doctrinas para argüir e responder, para culpar e defender e para mover los 
coraçones de los oyentes a saña o a misericordia o a las otras pasiones que en la voluntad 
humana cahen‖ (33; emphasis added) ―rather, they gave general doctrines for arguing and 
                                                 
16
 For a survey of these debates in the Castilian cancionero tradition, see Green 83-91. 
17
 For the colores grammatici and colores rhetoricae, see Murphy 20 n. 38 and 189-90. 
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responding, accusing and defending, and for moving the audience’s hearts to fury or mercy or 
the other passions of the human will.‖ This last rhetorical operation is, of course, the subject of 
the second book of Aristotle‘s Rhetoric, and thus is also a moral operation. And in Iberia‘s 
fifteenth-century discussion of moral philosophy, all three operations – debate (―argüir e 
responder‖), judgment (―culpar e defender‖), and affect – come together in the single concept of 
discretion. 
 
Discreçión 
 
As an essential element of judgment, discretion was a key topic of princely education. 
For example, according to the Tratado de la comunidad the king who ―non ha discreçión‖ is 
incapable of judging (94). But in the fifteenth century there was no real distinction between 
discretion (understood as discriminating prudence) as a public and private virtue: 
Aristotle differentiates between prudence as the power of discrimination, and the virtues 
as the forces necessary to act honorably. However, this is not reflected in the medieval 
system of virtues: in the Middle Ages prudence is in fact one of the virtues. This accounts 
for the reticence to describe politics as a domain of the practical world as opposed to a 
system of moral values. Medieval authors deal only with the moral system, which 
accounts for every human action ... The king‘s role is seen only from the perspective of 
his function as ruler, and the moral system only from the perspective of free will, vice, 
and responsibility. There is no distinction between the ethical character and the social 
condition of the king or the duties that concern him. (Rohland de Langbehn, ―Power and 
Justice‖ 202) 
 
In fact, prudence‘s role in medieval moral theory can be usefully analogized to the king‘s role in 
feudalism: just as the king was the most powerful, but not the only, lord, prudence is preeminent 
among the virtues, both of them and prior to them. As Santillana writes in his Proverbios o 
Centiloquio (written at the request of Juan II for the instruction of the future Enrique IV):  
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[Ç]iertamente bien meresçe 
Preminençia 
quien de doctrina e prudençia 
se guarnesçe. 
El comienço de salud 
es el saber 
destinguir e conosçer 
quál es virtud. (Poesías completas 383, l. 117-124; emphasis added) 
 
He certainly deserves preeminence who furnishes himself with doctrine and prudence. 
The foundation of health is knowing how to distinguish and recognize what is virtuous. 
 
The ability to resolve internal moral dilemmas is perfectly analogous to the ability to judge 
difficult cases – the latter an ability Santillana considers essential for winning the affection of 
one‘s subjects (Rohland de Langbehn, ―Power and Justice‖ 210). Furthermore, prudence is 
superior to eloquence: ―Si fueres gran eloquente, / bien será; / pero más te converná / ser 
prudente, / que el prudente es obediente / toda vía / a moral filosofía / e sirviente‖ (383-4, l. 137-
44) ―It is good to be very eloquent, but better to be prudent, for the prudent are always obedient 
servants to moral philosophy.‖ There is a strangely unresolved tension here between eloquence 
and moral philosophy encapsulated in the words ―toda vía.‖ On the one hand, they seem to 
imply, through their homonymity with ―todavía,‖ that the eloquent are no longer morally 
obedient. On the other, if it is taken to mean ―in all ways,‖ it points to the moral neutrality of 
eloquence, showing prudence to be the fundamental activator of eloquence‘s moral possibilities. 
 Already in Cartagena‘s Rhetórica, eloquence is posited as a morally neutral source of 
social cohesion. In a speculative passage on the origins of civilization, Cicero argues that a great, 
eloquent man must have arisen from the savage masses to persuade them to organize themselves. 
This man met first with resistance, but soon was able to persuade the others: ―E luego a 
comienço reclamavan con la sobervia que tenían, e después por la razón e por la eloquençia oían 
más voluntariosamente e de fieros e crueles que eran, tornó-los mansos e paçíficos‖ (36) ―And in 
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the beginning they complained out of their arrogance, and after, through reason and eloquence, 
they listened more willingly, and he made them, cruel beasts that they were, meek and peaceful.‖ 
The key here is not the meek state to which the audience was reduced, but the fact that they were 
persuaded to listen willingly. The sentence reenacts in miniature the conflict between reason and 
the will, and eloquence‘s target is shown to be the passions. But Cicero is also speculating about 
a supposed neglect of rhetoric in ancient times, and he posits that it came into disrepute because 
of some eloquent but bad-intentioned men who brought ―muy grandes destruimientos e dapños‖ 
to the cities they came to rule through their eloquence (38). Eloquence is therefore placed at the 
origin of both political community and bad governance; it is no wonder that medieval authors 
sought to avoid destructive eloquence by advocating prior discretion. 
In this way, the private virtue of discretion becomes the key to both virtuous eloquence 
and good governance. The king protects and foments communal morality through a two-fold 
exercise of discretion that, again, blurs the public/private distinction. The explicitly public 
element of the king‘s moral leadership is the administration of justice, but the king whose 
superior discretion leads to virtuous private behavior also serves his subjects as an exemplar of 
morality. For Santillana, these two roles (judge and exemplar) are inextricably linked: ―pues 
devémonos forçar / a bien fazer, / si queremos reprehender / o castigar‖ (388, l. 213-216) ―we 
should exert ourselves doing good if we want to admonish or punish.‖ Note, too, that the concept 
of reprehensión has made its return here, corresponding to the exemplary role of kingly virtue. 
The Proverbios are an important precursor to the Sátira, since in them Santillana anticipates the 
Constable‘s self-glossing. But even erudition should serve the goal of reprehensión: ―non 
cobdiçies ser letrado / por loor, / mas sçiente reprehensor / de pecado‖ (382, l. 101-104; 
emphasis added) ―do not desire to be a letrado for praise, but a knowing reprehensor of sin.‖ 
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Discretion, knowledge, and eloquence (in that order) enable the king to watch over public 
morality. 
In the Sátira, the Constable seems also to be exercising his erudition and eloquence in the 
service of reprehensión. It should alarm us, then, that his narrator defeats personifications of his 
own Discretion and his lady‘s Prudence in debate, only to end up in a moment of supreme 
indecision (incapacity to judge), able neither to take his own life nor to endure patiently his 
ongoing suffering. If we take the narrator to be merely a negative example whose bad end is a 
lesson to others, then the claims about the Sátira‘s adoption of lyric confession must surely be 
wrong: the narrator‘s emotions would be rhetorical instruments of the Constable‘s overarching 
moralism, and his eloquence in relating and defending them would simply lay bare rhetoric‘s 
moral vacuity. If this were the case, however, the narrator‘s full-throated condemnation of 
cruelty would also be fatally undermined. In effect, to ask readers simply to take the narrator‘s 
bad end at face value as a warning of love‘s risks is to leave unresolved the conflict between 
reason and will: reason‘s triumph is also cruelty‘s, and as the narrator himself says early on in a 
complaint against fortune, no two things are more opposed than cruelty and virtue: ―Et quales 
son o a do se fallaran mayores contrarios que crueldat e virtud? Tu los ayuntaste en la mas 
perfecta señora que bive, tu fesiste que su virtud e beldat engañassen mi coraçon, que de libre 
fuesse cativo e subjecto, e que su crueldat amenguasse e destruyesse en mi juvenil edat muy 
apressuradamente la mi vida‖ (33) ―And what are, or where can be found, greater opposites than 
cruelty and virtue? You joined them in the most perfect lady alive, you made her virtue and 
beauty trick my heart, which went from freedom to captivity and subjection, and you made her 
cruelty diminish and destroy, very quickly and at a young age, my life.‖ In other words, to take 
the narrator as a negative example is to ignore the text‘s central tension. On the other hand, to 
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take the narrator at his word that compassion – the galardón he seeks from his virtuous but cruel 
beloved – is the solution is to reject the model of virtue as subjugation of the will (that is, the 
passions) to reason. And it is through discretion that this subjugation takes place. Thus, the 
Constable dramatizes in the Sátira two moral conflicts: alongside the traditional one between 
reason and the will is another between compassion and discretion. Now, the moral model that 
exalts reason and discretion – from which the Constable wishes to escape – is drawn directly 
from the writings of the Aviz court. We must therefore turn now to texts from this cultural 
context in order to better understand the Constable‘s gesture of admonishment. 
 
Duarte’s Leal Conselheiro: Will, Experience, Example 
 
The Castilian tradition described above provides the form of the Sátira‘s debate and 
certainly affected the Constable‘s thinking; however, the Portuguese tradition best represented by 
the Constable‘s uncle, Duarte I, in his Leal Conselheiro (LC; ca. 1436-38), and father, the Infante 
Pedro, in his Livro da Virtuosa Bemfeitoria (VB; finished ca. 1430), played a more direct role in 
providing the debate‘s terms. In the Sátira, Prudence explains that the narrator‘s lady has 
removed her carnal, spiritual, and tepid wills from herself, now following only her praiseworthy 
and virtuous will (97-8). In his gloss on ―Voluntad carnal, spiritual e tibia,‖ the Constable 
explains that although for Aristotle the virtuous will is the only true will (the other three are 
―beastly appetites‖), we can speak of four kinds of will ―segund comun e vulgar locuçion, la qual 
no solo de muchos scientificos varones, mas aun de nuestro soberano Señor en la Sancta 
Escriptura algunas veses es aprovada‖ (98) ―according to common and vulgar speech, which is 
confirmed not only by many knowledgeable men, but also several times by our sovereign Lord in 
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Holy Scripture.‖ Although it goes unmentioned here, the likeliest immediate source for this 
theory of four wills is Duarte‘s LC, in which the concept is explored at length and given great 
moral weight. Duarte explains, in an opening letter to his wife, that the LC is a collection of 
various writings dedicated to ―the good management (regimento) of our consciences and wills 
(voontades)‖ (7), an ―ABC of loyalty‖ in which A refers to the ―powers and passions‖ we all 
have, B to the good that follows from virtue and kindness, and C to the correction of ―evils and 
sins‖ (9). The text contains a ―brief section‖ on the understanding, ―our most principal virtue‖ (8; 
―nossa virtude mui principal‖), to which Duarte has attached a hodge-podge of other writings – 
mostly his own, such as three autobiographical chapters about his own struggle with melancholy, 
but also by others, such as chapter 59, ―Sobre a prudencia, feito per o doutor Dieg‘Afonso.‖18 
Duarte presents his four-part theory of will, whose declared source is John Cassian‘s 
Conferences, in the section on the understanding. He condemns carnal will (―voontade carnal‖) 
because it leads to vicious desires and laziness. In a manner perhaps surprising to the modern 
reader, he also condemns spiritual will (―voontade espiritual‖), because it ―quer seguir aquelas 
partes em que se mais inclinom as virtudes e faz, aos que se despõem a vida de religiom, requerer 
que jejũem, vigiem, leam e rezem quanto mais poderem, sem nehũa descliçom‖ (21; emphasis 
added) ―wishes to follow those parts [of the will] most inclined toward the virtues, and it makes 
those who enter orders wish to fast, stay awake, read, and pray as much as possible, without 
discretion.‖ Here, Duarte is following Cassian closely, since for the latter, discretion is ―the 
begetter, guardian, and moderator of all virtues‖ (87).19 The risk of spiritual will, then, is that it 
                                                 
18
 In fact, the degree of unity or organization in the LC has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate. The 
traditional view has been that the text is a miscellany, following no unifying plan; recently, however, James A. 
Grabowska has argued that the text is a kind of sermon on loyalty, noting that its division of the theme into three 
(ABC) and its focus on personal anecdote are evidence of ―sermonic influence‖ (44, 52). 
19
 Cassian, in condemning the spiritual will, has in mind those monks tempted by demons into self-destructive acts 
of extreme asceticism. In his conference ―On the Goal and End of the Monk,‖ he names God, demons, and ourselves 
as the three possible sources of thoughts [i.e., emotions] (I.xix.1). Discretion ―holds the supreme and first place‖ 
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leads to immoderate fasting and praying. The constant conflict between these first two flawed 
wills leads to the third and most harmful will, tepid will (―voontade tiba‖), which seeks to satisfy 
each of the first two without offending the other (21). All three of these wills are contrary to 
discretion in that he who obeys them will ―vĩir a morte, sandice, ou enfermidade, perdimento de 
toda sua fazenda, pois nom guarda descliçom no que ha de fazer‖ (22) ―come to death, 
foolishness, sickness, or loss of all his possessions, for he does not exercise discretion in what he 
must do.‖ But tepid will is more dangerous than the others precisely because, in seeking 
―pleasant‖ moderation, it refuses to judge: ―E a terceira por querer complazer a estas ambas e as 
de todo concordar, o que fazer nom pode por seer batalha que Nosso Senhor Deos nos ordenou 
por nosso proveito, faz seguir as virtudes tam friamente que jamais nunca trazerá aquel que per 
tal voontade se governar a nem ũu boom estado‖ (22) ―And the third [will], because it wants to 
please the first two and maintain them in concord, which it cannot do because their battle was 
ordered by God for our benefit, makes one follow the virtues so coldly that it will never lead one 
governed by it to a good state.‖ 
The ―perfect and virtuous‖ fourth will (―voontade perfeita e virtuosa‖) stands in stark 
contrast to the tepid will in that, in deferring to the understanding, it refuses to placate the carnal 
and spiritual wills: 
E a quarta todo per o contrairo, porque todalas cousas que se apresentam ao coraçom de 
cada ũa destas tres as oferece ao entender que julgue se som de fazer ou leixar … assi 
esta quarta voontade todalas cousas faz ou leixa de fazer per exame de entender e razom 
… E naquesto se desvaira esta quarta voontade muito da terceira, porque aquela nom 
consente em tal guisa contradizer as duas primeiras que algũu agravamento sentam, e 
                                                                                                                                                             
(I.xxiii.1) among the virtues precisely because it allows us to surmise the source of a particular thought and act 
accordingly. It is important to keep in mind that the thoughts themselves, even those of demonic origin, are not sins 
and cannot be avoided altogether: ―It is, indeed, impossible for the mind not to be troubled by thoughts, but 
accepting them or rejecting them is possible for everyone who makes an effort. It is true that their origin does not in 
every respect depend on us, but it is equally true that their refusal or acceptance does depend on us‖ (I.xvii.1). In 
later thinkers such as Duarte, discretion is conceived of not so much as a way to identify the source of thoughts (or 
emotions), but as a way to react appropriately to them. 
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aquesta de todo lho contradiz quando determina o entendimento e razom que é bem de o 
fazer assim. (22-3; emphasis added) 
 
And the fourth [will] is the complete opposite, because everything the first three offer to 
the heart, the fourth offers to the understanding so that it can judge if it should be done or 
abandoned … thus, this fourth will does or abandons everything according to the analysis 
of the understanding and reason … And in this it differs greatly from the third, because 
the latter is not so willing to contradict the first two when they are aggrieved, and the 
former contradicts if the understanding and reason determine that something is good to 
do. 
 
Duarte‘s system, then, reinforces the close relationship of discretion and judgment that has been 
noted in the Castilian context.
20
 And although it seems to focus on individual virtue, its 
vocabulary of self-government – ―que jamais nunca trazerá aquel que per tal voontade se 
governar a nem ũu boom estado‖ – suggests a broader application. The combined metaphors – 
probably already dead – of ―boom estado‖ and ―governar-se‖ indicate once again this period‘s 
constitutive analogy between the private and the public. 
 Duarte‘s enumeration of the specific errors caused by the tepid will in the next chapter 
further demonstrates the social aspect of his general theory of the will.
21
 The chapter begins with 
a description of society‘s five estates: in addition to the familiar oradores, defensores, and 
lavradores, there are oficiaes (―conselheiros, juizes, regedores, veedores, scrivães e 
semelhantes‖) and a fifth, unnamed category of artisans and professionals (26). Duarte warns 
that ―o mal que vem desta tiba voontade é que querem seguir as partes doces do mester ou oficio 
em que vivem, e leixar o amargoso sem o qual d‘el bem nom podem usar‖ (28) ―the evil that 
comes from this tepid will is that they want to follow the sweet parts of their vocation or office, 
                                                 
20
 It also reinforces the close relationship between these two concepts and that of prudence, since ―sobr‘esta quarta 
voontade faz fundamento a real prudencia per que scolhemos o bem do mal‖ (24) ―prudence, which distinguishes 
good from bad, is founded upon this fourth will.‖ 
21
 The social relevance of the LC has been recognized by a number of critics in general terms. Thus, José Gama 
describes the text as a reflection of both ―the dominant society and thought of the Portugal of the first half of the 
fifteenth century‖ and the forward-looking ―motivating spirit‖ of the Ínclita Geração (50). 
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and avoid the bitter without which they cannot carry out their tasks well.‖ For example, the 
defensores, who as such receive numerous social and economic benefits, may be led by tepid 
will to try to avoid the dangerous responsibilities of their estate by, on the one hand, taking 
religious orders, or on the other, entering the mercantile economy (27). Thus, the private failings 
of the tepid will – in this case, a kind of greedy cowardice – are seen primarily as a threat to the 
existing idealized sociopolitical structure. At the same time, the limits of that idealization are 
starting to show, in that even the nuance Duarte adds to it (the two new estates) is inadequate to 
preserve the rigidity of its categories. And crucially, if we take into account the way Duarte 
differentiates tepid from perfect will, the refusal of the king‘s subjects to adhere to his own 
structural idealization is presented as an unreasonable failure to exercise judgment. 
 In the subsequent chapters, Duarte describes a second four-fold taxonomy of the will, this 
one more in line with traditional philosophical psychology. In this system, which complements 
the other one, the first three wills correspond to the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls, and 
the fourth is free will (32). None of these wills is inherently good or bad; rather, they are divided 
according to the behaviors they regulate and the level of creation to which they belong. That is, 
the vegetative will regulates activities, such as eating, drinking, and sleeping, that we share with 
trees; the sensitive regulates that which we share with the animals; and the rational will, ―in 
which men participate with the angels,‖ regulates that which has to do with virtue, honor, 
discretion, and pleasure (32-4). Finally, the free will reigns ―como senhor antre todas‖ (34) ―as 
lord among them all,‖ and ―no consentimento dela está o pecado e virtude‖ (35) ―in its consent 
lie sin and virtue.‖ Despite this last statement, however, it is clear that vice and virtue are at stake 
throughout this taxonomy, and emotion is at its center: the sensitive will regulates the twelve 
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passions,
22
 and ―por quanto em esto se resolve a maior parte de todos nossos feitos, me parece 
bem consiirarmos sempre como nos governamos em estas paixões‖ (33) ―because the majority of 
our actions are resolved in this, it seems good to me always to consider how we govern ourselves 
in our passions.‖ The fact that Duarte attributes to the passions ―the majority of our actions‖ 
demonstrates their centrality to moral (that is, practical) philosophy. And, again, the free will‘s 
judgment (in the form of ―consent‖) is the highest arbitrator, which is why the cardinal virtue 
that corresponds to the free will is justice (35; the understanding requires prudence, desire 
temperance, and irascibility strength). 
 As in the above case, psychological explanations throughout the LC are often 
subordinated to moral pedagogy. On the one hand, this element of Duarte‘s psychology has been 
noted by António José Saraiva for its distance from social reality (235). On the other, the same 
critic has already recognized in the specific case of Duarte what has been claimed generally 
about the status of politics in fifteenth-century Iberia: ―For Duarte, there is no specifically 
political sphere, different from the moral and religious spheres‖ (234). The taste for abstraction is 
not general throughout Duarte‘s moral pedagogy, however. Or rather, at least in pedagogical 
terms, that taste is accompanied by a suspicion of imagination. Thus, although the moral 
example was a crucial genre of wisdom literature in Castile (and Duarte himself owned a copy of 
Don Juan Manuel‘s Conde Lucanor23), Duarte announces in his introductory letter that the LC 
will not be a ―livro d‘estorias, em que o entendimento pouco trabalha por o entender ou se 
nembrar‖ (10) ―book of stories, which the understanding hardly works to understand or 
remember.‖ Indeed, later in the LC, he associates storytelling, even in the context of ―conselhos 
                                                 
22
 The sensitive will is itself divided into two parts, desiring (―desejador‖ – what others call ―concupiscible‖) and 
irascible (―iracivel‖). To the desejador belong, on the positive side, love, desire, and delight, and on the negative 
side (―enna parte do mal‖), hate, abhorrence, and sadness. To the iracivel belong, on the positive side, meekness, 
hope, and daring, and on the negative side, anger, desperation, and fear (33). 
23
 The entire inventory of Duarte‘s library can be found in Nascimento 284-86. 
108 
 
proveitosos,‖ with the sin of idleness (106). The few examples there are in the LC are 
overwhelmingly personal; along with the above-mentioned chapters on Duarte‘s bout of 
melancholy, there is a long chapter (349-61) about his father, João I (1357-1433), and a mention 
(56) of his cousin Henry V of England‘s exemplary determination in the Battle of Agincourt 
(1415). In other words, experience is preferred to imagination, and in fact, Duarte claims that 
―experience and practice‖ (229) are crucial to the attainment of prudence, whereas emotion is an 
unreliable guide: ―Sobre o que perteence aa virtude da prudencia, a mim parece que nom convem 
a persoas que virtuosamente desejom viver creer-se per seus corações em qualquer estado, por as 
grandes mudanças de seus sentimentos‖ (205) ―Regarding the virtue of prudence, it seems to me 
that those who wish to live virtuously should not follow their hearts in any state, because of the 
great changes in their feelings.‖ Duarte is remarkably interested in emotion, but shares the 
suspicion of it found throughout his period‘s moral literature; his own moral teaching combines 
schematic explorations of emotion and vice and virtue with a strong emphasis on the related 
concepts of reason, judgment, discretion, and prudence. And among the methods of transmitting 
moral lessons on these concepts, Duarte emphasizes familial exemplarity.
24
 In fact, he recounts 
his own bout of melancholy ―por tal que minha speriencia a outros seja exempro‖ (73) ―so that 
my experience can be an example to others.‖ 
The dearth of narrative examples in the LC is truly striking and sets it apart from a great 
deal of its contemporary moral literature. From this perspective, the Constable‘s didactic 
                                                 
24
 One way in which Duarte‘s emphasis on familiar exemplarity manifests itself in the LC is the repetitive presence 
of the verb ―filhar.‖ According to José Pedro Machado‘s Dicionário etimológico da língua portuguesa, the original 
meaning of filhar was to attract or adopt (as a child); it later came to mean ―take account of‖ or ―come over to‖ 
(―apossar-se‖), and its final meaning was to rob or kidnap (1042). Viterbo‘s Elucidário (1798) defines it as ―Tomar, 
receber, conquistar‖ and notes that it is ―do século XIII, XIV e XV‖ (271). Duarte uses the verb to describe his 
inclusion of passages from Cassian‘s Conferences (21), the onset of certain emotions (―suidade propriamente é 
sentido que o coraçom filha por se achar partido da presença d‘algũa pessoa‖ [98]), the adoption of virtues such as 
patience (33), and the conquest of cities (74). As such, the filial metaphor operates inwardly and outwardly, once 
again reflecting the implicit analogy between private and public governance. 
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adoption of the classical allusion as exemplum is important in considering the communitarian 
aspect of his moral thought. Charles Heusch has argued that in the absence of scholarly study of 
Aristotle‘s Ethics in Castile, an independent tradition formed in which ―moral thought closes 
itself off in ‗maxims‘ … it shapes itself as a petrified code in which a certain wisdom constitutes 
itself as an authority … The moral is an example that should be followed‖ (96). Duarte‘s familial 
or personal exemplarity lacks this appeal to authority in the sense that it is not axiomatic, 
depending rather on experience. If, as Giorgio Agamben argues in The Coming Community, the 
example is a ―concept that escapes the antinomy of the universal and the particular‖ in that it 
embodies both (9-10), then the Constable‘s readoption of narrative exemplarity in his classical 
allusions places emphasis on the (supposedly) universal, in contrast to Duarte‘s embrace of the 
particular. The Constable‘s communal gesture (in the sense that it refers readers to a body of 
knowledge authorized by others) is certainly not what Agamben has in mind, since for the latter 
the example‘s communitarian possibilities depend on its eternal situation between the universal 
and the particular; however, his understanding of the example helps suss out the orientational 
distinctions between the didactic strategies of Duarte and his nephew. 
 
Communal Reciprocity as Participation in the Infante Pedro’s Virtuosa Bemfeitoria 
 
Duarte‘s familial exemplar of discretion is Pedro, his brother and the Constable‘s father 
(LC 91). Pedro‘s historical reputation has fluctuated wildly over the centuries, and even during 
his life he was viewed as either a model of chivalry and selfless servant to the Portuguese nation 
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or a sinister slave to his own ambition.
25
 In any case, he took his regency seriously enough in the 
early going to ask Vasco Fernández de Lucena to translate Pier Paolo Vergerio‘s pedagogical 
treatise De ingenibus et liberalibus studiis (The Character and Studies Befitting a Free-Born 
Youth; ca. 1402) into Portuguese (Gascón Vera 35); Gascón Vera suggests that this treatise 
would therefore have formed part of the Constable‘s education (35). Like Duarte, Vergerio 
stresses the pedagogical importance of moral exemplars: ―Thus a young man inclined toward 
study who is aroused by the desire for virtue and true glory ought to select one man or a number 
of men who seem morally excellent to him, and whose life and character he will imitate to the 
extent that his age will allow‖ (13-5). And again, Vergerio‘s description of  books as  ―a kind of 
second memory‖ (45-7) is recalled in Duarte‘s somewhat facetious affirmation that writing 
things down is the ―mais certa maneira da arte memorativa‖ (20). But perhaps the most important 
element of Vergerio‘s pedagogy is his insistence that the education of young noblemen is crucial 
to the good governance of ―our cities‖ (21). Whether or not the Constable read Vergerio‘s 
treatise, there is no doubt that many of the Ínclita Geração‘s cultural enterprises were public-
minded; even Duarte‘s bout of melancholy was brought on by his excessive sense of duty in 
managing Portugal‘s domestic affairs, which had been delegated to him while his father 
attempted to conquer Ceuta (LC 73-4). 
Pedro himself translated Cicero‘s De officiis, and his Livro da Virtuosa Bemfeitoria, 
dedicated to Duarte, is based on (it might be more accurate to say ―inspired by‖) Seneca‘s De 
beneficiis.
26
 Pedro‘s initial definition of benefiçio is largely psychological, emphasizing that a 
                                                 
25
 Joaquim Costa‘s introduction to his edition of the Livro da Virtuosa Bemfeitoria (1946) is dedicated almost 
entirely to this historical controversy; Costa is an unabashed partisan of the Infante but recounts the charges against 
him, both during and after his life, quite thoroughly. 
26
 For a recent discussion of the VB‘s date of composition, see Gomes 269-270. The text is actually a collaboration 
between Pedro and his confessor, Frei João Verba: Pedro began composing the VB alone in 1418, Verba expanded 
on Pedro‘s work sometime after that, and Pedro gave the text a final retouching toward 1430 (Urbano Afonso 106). 
As Francisco Elías de Tejada notes in comparing the VB and De beneficiis, ―the shared theme gives rise to many 
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favor must be voluntary – in the strict sense of having ―sua naçença en o querer da uoontade‖ 
(33) – and disinterested: ―Beneffiçio propriamente he chamado, o quall homem da nom 
sguardando o proueyto de si meesmo, mas aquelle que de sy reçebe sguardando seu proueyto o 
outorga‖ (39) ―A man is properly said to do a favor when he does so without thinking of his own 
benefit, but only in that of the favor‘s recipient.‖ Ultimately, these psychological considerations 
will be grouped under the heading of intention, since ―entençom he aucto da uoontade, e o 
beneffiçio proçede della meesma‖ (43) ―intention is an act of will, and favors proceed from it.‖ 
In its focus on the giver‘s mental state, Pedro‘s definition of a gift or favor closely follows that of 
Seneca: 
What then is a favour? An act of benevolence bestowing joy and deriving joy from 
bestowing it, with an inclination and spontaneous readiness to do so. Thus what matters is 
not the deed or the gift but the mentality behind them: the kindness lies not in the deed or 
gift but in the mind itself of the person responsible for the deed or gift. (I.6.(1)) 
 
For Seneca, these psychological requirements mean that favors can only be carried out between 
individuals: ―favours should not be showered on the crowd, and it is not right to cast anything 
about – least of all, your favours. Take away the element of judgment and they cease to be 
favours‖ (I.2.(1)).27 It is here where Pedro departs radically from his source; favors are 
necessarily intersubjective – ―Nem chamaremos piedoso a quem se perdoa, nem misericordioso 
ao que sente e ha compayxam dos seus padeçimentos‖ (41) ―We will not call ‗pious‘ one who 
pardons himself, nor ‗merciful‘ one who feels compassion for his own suffering‖ – but 
furthermore, they are a crucial medium of communal adhesion, for which political leaders are 
responsible. Thus, just as doctors err in treating acute pains without curing the general malady, 
                                                                                                                                                             
common perspectives and inevitable parallels; but, in general, [Pedro‘s] argument follows independent paths, 
developing along its own lines‖ (8). 
27
 In their introduction to On Favours, John M. Cooper and J.F. Procopé write: ―On Favours is a work about acts of 
kindness by individuals to other individuals. Seneca is not concerned with the spectacular benefactions – the 
erection of lavish public buildings, the financing of festivals and so forth – by monarchs, magistrates, and local 
notables – to entire communities, important though these were in the ancient world‖ (186). 
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rulers err in addressing their own problems without purging those of the community 
(comunydade) (86).
28
 
This generally communal outlook unfolds into an analysis of the feudal social structure as 
Pedro explores the exchange of favors between different estates.
29
 According to Pedro, there are 
three links (―lianças‖) that oblige people to help each other. The first is spiritual, based on divine 
love or charity (100). The second is natural; it is felt between those who ―share the same nature,‖ 
and its strength is proportional to the degree of relation between two people (101). It is the third 
link, ―political and moral,‖ that is most relevant to governance: 
A iij liança he politica e moral. E faz per concordauel e rrazoado deseio de muytos, pera 
se manteerem bem em aqueste mundo fazendo uida comuũ. E em aquesto ha 
desuayramento, porque segundo q o senhor he mais uniuersal, tanto deue seer mais 
deseiado a seu proueyto. E esto se entende se o proueyto he tall q faça melhoria em a 
comunydade. (101) 
 
The third link is political and moral. It is made through the concordant and reasoned 
desire of many, to live well in this world making a common life. And in this there is 
confusion, because the more universal the ruler, the more desirable his benefit. And this 
can be understood if the benefit is such that it improves the community. 
 
In a community well governed through favors, reason cannot purge desire (Pedro has already 
cited approvingly Augustine‘s claim that ―nunca se pode fazer obra rrazoauel, se a uoontade nom 
tem em ella sua tençom‖ [43]); hence, a ―reasoned desire‖ is called for. There is also a 
fundamental but tenuous reciprocity to this liança: the leader‘s greater cosmological weight 
(―mais uniuersal‖) means that his profit is most to be sought, and, by implication, most likely to 
                                                 
28
 Later in the text, Pedro insists on this point: ―E consyrando nos q o bem comuũ he melhor q o perssoal 
prinçipalmente acorreremos a elle‖ (99) ―And considering that the common good is better than the personal, we will 
attend to the former principally.‖ 
29
 For Tejada, Pedro‘s concrete social analysis is the source of the political in the text: ―The political manifests itself 
in the conception of the theory of political community as the exchange of external benefits, as the weaving-together 
of men appreciative of concrete and palpable favors‖ (17). 
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benefit the entire community – although the final subjunctive construction makes it clear that this 
process is not automatic. 
 If the benefits of this liança are reciprocal, so are its obligations: ―O prinçipe e a 
comunydade teem antre sy special e stremada liança, per cuio aazo som theudos de acorrerem 
aas neçessidades commuunes. E cada hũa perssoa q uiue em a comunydade, a esto meesmo he 
obrigada‖ (107) ―The prince and the community have between them a special and unparalleled 
link, through whose tie they are obliged to attend to common needs. And each person who lives 
in a community is obliged to this.‖  The mechanism that assures this sense of mutual obligation 
is bemquerença itself: ―E porem deue a benquerença seer antre o prinçipe e o poboo tam firme q 
ambos aiam ygual sentimento de hũa desauentura e tomem huũ mesmo prazer pollo bem q 
ouuerem‖ (108). ―And therefore the good will between the prince and the people should be so 
strong that both suffer a misfortune equally and take the same pleasure in the good that comes to 
them.‖ Thus, the concept of bemquerença goes beyond ―good will‖ or even ―love‖ (which is how 
Duarte defines it [LC 167]) into empathetic – or compassionate – terrain.30 The leader, ―sentindo 
a door da comunydade auera compaixom dos menbros q o soportam‖ (135) ―feeling the 
community‘s pain, will have compassion for the members that support him,‖ and the subjects, 
―sentindo … per afeyçom leal as neçessidades do prinçipe, deseiaram de comprir a sua 
uoontade‖ (138) ―feeling … through loyal affection the needs of the prince, will desire to do his 
will.‖31 Psychological unity – the compassion, affection, and shared intention, desire, or will 
between leader and subjects, all of which are based on bemquerença – is not the sign of a well-
                                                 
30
 Pedro, like the Castilian thinkers discussed in chapter one, goes so far as to say that two friends should have no 
fear in counseling each other, ―pois homem strangeyro nom sta antre elles, mas cada huũ he tornado em outro, e 
ambos som feytos hũa perssoa‖ (117; emphasis added) ―since there is no discrete man between them, but rather, 
each has become the other, and both have become one person.‖ 
31
 In the Sátira, the constable focuses on compassion rather than affection as an element of communal cohesion, but 
as Josiah Blackmore has shown, afeiçom was a crucial term for fifteenth-century Portuguese thinkers. Blackmore 
notes several occurences of afeiçom connoting goodwill in the VB (16), and points out that it is explicitly opposed to 
reason in Duarte‘s LC, where it furthermore ―clouds the mind that must act judiciously‖ (17). 
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governed kingdom, but the cause. Public bemfeitoria – the active outcome of the bemquerença at 
the heart of the third, political and moral liança – is the participatory manifestation of this 
unity.
32
 
 The characteristic that governs bemfeitoria is not compassion, however – and this is 
where the Sátira will ultimately differ from the VB – but discreçom: ―todos deuemos seer 
prinçipalmente fazedores das benffeyturias. E porquanto pera esto auemos mister aiudoyro, he 
neçessayro de seer nossa guyador a uirtuosa discreçom‖ (95) ―we should all be granters of favors 
above all. And to the extent that we need help in this, it is necessary that our guide be our 
virtuous discretion.‖ Discretion is yet another articulation between the interior and exterior, 
since, as Pedro, echoing Duarte, explains, it contributes to bemfeitoria principally by allowing us 
to understand our place in society: ―E a discreçom … diz a cada huũ que direytamente quiser dar 
beneffiçios q primeyro conheça sy meesmo sguardando queiando he o seu stado‖ (96) ―And 
discretion … tells each person who wants to do favors right away that he must first know 
himself, considering which is his estate.‖ Furthermore, discretion ―beautifies‖ (―afremosenta‖) a 
favor by allowing its author to recognize its potential benefit (170). For Pedro, then, the conflict 
between reason and the passions is understated, as discretion is imagined as a guide that allows 
the unified, reasoned desires of a given society to be carried out.
33
 The Infante differs in this way 
from his brother, whose keen interest in emotion runs up against a more traditional faith in 
reason and prudence. Of the two brothers, Pedro is more often accused of archaism, and it is true 
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 As we have seen, a less articulated for of this same psychological unity is at the heart of the Castilian Tratado de 
la comunidad, whose definition of ―community‖ reproduces not only the connection between shared will and good 
governance, but also, in referring to ―personas mayors e medianas e menores‖ (87), Pedro‘s concern for social 
hierarchy. 
33
 It cannot be said that this conflict is completely absent; early in the VB, Pedro makes the familiar assertion of the 
understanding‘s superiority among our faculties: ―Segundo q ueemos q o entender porque he fundado em natureza 
spiritual he mais perffeyto q o sentir, o quall em a corporall sensualidade tem seu naçimento‖ (67-8) ―We see that 
the understanding, because it is grounded in our spiritual nature, is more perfect than perception, which is born of 
bodily sensation.‖ 
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that his Scholastic style seems backward-looking next to Duarte‘s confessional idiosyncrasy.34 
However, in political terms, the VB probably anticipates future events better than the LC, since 
within its feudal structure one can perceive a defense of the prince‘s political standing in line 
with other European trends toward the centralization of royal power (Gomes 267).
35
 And while 
the Constable ―adopts‖ relatively intact Duarte‘s theory of will in his glosses, it is the close 
relationship of discretion, interior and exterior governance, and compassion that he explores 
most thoroughly in the Sátira. 
 
Discretion’s Plea 
 
In the Sátira‘s introductory letter, the Constable twice emphasizes his work‘s novelty: he 
translated it into Castilian because ―todas las cosas nuevas aplazen,‖ and his self-glossing is also 
a novel feature (9). He asserts self-glossing‘s novelty by constrasting it with ancient practice: 
―Ffize glosas al testo, aunque no sea acostumbrado por los antiguos auctores glosar sus obras‖ 
(9) ―I made glosses for the text, although it was not usual for ancient authorities to gloss their 
works.‖ The daring of these novel practices should not be confused with arrogance, however; the 
Constable has already clarified that he wrote in Castilian ―mas costreñido de la neçessidat que de 
la voluntad‖ (9; this is a reference to his exile) ―more out of necessity than desire,‖ and he added 
                                                 
34
 Already in 1919, Manuel Paulo Merêa wrote that Pedro could only be considered a precursor of the Renaissance 
in the general way in which the entire Middle Ages were its precursor (21), and Joaquim de Carvalho argued in 1949 
that, in contrast to the practices of the Italian Humanists, the classical references in the writings of the Ínclita 
Geração are merely made to reinforce ideas already dominant at their court (57). More recently, Armando Luís de 
Carvalho Homem and Isabel Beceiro Pita contrast Duarte, as a ―modernizing exponent of fifteenth-century 
Portuguese political thought,‖ with Pedro and the ―archaizing sense of the theory of the feudal favor palpable in the 
VB‖ (943 and 943 n. 66). Gascón Vera describes bemquerença itself as a ―feudal principle‖ (41). 
35
 Along these lines, but from a purely biographical perspective, it should also be noted that in his struggles against 
other feudal lords during his regency, Pedro almost always had the support of the people (Costa XI).  
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glosses out of the fear that his text would raise more questions than it answered (9-10).
36
 This 
letter‘s content may, in broad outline, contain all of the elements of medieval accessi ad auctores 
(Serés, ―Ficción sentimental‖ 48), but its discussion of novelty and fortune also introduces the 
theme of the overcome will. The Constable‘s will was not, however, overcome by his reason or 
discretion; rather, circumstances led to his adoption of Castilian, which is only retrospectively 
justified as an aesthetic choice. The glosses follow the opposite path: the Constable‘s classical 
allusions were first the product of his increasing ―gozo‖ in writing about the ―worthwhile lives of 
Antiquity‖ that he discovered (10) – only later did he realize that they would require explanation. 
In narrating the production of his novel work of moral instruction, then, the Constable 
emphasizes aesthetic choices based on circumstance and pleasure, thus undermining any 
universalist or encyclopedic pretensions that might have been imputed to him. At the same time, 
the ultimate motive of his writing is his romantic suffering, which led him to try to ―declarar mi 
apassionada vida‖ (4). Even the didactic goal of reprehensión is retrofitted into these emotional 
circumstances, so that the Sátira is ultimately presented as a work in which the moralistic 
impulse occasioned by emotional suffering is successively hijacked by historical circumstance, 
the pure pleasure of study, and, finally, the alternative moral response of compassion, 
exemplified by Juno‘s transformation of the eyes of her imprudent, murdered sentinel into those 
of the peacock‘s tail. 
 The rhetorical nature of the Sátira‘s opening (both its letter and introductory chapter) is 
not exhausted by its reference to reprehensión or its structural similarity to the accessi ad 
auctores. The first chapter opens in the prison of love, where the narrator is a captive; he gives 
the day, month, and hour in which the narrative begins, and also tells readers of his young age 
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 The constable makes a similar claim about the necessity of the work as a whole in his gloss on ―Luçio Sila‖: ―[L]o 
fago mas como cosa neçessaria que voluntaria‖ (30). 
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(15-20). In his gloss on ―En el comienço de la terçera edat de mis años,‖ he explains that the 
inclusion of this information is evidence of the ―author‘s‖ (―auctor‖) emotional state, since those 
who are suffering mark time more closely (23). Furthermore, he specifies his age in order to 
provoke the compassion of ―aquella persona a quien se quexava‖ (―the person to whom he was 
complaining‖), since he was too young for such suffering (23). In this way, novelty, youth, and 
suffering are linked, given that ―toda nueva dolor al humano coraçon mas llaga e fiera que otra 
alguna‖ (23) ―each new pain wounds the human heart more fiercely than any other‖; this is the 
mirror-image of the introductory letter‘s association of novelty with pleasure. The formulation 
―aquella persona a quien se quexava,‖ which superficially should refer to the author‘s beloved, is 
in fact ambiguous: the narrator has not yet begun to speak (or complain), and in the very 
sentence in which he reveals his age, he explains that even now he lacks the daring to speak of or 
write about ―tan desiguales penas e desmesuradas cruezas‖ (20-3) ―such unparalleled pains and 
immeasurable cruelties.‖ In other words, in the sentimental narrative the narrator tells us that to 
this day he lacks the daring to complain, whereas in the gloss we are introduced to an auctor who 
is already complaining in an effort to provoke compassion. The auctor and narrator are identified 
with one another, which implies that the sentimental narrative is itself the complaint, but that its 
audience (the narrator‘s beloved) is therefore different from that of the glosses (the reader). In 
this way, readers can imagine themselves reading the sentimental narrative alongside the 
beloved, but with the exegetical advantage of the glosses, which foster the compassion the 
beloved lacks. And it is no surprise that this appeal to the audience‘s compassion is phrased in 
terms of the narrator‘s novel and unique suffering. Alonso de Cartagena‘s translation of De 
inventione ends with a discussion of the conquistión or quexamiento, ―aquella fabla que procura 
mover a los oyentes a misericordia e compasión: e en esta conquestión e quexamiento conviene 
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primeramente fazer el coraçón del oyente misericordioso, porque más ligeramente se mueva a la 
misericordia que le piden‖ (109-10) ―that speech that seeks to move the audience to mercy and 
compassion: and in this conquestión and complaint one should first make the listener‘s heart 
merciful, so that it can be more easily moved to mercy asked of it.‖ The gloss on the narrator‘s 
age, which closely associates complaint (―se quexava‖) and compassion, certainly carries out this 
rhetorical operation primeramente, and it does so through one of Cicero‘s recommended 
methods: ―declarar los tiempos e dezir por quien e en quales males fueron e son e serán‖ 
(Rethórica 110) ―declare the times and explain who is responsible and in which bad 
circumstances [the speaker] finds and will find himself.‖ The gloss makes this operation explicit 
but specifies a misleading target, so that the rhetorical seeking of compassion from the beloved 
becomes itself a technique for arousing the compassion of the reader. This rhetorical doubling 
will recur throughout the Sátira. 
As the first chapter comes to a close, the narrator imagines how cruelty might respond to 
his complaint (by arguing that the examples of historical suffering he has adduced far outstrip his 
own), and then condemns fortune for having united cruelty and virtue, which should be the 
greatest opposites, in his beloved (33). The figures of cruelty and fortune are not allegorized, 
however; this dialogue is consciously imagined, taking place in the realm of pensamiento, and 
the narrator‘s interlocutors never speak directly for themselves. After condemning the conflation 
of cruelty and virtue in his beloved, the narrator experiences a crucial mental break: ―Assy 
estando, a oras fablava, a oras callava ... Ya mis sentidos enmortesçidos, ya mi seso, ya mi 
entendimiento, cansados de tan continuos males, me reprehender mi libre voluntad en contra de 
quantos biven, desseava mi mal e mi final perdimiento‖ (33-4) ―In this state, I sometimes spoke, 
sometimes kept silent … My senses had swooned, my brain, my understanding, were tired of 
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such continuous suffering, my free will admonished me that against all the living, I desired my 
own ill and my final loss.‖ The allegorical debates that follow this break are thus set beyond the 
reach of the understanding, after its failure to cope with romantic cruelty, and the narrator‘s 
Discretion steps in as reason‘s last champion. The battle has probably already been lost, 
however, since it takes place on definitively affective terrain, and Discretion‘s very 
personification shows that the ground has shifted. Furthermore, Discretion is represented as 
having been blindfolded for the last five years (34) – when compassion is elsewhere in the Sátira 
associated with sight. Finally, Discretion speaks ―mas por faser lo que devia que por contrastar 
mi infinito querer‖ (34) ―more to do what it should than to contradict my infinite desire‖ and is 
thus associated, as it is in Duarte and Pedro, with duty, which turns out to be an inadequate moral 
motive – as Discretion‘s failure in the ensuing debate makes clear. 
Discretion quickly identifies the will – particularly the free will – as the central variable 
in the narrator‘s moral equation: ―O çiego ombre, conosçe lo que fases! Piensa lo que faras! Que 
te puedo dezir, salvo el mas malaventurado de los nasçidos, pues tu pena quieres, e tu pena 
seguiendo desseas?‖ (35; emphasis added) ―O blind man, recognize what you are doing! Think 
about what you are going to do! What can I call you but the most unfortunate of the living, since 
you want your pain, and pursue it in your desire?‖ Predictably, then, Discretion tries to draw the 
debate into the familiar moral territory of action (―Piensa lo que faras‖) and decision; if the 
narrator‘s actions can be ascribed to his free will, he becomes the only responsible moral actor. 
Discretion‘s short speech ends with a plea for the narrator to free himself from the prison of love 
by fighting against his will (voluntad, not libre albedrío): ―O ombre cativo, desencarçela tu 
libertad de la tenebrosa e muy amarga carçel! Pelea, pelea con tu voluntad e, otra ves te digo, 
pelea, e non con otro, synon contigo mesmo, e non seas contento nin seas deseoso de tantas 
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penas sofrir, syn aver piedat de ty e de la triste vida tuya‖ (41) ―O captive man, release your 
freedom from its dark and most bitter prison! Struggle, struggle against your will and, I say 
again, struggle, and not with another, but with yourself, and do not be content to suffer such pain 
and even desire it, without pity for yourself and your sad life.‖ This final plea is emblematic of 
the moral tradition that stresses individual virtue. Morality, understood as the purging of the 
passions (this, after all, is what it would mean to free oneself from the prison of love), is reduced 
to a battle between will and free will; the inwardness of this battle is stressed by the emphatically 
repetitive call to have pity on himself and on his sad life.
37
 The Constable‘s goal in the rest of the 
Sátira will be to reassert intersubjective compassion (through the figure of the beloved who takes 
pity on her servant) as a vital factor in moral calculation, in essence highlighting the mortal 
affective stakes of mutual obligation. 
 
The Courtly Lover and the Frozen Rider 
 
The Infante Pedro‘s rendering of this mutual obligation in the VB does not go far enough 
in seeking a moral role for the passions; the Constable finds in the tradition of cancionero poetry 
a different evaluation of their moral weight. Although the Sátira‘s debt to the cancionero 
tradition has been suggested, the exact nature of this debt – beyond a borrowed affective palette 
– has not been explored.38 The general attitude toward emotion found in this poetry is in fact not 
terribly far from the skepticism of moral philosophy; Rafael Lapesa lists among the most typical 
elements of the courtly tradition ―the ponderous description of suffering, pleasure in pain, 
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 It is useful to recall here Pedro‘s pronouncement that those who have compassion for their own suffering are not 
to be called piedoso (41). 
38
 Gerli has noted that the Sátira ―has numerous elements in common‖ with this lyric tradition, and it was he (to the 
best of my knowledge) who first made the explicit link between the constable‘s pursuit of compassion and the 
lyrical concept of the galardón (―Revaluation‖ 112-13). 
121 
 
struggle between reason and desire, fear of death, [and] confusion before the beloved‖ (148).39 
As this list makes clear, cancionero poets tended to view the passions not just as morally risky, 
but as mortally dangerous. The will is furthermore almost always victorious in its debates with 
reason; in this strong appraisal of desire‘s power, these poets were the pessimistic counterpart to 
the Stoic moralists. At the same time, cancionero poetry, in its very pessimism and also in its 
formal attributes, makes manifest a communal writing practice and a tendency toward collective 
sentiment that are highly relevant for both the analysis of the Sátira and modern debates about 
the communitarian possibilities of writing itself. 
Courtly poetry bears out Michel Maffesoli‘s description of style‘s inherent dialogism (see 
chapter one) in generic terms, in its trading of insult poems and, most prominently, in its poetic 
debates, which could involve six or seven poets; these are forms of poetic creation that 
presuppose not just an audience, but the intervention of foreign poetic wills.
40
 This phenomenon 
can be perceived outside of literal exchanges of poetry between more than one poet, however. 
Maffesoli‘s identification of collective sentiment as an important stimulus of artistic expression 
is also made explicit in the stylized suffering of, for example, Lope de Estúñiga: 
Llorad, mis llantos, llorad, 
llorad la paſſión de mí, 
llorad la mi libertad 
que por amores perdí; 
llorad el tiempo paſſado 
paſſado ſyn galardón, 
llorad la triſte paſſión 
de mí, muerto et non finado (Cancionero de Estúñiga 6.1-8). 
                                                 
39
 Lapesa also notes as particularly Castilian the tendency to avoid ―the physical portrayal of the lady, concentrating 
on the psychological interiority of the lover‖ (150). Regarding the enjoyment of suffering, this is the very accusation 
leveled at the narrator by his Discretion (see above); the second motto adopted by the Constable was ―Paine pour 
joie‖ (Gascón Vera 44). 
40
 Joaquín Gimeno Casalduero discusses one such debate, found in the Cancionero de Baena, whose topic is free 
will and whose contributors included the chancellor of Castile, a Jeronymite monk, a Muslim physician, and one of 
the king‘s converso scribes (1). Debate poetry is not, of course, exclusive to the Iberian cancioneros, but they are the 
Constable‘s likeliest direct model. 
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Bewail, my sobs, bewail, bewail my passion, bewail my freedom lost for loving; bewail 
the time that has passed, passed without reward, bewail my sad passion, I, dead but not 
deceased. 
 
According to the modern punctuation, the first line is an apostrophic command addressed to the 
poet‘s own sobs, and this is certainly one intended reading. However, another plausible reading, 
―Llorad mis llantos, llorad,‖ is consistent with the structure of the stanza‘s remaining lines, in 
which each noun is the direct, rather than apostrophic, object of the command, and reveals how 
readers of the poem would feel themselves directly addressed by its relentless imperatives. In 
fact, the poem‘s subjective play – it moves from further second-person plural commands to third-
person singular ones, and thence to first-person declarations, to arrive finally at third-person 
plural commands – increases this ambiguity of address. The tropes of lost liberty, service without 
reward, and living death are part of a collective system of creation in which repetition and 
recognition sharpen, rather than blunting, readers‘ affective responses. In other words, the 
courtly aesthetic invoked here is one of empathy, in which the immediate collective recognition 
of an emotion signifies not its banality but its depth. 
 Cancionero poetry is, of course, thematically and formally diverse, and it changed 
constantly throughout its century of flourishing in Castilian culture. However, its concern with 
collective sentiment was present from its inception. As the following lyric complaint against love 
itself by Macías – who would become the prototypical courtly lover for later Castilian literature 
– shows, questions of sentiment were intimately, if metaphorically, connected to social structure 
and judgment:
41
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 Macías‘s example is deployed by Discretion as a warning to the narrator; the accompanying gloss begins, 
―Natural fue de Galisia, grande e virtuoso martir de Cupido‖ (39). The Galician poet is also revealed to be one of 
love‘s tortured souls toward the end of Santillana‘s Infierno de los enamorados, a work often cited as a precursor to 
sentimental fiction in general and the Sátira in particular. He is a transitional figure in the relocation of the Iberian 
center of courtly poetry from Galicia and Portugal to Castile (and thus, in linguistic terms, from Galician-Portuguese 
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Rey eres sobre los rreyes 
coronado enperador, 
do te plase van tus leyes, 
todos an de ty pauor; 
e pues eres tal sseñor 
non fases comunalesa, 
sy entyendes que es proesa 
non soy ende judgador (Cancionero de Baena 308.13-20). 
 
You are king of kings, emperor crowned, your laws go where you wish, all fear you; and 
since you are such a lord, your behavior is uncommon; whether you understand it to be a 
great deed, I cannot be the judge.  
 
Macías‘s hyperbolic estimation of love‘s temporal power (caritas hardly receives the same 
treatment in contemporary moral treatises) leads him to criticize the inequality with which that 
power is wielded. Love‘s injustice produces public fear, and the poet‘s condemnation thereof is 
carried out through an ironic withholding of judgment (―non soy ende judgador‖) that stands in 
stark contrast to love‘s poor – or malicious – judgment. The meaning of ―comunalesa‖ here is 
ambiguous but key. Fundamentally, the poet is expressing an expectation of equal treatment 
from love as king, but this does not exhaust his complaint‘s subtleties. Viterbo‘s Elucidário 
defines ―comunal‖ as ―[c]omum, ordinário,‖ such that love‘s injustice takes on a coloring of 
abnormality. Meanwhile, ―comunaleza‖ (noted as an antiquated term) is defined in the 
Diccionario de autoridades as ―[c]omunicación, trato y comercio.‖ Thus, love is also criticized 
as distant and opaque – in contrast to the fear and sadness felt communally by love‘s subjects. 
 Macías‘s poem ends with another ironic complaint, this time about the supposed reward 
for service to love: ―quien te sirue en gentylesa / por galardon le das morte‖ (308.35-6) ―you give 
to those who serve you courteously death as a reward.‖ This raises the question of what a truly 
                                                                                                                                                             
to Castilian); this transition was more or less complete by the second half of the fourteenth century (Deyermond, 
―Baena, Santillana, Resende‖ 208). On the other hand, the Aviz court had its own taste for troubadour poetry 
(Gascón Vera 43), and from this point of view, the the Sátira‘s courtly elements cannot be said to show a purely 
Castilian influence. 
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appropriate galardón would be. Pity, rather than amorous acquiescence, was the traditional 
reward – but admitting to seek more than mere pity was itself a courtly trope (Green 60-4). In a 
similar vein, while debates between reason and will were a courtly commonplace, these lyric 
debates actually included a wide variety of allegorical participants (for example, sensualidad or 
amor could replace voluntad). The Constable‘s dogged insistence on compassion or pity for his 
galardón and his choices of Discretion and Prudence as his principal opponents cannot therefore 
be dismissed as ―mere‖ tropes or borrowings. Furthermore, the Constable often adapts courtly 
tropes to his own purposes. For example, when Discretion finishes admonishing the narrator for 
voluntarily abandoning his free will, his wordless response – ―Gemir, sospirar e plañir le di por 
respuesta … Por ende, dexe el fablar, e recogime al pensoso silencio‖ (43) ―Moaning, sighing, 
and wailing I gave him in reply … Finally, I stopped speaking, and retired into pensive silence‖ 
– recalls the courtly poet‘s embarrassed silence before his lady, but attributes that silence to a 
moral system rather than to chastity, humility, or even shame. Having left behind the realm of 
the understanding and admitted the defeat of his Discretion, the narrator compares himself to 
those who, ―pasando los Alpes, el terrible frio de la nieve e agudo viento dan fin a sus dolorosas 
vidas; et, assy pegados en las sillas, elados del frior, siguen su viaje, fasta que de aquellas, non 
con querer o desquerer suyo, son apartados, e dados a la fria tierra‖ (44; emphasis in original) 
―while crossing the Alps, the cold snow and sharp wind bring their painful lives to an end; and, 
stuck to their seats, frozen solid, they continue their journey, until they are separated from their 
seats, neither willingly nor unwillingly, and fall to the cold ground.‖ This image of death in life – 
the frozen riders remain on their horses for a way before falling to the ground – again recalls a 
courtly trope, but here it emphasizes a lack of will that goes beyond captivity to death, thus 
foreshadowing the mortal dilemma of the Sátira‘s closing scene. 
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Cruelty 
  
Before that closing scene, the narrator engages in a lengthy debate with Prudence – not 
his own now, but that of his beloved. When Prudence first appears (accompanied by the other six 
virtues), she is described in her gloss as ―sovereign‖ among the non-theological virtues; charity 
is the highest theological virtue, but the present work ―mas fabla de moral doctrina que de 
theologico documento, e a cosas mundanas se dirige et no a divinas‖ (51) ―speaks more of moral 
doctrine than theology, and is dedicated to worldly, not divine, affairs.‖ In medieval Iberian 
moral theory, prudence has as its object the understanding, the ―reasonable‖ part of the soul, and 
is therefore an intellectual virtue, whereas the other virtues are ―moral‖ in that their object is the 
appetitive part of the soul. Prudence‘s sovereignty consists in the fact that it acts upon both parts 
of the soul (―no solo tiene acto çerca de las intellectuales mas aun çerca de las morales‖), 
determining on behalf of the appetitive part ―quales son las cosas convenibles para proseguir, e 
quales para desechar‖ (51). As such, prudence‘s psychological role bleeds into that of discretion, 
sorting out willful impulses to produce moral behavior. In contrast, the theological virtues cannot 
be achieved through will or understanding, but only through grace (53) – which is why they are 
mute in the Sátira. 
 Prudence, in her defense of the narrator‘s beloved, claims that her mistress has achieved – 
effortlessly – the ―heroic degree‖ of strength (82). In the accompanying gloss on ―Eroyco grado,‖ 
the Constable explains that there are four degrees of any virtue: perseverance, constance, 
temperance, and the heroic degree (82-3). Affect is the central element of this scale: the 
perseverant fall into vice but climb back out; the constant ―feel the passions,‖ but abstain from 
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sin ―with pain and sadness‖; the temperate take pleasure in resisting temptations but are still 
subject to them; and finally, the heroic ―do not feel the passions‖ (83). These latter ―son mas 
marmorinas estatuas inmutativas o dioses de la humana vida que mugeres o ombres‖ (84) ―are 
more like immutable marble statues or gods of human life than women or men.‖ These 
statuesque heroes are perhaps a bitter echo of the frozen rider crossing the Alps, equally stiff but 
for the opposite reason.
42
 Continuing along these lines, Prudence explains that her mistress 
rejects the Epicureans in favor of the Stoics, and the gloss on the Epicureans explains that virtues 
should be valued in themselves, not for the pleasure (―delectaçion‖) we feel when acting on them 
(93). Finally, as mentioned above, Prudence says that the lady has rid herself of desires based in 
carnal, spiritual, and tepid will, and follows only her praiseworthy and virtuous will (98). The 
accompanying gloss hews closely to Duarte‘s theory of will, adding that the heroic degree of 
virtue can only be achieved by those who follow their virtuous will (99). In essence, then, 
Prudence‘s argument and the glosses it engenders combine to paint the narrator‘s beloved as the 
embodiment of passionless virtue, the perfect realization of a dense field of emotionally ascetic 
moral systems. Totally free of affect‘s pull – in Prudence‘s words, ―ni puede faser tanto alguna 
passion que dexe de estar en un compas tan perfecto que, farto en pensarlo, esto maravillada‖ 
(123) ―no passion can do enough to shake her from her perfect measure, [and] having thought of 
it endlessly, I am amazed‖ – she is the opposite of the narrator, mortally subject to his will. Her 
perfect compás, Prudence argues, makes up for her lack of compasión. But this is just the view 
the narrator refuses to accept in the Sátira‘s closing pages. 
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 In an amusing sixteenth-century coda to this image of virtue, Juan Luis Vives would violently condemn the 
Stoics, and Cicero and Seneca in particular, for their views on pity, arguing that ―[n]othing is more human than to 
sympathize with those who suffer,‖ and concluding, ―But let us forget the Stoics, who through pedantic cavils tried 
without success to convert their human natures into stones‖ (46-7). 
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Compasión 
  
Toward the end of her defense, Prudence claims that her mistress would be found ―syn 
yerro o reprehension‖ even if she were invisible (125) – but in the Sátira, the eyes examining her 
are those of compassion. This is why the narrator, whose brief response to his beloved‘s 
Prudence stands in contrast to his silence before his own Discretion, accuses his beloved only of 
cruelty: ―si esta mi sola e perpetua señora contra mi … fue llena de crueldat, como en tal estremo 
o grado qual dexistes sera perfecta e virtuosa?‖ (135) ―if this, my only and perpetual lady … was 
filled with cruelty against me, how can she be as perfect and virtuous as you say?‖ It is Pity, not 
Prudence, who answers this attack, ―porque esta culpa a ella solamente o mas prinçipalmente 
tañia‖ (136) ―because this accusation touched only or principally on her.‖ She repeats the charge 
that the narrator chose to enter his current predicament freely, and she adds, crucially, that 
having done so, he is now an ―indigno juez‖ (137) ―unworthy judge.‖ The indictment of the 
narrator is now complete: having subjected himself to his own will, he can no longer carry out 
the morally central task of judging. His brief reprehensión – rebuttal and condemnation – of his 
beloved‘s cruelty is empty because it is enunciated from a fatally compromised moral position. 
 It is precisely here, when his capacity to judge has apparently been completely 
undermined, that the narrator states his decisive reply – that he desires not his lady‘s love, but 
her compassion: 
mas, solamente, movida a clemençia, deseava que de mi mal se doliesse e que mi 
desigualado pesar sintiesse, pues non es alguna cosa mas convenible ni que mas cara 
deva ser al gentil, alto e virtuoso coraçon que aver merçed, dolor e sentimiento de los 
tristes infortunados. De aver compassion e piadat de mi, mucho mas que de todos los 
mortales, razon lo mandava, virtud lo consentia. (141-2; emphasis added) 
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I desired only that she, moved to mercy, would grieve for me and feel my unparalleled 
suffering, for there is no more appropriate or dearer thing to the courteous, high, and 
virtuous heart than to feel pity, pain, and sadness toward the unfortunate. Reason 
commanded, and virtued consented, that she should have compassion and pity for me, 
more than any other mortal.   
 
Compassion and pity are not depraved passions; rather, they are themselves both reasonable and 
virtuous. Furthermore, his beloved has not truly mastered her will: 
E que otra cosa, salvo su no piadosa voluntad, esto causava? Como no sea dubda que, ado 
ha e mora cruel voluntad, el serviçio buelve en deserviçio, el amor en desamor trastorna, 
porque tanto puede la voluntad llena de crueldat que çiega los ojos de la discreçion, 
judgando el bien por mal, la virtud por viçio, e la verdat por mentira o falsedat. (142) 
 
And what other thing than her pitiless will caused this? There can be no doubt that, where 
there is a cruel will, service becomes disservice, love is twisted into indifference 
[desamor], because the will filled with cruelty is so powerful that it can blind discretion‘s 
eyes, taking [judgando] good for evil, virtue for vice, and truth for lies o falsehood.  
 
By introducing the element of willful cruelty, which blinds discretion and turns moral judgment 
around, the narrator disrupts the (former) binary that opposed virtuous reason to vicious will. In 
essence, malice replaces temptation as the primary moral risk, and its antidote is not restraint but 
compassion; this is why cruelty, not the passions, is now repeatedly associated with blindness. 
 These arguments vanquish Prudence, Pity, and the lady‘s other virtues, who retreat before 
them, and the narrator argues that his victory was not rhetorical: ―claramente conosçi que, 
vençidas, de mi se partieron, no con eloquente e fermosa fabla, mas con verdat e justiçia que 
posseya, no con fraudulentas, sotiles o agudas questiones, mas con verdaderas‖ (153) ―I saw 
them depart from me, clearly defeated not by eloquent or beautiful speech, but by truth and 
justice; not with fraudulent, sophistic, or sharp questions, but with true ones.‖ In a final reversal, 
the narrator accuses the fates of having frozen his lady‘s will against him: ―Por que teneys elada, 
o fados crueles ... la voluntad de aquella cuyo perpetuo esclavo so contra mi?‖ (153-4) ―Why 
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have you frozen against me, o cruel fates … the will of her whose perpetual slave I am?‖ The 
narrator‘s will was frozen when his Discretion abandoned him, but it is the cruelty of the fates 
that freezes the will of his lady, already blinded by her own pitilessness. The narrator cannot 
make a decision; his beloved can make only one. It is from this perspective that the 
compounding indecision with which the Sátira comes to a close must be understood. The 
narrator‘s first indecision is whether or not to continue speaking at all: 
O dessentido, no se que faga, sy fable o si calle! Mi fablar nadie no oye, mi callar no me 
trahe provecho, sy fablare, no avera reposo mi pena, sy me callare, no se apartara de mi. 
Mas fablare yo, por çierto, contra vos mi soberana e obedesçida señora; dexare el fablar 
contra tan muchas passiones e varias afflicçiones mias, enderesçarlohe a la señoria 
vuestra. (155) 
 
O confusión, I do not know what to do, speak or be silent! No one hears my speech, 
silence does me no good; if I speak, my pain will find no rest, and if I stay silent, it will 
not leave me. But I will speak, certainly, against you, my sovereign and obeyed lady; I 
will stop speaking against my many and varied passions and afflictions, and my speech 
against your rule. 
 
In the poem that follows, the narrator holds true to this promise; the culpability of his own 
emotions is rejected, and it is his beloved who is in moral peril: 
Doledvos de mi passion, 
e de mi gran perdimiento, 
quered, vuestra perfecçion 
no queriendo mi tormento 
desygual, 
mi firme querer leal, 
vuestro muy mas que devia; 
libradvos, ydola mia, 
de dolor pestilençial (159, l. 19-27). 
 
Grieve for my passion and my great loss; desire, your perfection not desiring my 
unparalleled torment, my own loyal desire, more yours than it should be; free yourself, 
my idol, from pestilential pain. 
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In keeping with the numerous inversions of the Sátira‘s precipitous conclusion, this stanza 
revisits a number of foregoing themes. First, ―passion‖ here recuperates its connotation of 
suffering, rather than vice, so that it calls for compassion rather than condemnation.
43
 The perfect 
will, furthermore, is desirous of loyal service, not indifferent or hostile toward it. In fact, it is the 
narrator‘s lady, not the narrator, who is a captive – to a painful fate. As such, the narrator‘s 
reference to his lady as his ―idol‖ is a wry comment on her statuesque – and thus morally 
incomplete, inhuman – ―perfection.‖ 
 Having finished speaking, the narrator is met with a new, and final, dilemma: 
E yo, sin ventura, padesçiente, la desnuda e bicordante espada en la my diestra mirava, 
titubando, con dudoso pensamiento e demudada cara, sy era mejor prestamente morir o 
asperar la dubdosa respuesta me dar consuelo. La discriçion favoresçe e suplica la espera, 
la congoxosa voluntad la triste muerte reclama, el seso manda esperar la respuesta, el 
aquexado coraçon, gridando, acusa la postrimería. (174) 
 
And I, unfortunate, suffering, looked at the naked and double-edged sword in my right 
hand, doubting, with halting thought and altered face, whether it was better to die quickly 
or wait for the doubtful reply to console me. Discretion favors and begs for waiting, the 
sorrowful will demands sad death, the sense commands to wait for the response, the 
suffering heart, crying out, reveals the end. 
 
This ending has been construed variously as a sign ―that allegory‘s fundamentally heuristic 
function has failed‖ (Brownlee 484), an attempt to provoke compassion in the reader (Serés, 
―Ficción‖ 46), or as evidence that the courtly conflict between desire and honor is unresolvable 
(Gascón Vera 87-8). One could add to these interpretations another, consistent with a literal 
reading of the Sátira‘s dedicatory letter, in which the narrator‘s bad end is evidence of his 
immorality, although of course the very existence of the letter would do away with this mortal 
fiction. The conflict described in this final indecision is between, once again, discretion and will, 
brain and heart. Compassion and cruelty, whose opposition had been added to this moral system, 
                                                 
43
 This is thus similar to passion‘s connotative force in Estúñiga‘s poem, above. 
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are once again absent. The opposition between will and discretion, which characterizes the moral 
thought of Duarte and Pedro, and whose fatal outcome is highly stylized in courtly poetry, is here 
compared to a double-edged sword. For the Constable, it is an inadequate moral palette, and 
further subjection to it – not just to the passionate side of it – is intolerable. Mercy had always 
been a desirable quality in a judge, but here, the Constable makes compassion an essential 
element of moral decision by dramatically laying bare the paralysis to which the old bipolar 
moral system leads.
44
 
 Although the Constable‘s subject matter in the Sátira seems relentlessly personal, there is 
reason to believe that his ideas about cruelty and compassion are significantly broader in their 
targets. In his gloss on the pharaoh of Exodus, he condemns cruelty in the following terms: 
O detestable viçio enemigo de toda humana naturalesa, e muy contrario a toda natural 
razon, fiero a los amigos, amigable a los adversarios, muy poderoso no para fazer 
solamente subvertir el exerçito de pharao en las marinas ondas, mas de despoblar las 
poderosas çibdades, de destroyr los magnificos regnos, de annular los altos poderios e de 
distinguir las muy antiguas e esclaresçidas linages! El qual viçio en nuestros tiempos es 
usado e seguido como si fuesse virtud famosa e loable. (144) 
 
O detestable vice, enemy of all human nature, and very contrary to all natural reason, 
fierce toward friends, friendly to adversaries, powerful enough not only to subvert 
pharaoh‘s army in the waves of the sea, but also to depopulate powerful cities, to destroy 
magnificent kingdoms, to annihilate high dominions, and to extinguish the most ancient 
and noble lineages! This vice is customary in our times and followed as if it were a 
famous and praiseworthy virtue. 
 
And in his poem of warning to his beloved, he calls cruelty ―de todos los viçios reyna, 
señora, / mal enemiga de real alteza‖ (169, l. 21-2) ―queen of all the vices, lady, enemy of royal 
highness.‖ Cruelty is thus a sociopolitical vice, particularly unbecoming in rulers and 
                                                 
44
 Rodríguez del Padrón‘s Siervo libre de amor contains a similar scene of paralysis; the unloved narrator has been 
abandoned by his understanding and feels himself to be in mortal peril (81-83). In the Siervo libre, however, these 
circumstances introduce a new narrative element, the Estoria de dos amadores. The Sátira‘s scene of indecision is, 
in contrast, definitive, bringing the narrative to an unsettling close. 
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representing a mortal danger not just to courtly lovers, but to courts themselves, to cities, 
kingdoms, and lineages. It is tempting to explain this in biographical terms, since the constable is 
writing in exile, his father having been killed in a civil conflict with his own nephew. It is also 
tempting to see the constable‘s faith in compassion – especially in light of the rather more ribald 
treatment the galardón receives in much courtly poetry – as a youthful (that is, immature) 
enthusiasm. But the fact remains that in infusing compassion and cruelty with moral weight, the 
Constable was trying to destabilize a longstanding system of moral thought, one whose logic 
dominates both the treatises of his uncle and father and the poetry of Santillana and his other 
Castilian influences. The poles of the reason-will binary were assigned different power by these 
two traditions, but in his Sátira, the Constable seeks to alter this system radically, seeking to 
make the granting of the compassionate galardón a real, communally potent possibility. In the 
next and final chapter, however, we will find, in Ausiàs March, a writer who sought not to 
complicate this inherited tradition, but to exhaust it. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
ALONE TOGETHER: AUSIÀS MARCH‘S ETHICAL APPEAL FOR SHARED SALVATION 
 
 
 
Nunc itaque in quantum ipse adiuuat creator mire misericors attendamus haec quae modo interiore quam superiore 
tractauimus, cum sint eadem … 
– Saint Augustine, De Trinitate  
 
 
 
I argued in the previous chapter that Pedro, Constable of Portugal seeks, in his Sátira de 
felice e infelice vida, to instill a new ethical force in the courtly trope of the Lady‘s compassion, 
and I read this as an attempt to complicate the moral framework that underlies political thought 
on community in fifteenth-century Iberia. This moral framework, again, takes the conflict 
between reason and the passions as the paradigm for moral deliberation. Here, I will argue that 
the Valencian poet Ausiàs March (ca. 1397-1459) goes further than the Constable, seeking not 
just to renovate this moral framework but to exhaust its discourse of body and soul, reason and 
the passions.
1
 This may seem paradoxical, since these are precisely the dominant themes 
throughout March‘s 128 surviving poems, in which he develops a three-fold theory of love based 
on hylemorphic doctrine. Indeed, March‘s poetry constitutes, from one perspective, a startlingly 
dense and focused exploration of the lyrical possibilities of human love as a conceptual and 
moral problematic involving the mixture of the carnal and the spiritual. It is all March seems to 
want to talk about, and he does so with an incredibly limited lexicon of about 700 words, much 
smaller than those of his Valencian contemporaries (Casanova 137 n. 7). This lyric focus reveals 
not investment in the moral system but an attempt to exhaust its possibilities rhetorically. 
                                                 
1
 Some modern critics place no accent on ―Ausiàs‖ because none appears on the manuscripts of his poetry; 
throughout this chapter, I follow the more common critical tendency to include the accent. 
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Through a poetics of introspection and self-judgment, and, ultimately, through an exploration of 
death and salvation, March shows that what is most intimate in us is shared, and that if the 
conflict between reason and the passions is real and deeply felt, it is not to be resolved 
individually. Rather, erotic love in its confrontation with mortality produces a shared subjectivity 
grounded in compassion, a subjectivity that March describes – exceptionally, in his oeuvre – in 
explicitly Christian terms. March adopts this rhetoric of salvation in order to blur the borders of 
erotic love, opening the empathetic identification it generates onto a broader community of 
readers and lovers. 
Ausiàs March is often considered the best poet ever to have written in Catalan and one of 
the fifteenth century‘s most important poets in general. His grandfather, Jaume March, was 
knighted by Pere III in 1360, and the family enjoyed noble status from then on. March 
participated as a representative of the military estate in the Valencian courts of 1415, was 
knighted himself in 1419, and participated in military expeditions to Sardinia, Corsica, Naples, 
Sicily, and Africa from 1419-1424. He was royal falconer from 1425-1428. After that, he 
probably retired to his lands in Gandia, administrating them and writing poetry. March‘s poems, 
which survive in thirteen manuscripts, have traditionally been divided into four groups: the cants 
d’amor, the largest group, addressed, for the most part, either to Plena de seny (―Wise lady‖) or 
Lir entre carts (―Lily among thorns‖); the Cants Morals; the Cants de Mort, a series of six 
poems thought to be inspired by the death of one or the other of March‘s wives; and the long 
Cant Espiritual.
2
 Neither the chronological order of the poems‘ composition nor the poet‘s own 
arrangement of them is known (Bohigas 7; Archer, Pervasive Image 6); most critics follow 
Amédée Pagès‘s ordering in his 1912 Auzias March et ses prédécesseurs as, in Robert Archer‘s 
                                                 
2
 This division first appeared in the first edition of March‘s poems, published by Baltasar Romaní in Valencia in 
1539. On the question of which wife inspired the Cants de Mort, see Archer, Pervasive Image 184-5 n. 5. 
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words, a ―good working order‖ (Pervasive Image 6).3 The primary audience for March‘s poetry 
is thought to have been Valencia‘s ―local petty nobility‖ and ―urban patricians‖ (Alemany 10). 
 It should be noted that March‘s youth, before he started writing, coincided with a time in 
which Catalan literature ―was courtly in every sense‖ (Smith 297-8); indeed, it was March‘s own 
uncle, Jaume March, who in 1393 founded Barcelona‘s Jocs Florals. We should not be 
surprised, then, that critics aware of this troubadour tradition are hesitant to identify Plena de 
seny and Lir entre carts as either of March‘s wives. His first, Isabel Martorell, was the sister of 
Joanot Martorell, author of Tirant lo Blanc. After her death in 1439, he married the Valencian 
lady Joana Escorna, whom he also survived; neither marriage produced an heir, although his two 
wills reveal that he had five illegitimate children. As Pere Bohigas writes, all indications are that, 
in life, March was a typical feudal lord, dedicated to protecting and increasing his possessions 
(6). But, as Joan Fuster famously added, March was a feudal lord ―with a problem of 
conscience‖ (12-3). 
The innumerable lyric manifestations of March‘s bad conscience have led critics to speak 
frequently of the poet‘s tendency toward sincere introspection or confession and of March‘s own 
assertions of exceptional individuality. The most celebrated of these assertions is found in the 
penultimate stanza of poem XCIV, which concerns the pleasure the poet, having abandoned 
human love, takes in his own sadness: 
Puix que lo món ne Déu a mi no val 
a rellevar la causa d‘on só trist, 
a mi plau bé la tristor que yo vist: 
delit he sent mentre yo·m trobe tal. 
Axí dispost, dolç me sembla l‘amarch, 
                                                 
33
 This is also the order followed by Bohigas in his edition of March‘s Poesies, from which I will be quoting. For an 
in-depth discussion of the problem of the order of March‘s poems, see Archer, Pervasive Image 6-11. My argument 
does not depend on a chronological development of ideas in March‘s poetry, but rather draws on themes that arise 
repeatedly, in varied guises, throughout the poems. For a brief history of the publication, translation, and reception 
of March‘s poetry, see Fuster 44-52. 
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tant és en mi enfeccionat lo gust! 
A temps he cor d‘acer, de carn e fust: 
yo só aquest que·m dich Ausiàs March. (CXIV.81-8) 
 
Since neither the world nor God helps me to root out the reason for which I am sad, I am 
content with the sadness I wear; I feel joy, while I am in such a state. Thus disposed, 
what is bitter seems sweet to me: so corrupted is my taste! I have a heart of steel, flesh 
and wood, all in one. I am this man who is called Ausias March!
4
 
 
In a representative reading of this stanza, Bohigas writes that the last line in particular 
is of great significance in such a personal and concentrated poet. His works, so stark and 
arid, still suggest to us a certain pride consonant with his individualism. Perhaps it is a 
manifestation of his inclination toward making confessions, even unfavorable to himself, 
in which we can see, however, the desire to safeguard the integrity of his ego, whatever 
the judgment they might provoke. (6) 
 
March‘s introspection and sincerity are often asserted to differentiate him from the troubadours, 
whose formal structures he never abandoned, or even to mark him as a ―modern‖ poet.5 The 
adoption of Catalan rather than Occitan is also considered a gesture of sincerity (Casanova 139) 
directed toward bourgeois Catalan culture (Sobrer, ―Myth of Language‖ 331).6 The poet‘s bitter 
attacks against his own person, his admissions against interest, are a tactic of persuasion: ―The 
poet wants us to believe his confession literally, since he offers us his poems as a confession‖ 
(Fuster 61). 
 My interest here is not in showing that March was insincere, but rather in examining the 
process of subjectivization carried out through his lyrical introspection. In this question I follow 
Sarah Kay in understanding lyric ―subjectivity‖ as ―the elaboration of a first-person (subject) 
position‖ (Subjectivity 1). It seems clear in the stanza of poem CXIV cited above that we are 
meant to take March‘s lyric persona as a literal representation of the historical poet: ―I am this 
man who is called Ausias March!‖ March‘s relationship with the Christianity was famously 
                                                 
4
 All translations are from Terry, Ausias March: Selected Poems; here, at 133. 
5
 On the first point, see Archer, Pervasive Image 2; Archer notes that this is not a question of absolute difference, 
but of degree. For the ―modernity‖ of March‘s introspection, see Bohigas 33 and Terry, Selected Poems 20. 
6
 On the question of sincerity and originality in March‘s poetry, see Zimmermann. 
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ambivalent; as he declares to God in the cant espiritual, ―Yo tem a Tu més que no·t só amable‖ 
(CV.57) ―I fear, rather than love, you‖ (119). Here, however, the poet represents himself as a 
penitent: ―the sadness I wear‖ recalls an earlier declaration that ―l‘esperit meu tostemps està trist 
/ per l‘àbit pres, que lonch temps és que vist / d‘un negre drap o celici molt gros‖ (CXIV.46-8) 
―my spirit is continually sad because of the kind of dress it has adopted, (and) which for a long 
time it has worn, of black material or coarse sackcloth‖ (131). The entire poem is framed as an 
almost literal confession, and its envoi, which immediately follows the stanza quoted above, 
takes the form of an indirect prayer: 
A Déu suplich que·l viure no m‘allarch, 
o meta·n mi aquest propòsit ferm: 
que mon voler envers Ell lo referm, 
perquè anant a Ell no trobe·nbarch. (CXIV.89-92) 
 
I pray God not to prolong my life, or (else) to instil in me this firm intention: to 
strengthen my will towards Him, so that, travelling towards Him, I shall meet with no 
obstacles. (133) 
 
March was no mystic, and he confesses here, above all, that his desire is not inclined toward 
God, nor does he wish to be severely tested if he is to journey toward the divine.
7
 The poet‘s own 
surname provides the rhyme for both the wish for death (―que·l viure no m‘allarch‖) and the 
obstacles to salvation (―no trobe·nbarch‖). And, indeed, it is in the confrontation with death and 
its implications for salvation that March forges himself as a lyric subject – and one not 
necessarily identifiable with the individual.
8
  
 March‘s lyric subjection to moral scrutiny, even if we read it in a confessional mode, 
indexes his participation in literary community. Michel Foucault has argued that the moment 
―when the task and obligation of truth-telling about oneself [was] inserted within the procedure 
indispensable for salvation‖ was a crucial turning point in the history of subjectivity in the West, 
                                                 
7
 On the rejection of Neoplatonism in March, see Lledó-Guillem. 
8
 See Kay, Subjectivity 6. 
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adding that this was not just a matter of personal salvation but also ―a necessary element in the 
individual‘s membership of a community‖ (363-4). March‘s admission in poem CXIV both that 
his will is misguided and that his senses themselves are corrupt – ―infected‖ – places his own 
manner of truthful confession squarely within a Scholastic ethical framework concerned with a 
particular model of the soul and the implications of that model – whose central principle Mark D. 
Johnston identifies as recta ratio, ―right reason‖ (384) – for proper worldly behavior. This 
hylemorphic model, reflected obliquely in the ―steel, flesh and wood‖ of March‘s heart in poem 
CXIV, is most commonly expressed by March in terms of a tripartite typology of love: spiritual 
love, in which only the rational soul is engaged; carnal love, in which the body‘s appetites reign; 
and human or mixed (compost) love, in which the soul and the body participate together, if not 
always in cooperation.
9
 Numerous scholars have noted that March is not truly consistent in this 
systematization throughout his works, while others have shown that the preoccupation with 
transcendence and immanence inherent in this paradigm, far from isolating March as an author, 
in fact puts him in dialogue with the cancionero poets and other fifteenth-century Iberian 
writers.
10
 The question of March‘s direct knowledge of Thomistic and other Scholastic texts is 
less important here than his possibly ―paradoxical‖ application of the Scholastic ethical 
framework to the ―implicitly immoral conduct of courtly love‖ (Johnston 387).11 March‘s theory 
of love was also influenced in important ways by the mendicant preachers (Alemany 11), a fact 
reflected in his thoroughly Augustinian theory of mind and his use of the powers of the soul 
                                                 
9
 March‘s most famous explication of this system is found in poem LXXXVII, although there he uses different 
terminology: spiritual love is honest, carnal love is delitable, and mixed love is profitable. 
10
 On the first point, see Archer, ―Theorist of Love‖ 4; Fuster 96; and Terry, Selected Poems 14. On the second, see 
Cocozzella, ―Ausiàs March‘s Imitatio Christi‖ 428-9. 
11
 Arthur Terry notes, however, that despite their apparent rigidity, the moral vocabularies of Scholasticism and 
fin’amor are in practice almost infinitely flexible (―Introspection‖ 169-70). For a brief overview of Aristotelian 
thought in medieval Aragon, see L. Cabré 50-3. 
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(memory, will, and understanding) as an analytic.
12
 In the rest of this chapter, then, I will explore 
how March‘s assertion of difference and rhetorical performance of moral self-scrutiny, within a 
framework of Scholastic hylemorphism, Augustinian theory of mind, and troubadour love, 
through a confrontation with death – both one‘s own and others‘ – articulates a particular form of 
collective subjectivity that bridges personal and political salvation. To this end, the rest of my 
discussion will be centered around a series of exemplary poems: XXIII, X, XIII, and the Cants 
de Mort (XCII-XCVII). 
 
XXIII: “Lexant a part l’estil dels trobadors …” 
  
March‘s most famous assertion of stylistic difference from the troubadours is found in the 
opening of poem XXIII, a poem that constitutes, in the end, a failed attempt to speak the truth: 
Lexant a part l‘estil dels trobadors 
qui, per escalf, trespassen veritat, 
e sostrahent mon voler affectat 
perquè no·m torb, diré·l que trob en vós. (XXIII.1-4) 
 
Leaving aside the manner of the troubadours, who, carried away by passion, exceed the 
truth, and restraining my own amorous desire so that it does not distract me, I shall say 
what I find in you. (53) 
 
I will return to these lines shortly, but first, I want to consider the question of just what March 
considered himself to be leaving behind in his abandonment of the ―manner of the troubadours.‖ 
Troubadour poetry first arrived in the Crown of Aragon through the patronage of Alfons II of 
Aragon (1162-96), known contradictorily as both the Chaste and the Troubadour, and its cultural 
                                                 
12
 The authors most commonly cited as sources for March‘s thought are Aquinas, Aristotle, Ramon Llull, and 
Seneca; Augustine, Dante, and Petrarch are also named with some frequency. For a critical appraisal of the literature 
on these sources in March, see Archer, Pervasive Image 11-20. The critical tendency is to downplay Italian 
influence (see, for example, Bohigas 28 and Fuster 15-7, although both critics do admit certain similarities). Bohigas 
also notes the possible influence of Capellanus‘s Art of Courtly Love, which was translated into Catalan in the 
fourteenth century, but he contrasts Capellanus‘s ―frivolous‖ text with March‘s ―serious‖ appropriation of it (15). 
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foothold was reinforced with the arrival of the faidits, exiles fleeing the aftermath of the 
Albigensian Crusade in the early thirteenth century (M. Cabré 129 and 133). Occitan remained 
the language of lyric poetry in Aragon until March chose to write in Catalan, which had been 
dominant in prose (alongside Latin) since the thirteenth century. Although I do not have space 
for a broad consideration of the enormous cultural legacy of the troubadours, I want to highlight 
here some features of troubadour culture of particular relevance to my discussion of March. 
 Troubadour poetry encodes both feudal ties and religious devotion in a discourse of erotic 
love. As Stephen C. Jaeger as argued, it represents at its origin an ―aestheticising of manners‖ 
and an ―intense refinement in sentiment and emotion‖ that allow above all for increasingly subtle 
communication – either genuine or deceitful – among a cultural and political elite (13). Chief 
among these refined sentiments was love, whose semantic field went far beyond the erotic. The 
word drut, ―lover,‖ connoted political as well as erotic love, describing the relationship between 
lover and lady but also that between lord and vassal (Cheyette 235). This discursive codification 
(or aestheticization) of fundamentally political ties made them more visible, rather than 
obscuring them, in its use of erotic language. In this way, the troubadour poetic code came to 
define courtly communities: ―the troubadours can be seen as determining the limits and members 
of polite society, and binding together an exclusive community in which an appreciation of the 
courtly lyric and practice of the courtly virtues of hospitality, generosity and affability were seen 
as marks of status and cultivation‖ (Harvey 20). The fact that courtly language serves to signal 
status does not mean, of course, that its ―refined‖ emotions are false; rather, as I argued in 
chapter one, the management of deeply held attitudes toward emotion is common to a wide 
variety of rhetorical practices and prior to judgments of truth. 
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 Questions of truth and irony also dominate discussion of the so-called religio amoris, in 
which troubadours, as is well known, adopted the discourse of religious devotion to express 
worldly love.
13
 The ambiguity of this apparently sacrilegious gesture arises at least in part from 
the erotic language of mystical texts and of scripture itself, and its recontextualization within the 
courtly system should not lead modern readers to assume ironic intent. In fact, ironic and earnest 
images of devotion coexisted throughout the entire period of troubadour production (Gaunt, Love 
and Death 5). Indeed, at the broadest level, it is difficult to untangle the secular from the sacred 
in the Middle Ages, and troubadour poetry may represent a lyrical exploitation of this ambiguity 
rather than a secular challenge to religious doctrine. Still, it is undeniable that the professed 
willingness of the courtly lover to die for love (echoed frequently, as we will see, by Ausiàs 
March) increases the ethical stakes of the erotic beyond traditional questions of sin and chastity; 
as Simon Gaunt has argued, this lyrical sacrifice ―engenders a space for an engagement with 
ethics that is removed from the sphere of organized religion‖ (―A Martyr to Love‖ 500). March 
certainly does not abandon this space in abandoning the troubadours. It is the space par 
excellence of the confessions entailed by his claims of difference. 
 The later troubadours tended to present themselves as love‘s initiates, privileged bearers 
of a knowledge born of rare experience (Wilhite 764). March also portrays himself as the bearer 
of special knowledge, but despite frequent critical references to his didacticism and its ties to 
courtly culture,
14
 he is not confident in his teaching ability. Rather, shared experience is the 
condition for understanding his poems: ―Qui no és trist, de mos dictats no cur, / o·n algun temps 
que sia trist estat‖ (XXXIX.1-2) ―Anyone who is not sad or has not at some time been sad should 
                                                 
13
 This trope was famously parodied in Fernando de Rojas‘s Celestina, published in 1499. 
14
 See, for example, Sobrer, Doble soledat 22. 
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pay no attention to my works‖ (55). This disavowal of rational pedagogy is a crucial 
counterpoint to XXIII‘s opening claim, which I will now quote in its entirety: 
Lexant a part l‘estil dels trobadors 
qui, per escalf, trespassen veritat, 
e sostrahent mon voler affectat 
perquè no·m torb, diré·l que trob en vós. 
Tot mon parlar als qui no us hauran vista 
res no valrrà, car fe no y donaran, 
e los vehents que dins vós no veuran, 
en creur·a mi, llur arma serà trista. (XXIII.1-8) 
 
Leaving aside the manner of the troubadours, who, carried away by passion, exceed the 
truth, and restraining my own amorous desire so that it does not distract me, I shall say 
what I find in you. All my speech will be in vain to those who have not seen you, for they 
will not believe it; and those who see you, if they cannot see within, will be sad at heart 
when they believe me. (53) 
 
At least one critic has read this opening as a ―troubadouresque‖ assumption of authority (Sobrer, 
―Myth of Language‖ 333), while another notes that elsewhere in March‘s oeuvre, sentiment and 
knowledge are complementary, not opposed (Ramírez i Molas, ―El saber del sentiment‖ 340). In 
fact, however, the explicit opposition between affectation and truth finds a deeper echo in the 
third line‘s juxtaposition of torbar, ―to disturb,‖ and trobar, literally ―to find,‖ but also, of 
course, the verb that describes lyric composition. Affect, it is implied, precludes worthy speech, 
which also suffers in comparison to sight. This sight, which obviates the need for faith, is in turn 
inferior to the poet‘s insight, which can only be believed – in a process that leaves believers with 
their own spiritual sadness (―en creur·a a mi, llur arma sera trista‖).15 But if the truth cannot be 
expressed by an affected soul, how can it be understood by one? This impasse – between speech 
and sight, sight and insight – will be explored in hylemorphic terms throughout the rest of the 
poem. 
                                                 
15
 D. Gareth Walters notes the tension between the expectation of dispassionate realism created by the poem‘s 
opening lines and the need for ―visionary, even mysterious, perception‖ expressed at the end of the stanza (46). 
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 That hylemorphism is primarily a problem of knowledge and speech in this poem is made 
clear in the second stanza: 
Quant és del cors, menys de participar 
ab l‘esperit, coneix bé lo grosser: 
vostra color y ell tall pot bé saber, 
mas ga del gest no porà bé parlar. (13-6) 
 
Whatever belongs to the body but does not share in the spirit, the coarse man knows well. 
He may be familiar with your colour and bearing, but he will not be able to speak 
properly of your gesture. (53) 
 
This sentiment is reinforced in the next stanza in one of March‘s rare assertions of commonality: 
―Tots som grossers en poder explicar / ço que mereix un bell cos e honest‖ (17-8) ―We are all 
coarse when we try to express what a fair and honest body deserves‖ (53). The soul is thus 
associated with the lyrically inexpressible because of its role in movement (the ―gest‖ that cannot 
be expressed by the coarse).
16
 Belief is not at issue. Sarah Spence has argued that the troubadours 
rework the relationship between rhetoric and the body ―so that the body can re-enter the field of 
rhetoric since desire is situated in the language of the body – or the vernacular – even as reason 
retains it connection to the tangible, visible world‖ (166). Here, however, March denigrates the 
lyrical value of the corporal. Of what, then, should the exceptionally wise, or experienced, man 
speak? 
 March attempts, in the following stanzas, to praise his lady for her seny, ―wisdom‖ (this 
poem, it should be noted, is perhaps surprisingly part of the Lir entre carts, ―Lily among thorns,‖ 
rather than the Plena de seny, ―Wise lady,‖ cycle), claiming that her mind is more peacefully 
ordered than the Venetian government (33-4). The delight provoked by this well-ordered mind 
makes baser desires impossible: 
Tan gran delit tot hom entenent ha 
                                                 
16
 In medieval Catalan, ―gest‖ could refer to both a body‘s movement and appearance (Faraudo, ―Gest,‖ def. 1 and 
2). 
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e occupat se troba·n vós entendre, 
que lo desig del cors no·s pot estendre 
a leig voler, ans com a mort està. (37-40) 
 
All who understand (these things) feel great delight and make it their occupation to 
understand you, since desire for the body cannot extend to base impulses: rather it is as 
though (it were) dead. (55) 
 
We return here to the question of lyric understanding as March continues punning on trobar in 
line 38. Like the ―understanding‖ man who es troba attempting to understand the lady, March 
performs this process as he explicates it, dedicating his own lyric endeavor to spiritual matters in 
such a way that his own body appears dead. The carnal will is described in visual terms: it is 
―ugly,‖ leig. It seems, then, that March‘s lyric is indeed up to the task of spiritual expression. 
 Unsurprisingly for those accustomed to March‘s contradictory envois, this turns out not 
to be the case: 
Lir entre carts, lo meu poder no fa 
tant que pogués fer corona·nvisible; 
meriu-la vós, car la qui és visible 
no·s deu posar lla on miracle stà. (41-4) 
 
Lily among thorns: my power is not so great that it could make for you an invisible 
crown. You deserve one, since a visible crown should not be placed where there is a 
miracle. (55) 
 
Thus, March‘s ―power‖ (of invention, trobar) is in the end inadequate for the ―invisible‖ praise 
Lir entre carts deserves. The final contrast between the visible and the invisible is complicated 
by March‘s comparison of his lady to a miracle, a phenomenon whose association with the visual 
is reinforced by the phonic echo of mirar, a verb of sight. The return to the passion of sadness in 
the poem‘s opening stanza – which resulted from a belief in spiritual insight – finds its own 
thematic echo in the poet‘s inability, or unwillingness, to abandon sensation. Body and soul, 
passion and truth cannot be fully disentangled lyrically; sight and sadness resurface inevitably. 
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X: “De ffet que fuy a sa mercé vengut …” 
  
Poem X is a portrait of the mind of the poet in love according to the Augustinian powers 
of the soul. It opens with an extended simile, as March compares his mind to a king ruling over 
three cities and engaged in long-running war with another king; the situation remains a stalemate 
until the enemy king hires a mercenary who helps him conquer all three cities. The conquered 
king is allowed to retain control, as the conqueror‘s vassal, of two of the cities, but he must 
abandon the third and avoid even thinking of it (1-16). In the poem‘s third stanza, March reveals 
that Love is his enemy, and Plena de seny the mercenary: 
Lonch temps Amor per enemich lo sent, 
mas jamés fon que·m donàs un mal jorn 
qu·en poch instant no li fes pendre torn, 
fforagitant son aspre pensament. 
Tot m‘ha vençut ab sol esforç d‘un cors, 
ne l·ha calgut mostrar sa potent força; 
los tres poders qu·en l‘arma són me força, 
dos me‘n jaqueix, de l‘altr·usar no gos. (17-24) 
 
[F]or a long time I have felt Love to be my enemy, but he has never given me a bad day 
without my instantly making him change, banishing from me his bitter thoughts. (Now) 
he has totally defeated me with the strength of a single body; he has had no need to 
display his might power: he overcomes the three faculties of my soul; he leaves me two, 
(and) I dare not use the other. (39) 
 
We are confronted here by two kinds of allegory: the kind that seeks to ―make the invisible 
visible‖ (Terry, ―Introspection‖ 171), expressing the inner through the outer (the opening simile), 
and psychomachia, which portrays inner conflict between, in this case, allegorized powers of the 
soul and Love.
17
 This psychomachia makes an initial move away from the visibility of the 
opening simile in that Love‘s hidden power (―ne l·ha calgut mostrar sa potent força‖) overcomes 
                                                 
17
 As an allegorical mode, psychomachia takes its name from the Late Antique Latin poet Prudentius‘s 
Psychomachia (ca. 400 CE), which portrays a battle between, on one side, faith and the cardinal virtues, and on the 
other, idolatry and the vices. 
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(força) the powers (poders) of the poet‘s soul. The rest of the poem explores the moral 
consequences, for the lyric voice, of the expressive insufficiency of the psychomachia, which 
finds its echo in the poet‘s lost memory (this is the power forbidden to him). 
 Troubadour poetry is replete with antagonistic figures such as flatterers and spies; 
March‘s enemies are always allegorical.18 At the same time, the kind of psychological allegory 
deployed in poem X was also frequent in troubadour poetry, playing a key but ambiguous role in 
the development of troubadour subjectivity: ―If the subject position is extended, by allegory, into 
a ‗self‘ where Love and other forces interact, then the boundaries of this ‗self,‘ and its 
relationship to other selves, are fundamentally unclear. Since the notion of the ‗self‘ is obscure, 
the relationship to it of the first-person subject is likewise problematic‖ (Kay, Subjectivity 55). 
Through this process, a moral scheme that began as a way of asserting community can become a 
way of asserting difference (Kay, Subjectivity 52), and this is indeed what happens in poem X‘s 
next stanza: 
Jamés vençó fon plaer del vençut, 
sinó de mi que·m plau qu·Amor me vença 
e·m tinga pres ab sa·nvisible lença, 
mas paren bé sos colps en mon escut. (29-32) 
 
Defeat was never a pleasure for the defeated except in my case, for I am glad that Love 
should defeat me and keep me prisoner in his invisible net: his strokes fall gratefully 
upon my shield. (39) 
 
Through this psychomachia, March declares himself an exceptional – indeed, unique – lover. He 
also, however, subtly recalls once more the image of the penitent, gratefully receiving Love‘s 
invisible lashes. Terry translates lença here as ―net,‖ but Bohigas glosses it as poetic license for 
lança, ―lance‖ (97 n. 31); the lance‘s colps, ―blows,‖ call to mind the poet‘s colpa, ―guilt.‖ 
Indeed, critics have read this poem as an admission of guilt, March‘s confession of having ceded 
                                                 
18
 For a similar point with particular reference to the cant espiritual, see Sobrer, Doble soledat 53. 
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moral judgment in ceding control of his memory (Pujol 308-9). However, March does not frame 
this concession in terms of absolute surrender, but rather of intersubjective participation.  
 Poem X does not describe, after all, an intact, discrete mind; rather, the poet‘s mind is ―at 
the mercy of‖ another‘s will: 
De ffet que fuy a sa mercé vengut, 
l'Enteniment per son conseller pres 
e mon Voler per alguazir lo mes, 
dant fe cascú que may sera rebut 
en sa mercé lo conpanyó Membrar, 
servint cascú lealment son office, 
sí que algú d‘éls no serà tan nici 
qu·en res contrast que sia de amar. (33-40) 
 
As soon as I fell into Love‘s hands, he took my Understanding as his adviser and 
appointed my Will executor, each promising that their companion Memory would never 
be admitted to their grace, each one loyally performing his duty, so that neither would be 
so foolish as to oppose anything which had to do with loving. (39-41) 
 
What is at stake in this portrayal of love as a disorder of the faculties, one in which memory in 
particular is silenced?
19
 Memory does not just instigate cognitive processes in the Middle Ages; 
it also informs them morally, bearing ―emotionally laden‖ intentions to the intellect along with, 
or rather as integral parts of, its images (Carruthers 14). In this sense, relinquishing control of the 
memory implies an affective, and therefore ethical, opening to the other‘s will – an opening that 
March figures in terms of intersubjective ―mercy.‖ 
 This figuration thus raises the question of subjectivity in terms of both self-
consciousness, in its moral self-scrutiny, and subjection, the submission to Love‘s (and, by 
implication, the lady‘s) will. In the Middle Ages, the Latin subjectum translated Aristotle‘s 
hupokeimenon, ―substance‖ or ―essence,‖ which fused the physical subject as a ―substrate for 
accidents‖ with the ―logical subject‖ as a ―support for the predicates in a proposition‖ (Balibar et 
al. 16). In a ―transition from subjectum to ego,‖ modern (Cartesian) notions of subjectivity make 
                                                 
19
 On the question of disorder in poem X, see Rubio, ―Les tres potències‖ 167. 
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this subjectum ―the basis of any psychology of the subject‖ (Balibar et al. 18). What is 
remarkable about medieval psychology is that these two notions have yet to be fused: 
[T]he Middle Ages had a theory of the ego or I-ness (égoïté), or a theory of the subject in 
the obvious philosophical sense of the term mens, but that theory did not require the 
implementation of the notion of a subjectum; it also offered a complete theory of 
subjectivity in grammar, logic, physics and metaphysics, but was reluctant to export it 
into pyschology in the form of a theory of mens humana. (Balibar et al. 19) 
 
Indeed, the Augustinian theory of mens, operative in poem X and throughout March‘s poetry, 
resisted this fusion as a matter of doctrine. This resistance is grounded in Augustine‘s theory of 
perichoresis, ―the mutual indwelling of the Persons of the Trinity‖ (Balibar et al. 22). This 
theory, also known as circumincession, explained how, in the Trinity, a substance could be both 
simple and multiple. 
 Augustine famously argued, in The Trinity, that the human mind was the image of this 
model of the Trinity‘s substance. God is not subject to accidents, differing in this essential way 
from the subjectum discussed above. If the mens humana‘s faculties constitute, as the image of 
God, a single substance, then they also must not constitute a subjectum, and this latter concept 
must be ―banished from the field of psychology, on pain of reducing mental acts to mere 
accidents that befall the mind … The hupokeimenon is incompatible with the transposition of the 
theological notion of mutual immanence to psychology‖ (Balibar et al. 22). In the Trinity, then, 
Augustine develops a Trinitarian theory of the human mind doctrinally opposed to modern 
notions of subjectivity. He was spurred on toward this by the Delphic injunction to Know thyself 
(X.12), and makes self-certainty the main element of his argument for a similar reason: ―The 
whole point of its [i.e., the mind‘s] being commanded to know itself comes to this: it should be 
certain that it is none of the things about which it is uncertain, and it should be certain that it is 
that alone which alone it is certain that it is‖ (X.16). Self-certainty, then, is the mortal endpoint 
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of human attempts to understand the nature of God, and it is essential to the human mind – but it 
is not a ―subjective‖ quality as modernity understands the term. 
 The invocation of the Delphic injunction in the Trinity puts Augustine‘s thought in line 
with what Foucault has called the ―ascetic-monastic‖ model of self-knowledge (255). This model 
calls for Christians to practice introspection as a search for moral truth: 
[S]elf-knowledge is arrived at through techniques whose essential function is to dispel 
internal illusions, to recognize the temptations that arise within the soul and the heart, and 
also to thwart the seductions to which we may be victim. And this is all accomplished by 
a method for deciphering the secret processes and movements that unfold within the soul 
and whose origin, aim, and form must be grasped. An exegesis of the self is thus 
required. (255-6) 
 
Readers will recognize in Foucault‘s exposition Cassian‘s model of discernment, the practical 
virtue that allows monks to identify the demonic, divine, or human sources of their affective 
―thoughts.‖ This practice is, of course, part of the broader practice of mneme theou, the ―memory 
of God‖ (Carruthers 2). In this way, the monastic mneme theou and the particularly Augustinian 
gnōthi seauton (―know thyself‖) come together to form the crucial background for understanding 
March‘s confession, in poem X, that he has abandoned his memory and ceded control of – that 
is, subjected – his understanding and will to another. 
 It is also important to bear in mind here that for Augustine, the disordered will is the 
result of original sin, and those who through ascetic discipline have gained perfect control of 
their will have in fact given their will over to God (Burrus and MacKendrick 92). March‘s will, 
however, is at the mercy of Love, leading, in poem X‘s envoi, not only to a loss of memory but 
to a loss of the power of speech:
20
 
Plena de seny, vullau-vos acordar 
com per Amor vénen grans sentiments, 
e per Amor por ser hom ignoscents, 
e mostre-u yo qui n‘he perdut parlar. (41-4) 
                                                 
20
 For a survey of March‘s invocations of his own silence, see Sobrer, Doble soledat 11-40. 
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Wise lady: please remember how from Love there comes great suffering and that through 
Love one may be reduced to childishness: I, who have lost the power of speech, am 
evidence of this. (41) 
 
March invokes here, in one dense hemistich, his lady‘s will and memory (―vullau-vos acordar‖). 
The poet has traded, unwillingly but with pleasure, those powers for Love‘s sentiments, 
becoming ignoscents – a term Terry (correctly) translates as ―childish,‖ but which also serves as 
an ironic contrast to the penitent guiltily receiving Love‘s harsh blows at the end of the fourth 
stanza. This play of innocence and guilt is further emphasized in the poet‘s claim of his own 
visibility – ―mostre-u yo‖ – as he is forced to submit to Love‘s invisible lance. Through the guilt 
of subjecting himself to Love‘s and his lady‘s will, March has lost the power of speech – and yet, 
as in poem XXIII, he retains his lyric voice. In retaining control of his understanding and will, 
but not his memory, that ―emotionally laden‖ (and morally essential) basis of human cognition 
and creativity, March presents himself as a lyrical subject moved primarily from without at his 
lady‘s ―mercy.‖ To be ―at another‘s mercy‖ is here not a mere figure of speech, but a strong 
figure for intersubjective participation. Through this participation, the lover is silenced but 
somehow retains the capacity to communicate lyrically. How, then, and with whom, does this 
lyrical subject communicate? 
 
XIII: “e vaja yo los sepulcres cerquant …” 
  
Poem XIII is March‘s most direct declaration of his affective isolation. In it, he contrasts 
public happiness with his macabre private sentiments: 
Colguen les gents ab alegria festes, 
loant a Déu, entremesclant deports; 
places, carrers e delitables orts 
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sien cerquats ab recont de grans gestes; 
e vaja yo los sepulcres cerquant, 
interrogant ànimes infernades, 
e respondran, car no són companyades 
d‘altre que mi en son contínuu plant. (1-8) 
 
Let people celebrate feast days and be glad, praising God (and) playing games between 
times; let squares, streets and pleasant gardens be filled with tales of great deeds; and let 
me walk among tombs, questioning the souls of the damned; and they will reply, for they 
have no one but me to accompany them in their continual lament. (43) 
 
In the Dantesque image of the poet interrogating damned souls, there is a conflation of empathy 
and communication: the dead respond because of March‘s accompanying laments. Perhaps, then, 
this is the communication that becomes possible after poem X‘s ―grans sentiments‖ have robbed 
the poet of his worldly voice. In fact, the image of March accompanying the dead in their 
―continual lament‖ is reminiscent of courtly poems from both the Occitan and Castilian 
traditions in which the lyric voice pleads with the audience to join in its suffering. In this context, 
the imperative that opens poem XIII (―Let people celebrate‖) is an ironic reversal of this poetic 
commonplace, and it is not coincidental that the other poets are to be found among the 
celebrating crowd, telling ―tales of great deeds.‖ March‘s affective distance from these poets is 
reinforced by the repetition of the verb cercar, which meant both ―to fill‖ or ―surround‖ (as in 
the case of the other poets) and ―to seek out‖ (in the case of March‘s visit to the cemetery) in the 
fifteenth century. Furthermore, the popular praise of God that opens the stanza stands in stark 
contrast to March‘s ―damned‖ lamentations. 
 The assertion of difference in poem XIII‘s opening stanza gives way to a Scholastic 
sentence about similarity: 
Cascú requer e vol a son semblant; 
per ço no·m plau la pràtica dels vius. 
D‘imaginar mon estat són esquius; 
sí com d‘om mort, de mi prenen espant. (9-12) 
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Everyone seeks and desires his like; thus I take no pleasure in the company of the living. 
They are reluctant to imagine my condition; they are terrified of me, as of a dead man. 
(43) 
 
Similarity generates desire, and for this reason March takes no pleasure in the living. Terry 
renders pràtica as ―company‖ in his translation, perhaps to recall the previous stanza, but the 
term more literally meant both ―practice‖ and ―conversation‖ in March‘s time (Faraudo, 
―Pràtica,‖ def. 1 and 2); it thus continues the meditation on communication, and renders the 
silence between March and the living as a failure of imagination (―D‘imaginar mon estat són 
esquius‖).21 As we will see, the confrontation with death in this poem seems to revive the poet‘s 
lyric imagination, as he here accuses the joyous crowds of the lack of imagination that plagued 
poem X‘s amnesiac version of himself. 
 The question of desire returns March, as always, to his hylemorphic schemes. His 
imagination may be intact, but love is attacking both his intellect and body, inflicting pain worse 
than that inflicted on Tityos by the vulture, 
car és hun verm qui romp la mia pensa, 
altre lo cor, qui may cessen de romper, 
e llur treball no·s porà enterrompre 
sinó ab ço que d‘aver se defensa. (21-4) 
 
… for one worm gnaws my thoughts, another my heart, and neither rests, and their work 
can only be interrupted by that which is forbidden to me. (45) 
 
Unrequited love – the absence of his lady‘s ―mercy‖ – causes a suffering that overwhelms March 
in body and soul and somehow prevents the release of death. Meanwhile, the figure of the worm, 
which represents a pain more severe than the pagan vulture, moves the poem into ascetic-
monastic discursive territory, recalling more than anything Bernard of Clairvaux‘s figuration of 
conscience in ―On Conversion‖: ―Let us not meanwhile resent the gnawing of that worm within. 
                                                 
21
 It also recalls the possible pun on ―àbit‖ as both the penitent‘s sackcloth and the affective ―habit‖ of melancholy in 
poem CXIV. 
153 
 
Nor let a dangerous tenderness of mind or pernicious softness persuade us that we want to hide 
our present trouble. It is far better for it to gnaw now, when it can be destroyed by gnawing itself 
to death‖ (V.7). The ―conversion‖ of Bernard‘s title marks a boundary between ascetic Christian 
self-knowledge and Platonic models of return to the truth: ―[T]he function of self-knowledge in 
Christianity is not to turn back to the self in an act of recollection in order to discover the truth it 
had once contemplated and the being that it is: rather, as I said a moment ago, if we turn round 
on the self, it is essentially and fundamentally in order to renounce the self‖ (Foucault 256). We 
should expect, then, March to hope that his two devouring worms finish the job, but the 
imagined confrontation with death in this poem belongs to the strain of March‘s thought that is 
skeptical of salvation: 
E si la mort no·m dugués tal offense 
– ffer mi absent d‘una tan plasent vista –, 
no li graesch que de tera no vista 
lo meu cors nuu, qui de plaer no pensa 
de perdre pus que lo ymaginar 
los meus desigs no poder-se complir; 
e si·m cove mon derrer jorn finir, 
seran donats tremens a ben amar. (25-32) 
 
And (even) if death did not inflict such a penalty – to deprive me of so pleasant a sight – I 
should not thank it for not clothing in earth my naked body, which expects to lose no 
other pleasure than that of imaging that my desires will never be achieved; and if I must 
end my last day, there will also be an end to good loving. (45) 
 
The lyric imagination that survives in the poet subjected to Love and his lady has, as its object, 
only the unfulfillment cited by Menocal as central to courtly poetry (see chapter one). The lost 
―pleasant sight‖ of the lady‘s body – March is not praising here her invisible intellect – is a 
consequence of the poet‘s imagining of his own death, not the apparently real death that inspired 
the Cants de Mort. The poet‘s own body is ―clothed‖ in earth – the material of grief rather than 
the sackcloth of penitence from poem XCIV – its visibility emphasized by the repetition of 
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―vista‖ at the end of line 26 (referring to the ―clothing‖ of the poet‘s cadaver with earth, rather 
than the ―sight‖ of the lady‘s body in line 25). This imagined end to the poet‘s life implies a true 
end to poetic composition, at least that tied to the system of ―good love,‖ ben amar. 
 In fact, March persists in imagining the consequences of his death, and his lady‘s 
imagined grief resuscitates fin’amor‘s tropic pleasure in pain through an image of compassion: 
E si·n lo cel Déu me vol allogar, 
part veur·a Ell, per complir mon delit 
serà mester que·m sia dellay dit 
que d‘esta mort vos ha plagut plorar, 
penedint-vos com per poqua mercé 
mor l‘ignoscent e per amar-vos martre: 
cell qui lo cors de l‘arma vol departre, 
si ferm cregués que us dolrríeu de se. (33-40) 
 
And if God wishes me to dwell in Heaven, apart from seeing Him, for my pleasure to be 
complete, it will be necessary for them to tell me there that it has pleased you to shed 
tears at my death, repenting that, because of your meager favours, there dies an innocent 
man and a martyr to loving you: he who would (gladly) separate body from soul, if he 
could really believe that you would pity him. (45) 
 
Pleasure and pain are joined here not only in the poet‘s imagining of death as the culmination of 
his pleasure, but also in the alliterative ―vos ha plagut plorar‖ of line 35. The poet‘s assumed 
salvation places the lady‘s salvation in question, as she takes on the penitent role elsewhere 
occupied by March.
22
 At the same time, the poet becomes the audience for the communication 
figured by March in the poem‘s opening stanza (―serà mester que·m sia dellay dit‖); his 
community with the dead is complementary to his lady‘s grief. This grief, in turn, has replaced 
the mercé of good love, as the fact of the poet‘s death again overwhelms hylemorphic fin’amor 
through the dense phonic group of amar/martre/arma in lines 38-9. The sacrifice of the 
troubadouresque love martyr is recontextualized within the discourse of Christian salvation, and 
the poem‘s envoi turns around questions of belief and faith: 
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 Readers should not overlook the humor of the sacrilegious understatement of ―part veur·a Ell,‖ ―apart from seeing 
Him,‖ whose one hemistich is dwarfed by the poet‘s almost juvenile delight in his lady‘s imagined regret. 
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Lir entre carts, vós sabeu e yo sé 
que·s pot bé fer hom morir per amor; 
creure de mi, que só en tal dolor, 
no fareu molt que y doneu plena fe. (41-4) 
 
Lily among thorns: we both know that a man may well die of love; the least you can do is 
believe with all your heart that my suffering is as great as I say. (45) 
 
Terry‘s translation elides the similarity implied by the poet‘s plainspoken and emphatic ―you 
know and I know‖ (―vós sabeu e yo sé‖), which implies in turn that questions of desire (since 
―[e]veryone seeks and desires his like‖) do not lose their relevance in the context of salvation. 
The lady‘s belief here seems to stand in for the audience‘s, who perhaps will now be able to 
imagine the poet‘s state of mind. Empathetic grief here is thus presented as a way out of courtly 
love‘s hylemorphic tangle, but March‘s solution will change when that grief becomes his own. 
 
The Cants de Mort: “… mescladament partirem nostres cossos.” 
  
March‘s Cants de Mort represent both the poet‘s deepest exploration of the conflict 
between reason and passion, body and soul, but also his most daring escape to exhaust the ethical 
paradigm in which that conflict was central. March brings his grief at his beloved‘s death to bear 
lyrically on all of the philosophical structures that have dominated his cants d’amor: carnal, 
spiritual, and mixed love; memory, will, and understanding; pleasure and pain. The analysis 
focuses sometimes on love, sometimes on grief; March considers the fate of his own and his 
beloved‘s souls and bodies. But what might seem like the apotheosis of March‘s Scholastic 
inclination is in fact its end. Grief leads March‘s lyrical subject to a new self-awareness as a 
potentially shared subject, sharing in particular its will through its capacity for compassion. This 
shared, compassionate subject moves March beyond the ethical paradigms, courtly and 
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Scholastic, that had opposed virtuous spirit to sinful flesh, and the passions become a means to 
the salvation, rather than damnation, of body and spirit. 
Poem XCII, the first of the Cants de Mort according to Pagès‘s order but probably the 
last to be written (see below) concludes with an almost certainly sacrilegious image of shared 
perception and shared will: ―Lo jorn del Juhy, quant pendrem carn e ossos, / mescladament 
partirem nostres cossos‖ (249-50) ―On the Day of Judgement, when we take on flesh and bone, 
we shall share out our bodies without distinction‖ (99). This final image is March‘s attempt to 
escape the moral conflicts of courtly love through a reimagination of a will whose subject is the 
lovers, not the lover. It is certainly not Christian in an orthodox sense, but perhaps there is an 
echo here of Christ, who, for monastic thinkers such as Bernard of Clairvaux, incarnated divine 
mercy more perfectly precisely because his body housed two natures (because Christ‘s human 
nature allowed him to suffer, it taught him to suffer with us). March, going farther than Pedro de 
Corral and the Constable, imagines a kind of compassionate subjectivity made conscious of itself 
as shared through death. His few poetic inheritors did not follow him down this particular road, 
but perhaps March‘s defiantly sacrilegious reimagination of the Resurrection, spurred by his 
grief at the discovery of mortal truth, can serve as a model for a new communitarian subjectivity. 
I will return to poem XCII shortly, but in order to see how March arrives at this communitarian 
model, we must first examine another Cant de Mort, poem XCVII, whose overwhelming concern 
is the fate of the beloved‘s soul, reflecting the broader concern for salvation evident throughout 
the Cants de Mort.
23
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 On salvation in XCVII in particular, see Archer, ―Against Consolation‖ 148. For a perceptive overview of the 
entire series of the Cants de Mort, see Zimmerman, ―Els ‗Cants de Mort‘.‖ 
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In poem XCVII, March does not present his anguish in altruistic terms, instead returning 
to the ethical examination of his own status as lover. Thus, the poem begins with the poet 
accusing himself of insufficient love in the aftermath of his wife‘s death: 
Si per null temps creguí ser amador, 
en mi conech d‘amor poch sentiment. 
Si mi compar al comú de la gent, 
és veritat qu·en mi trob gran amor; 
però si guart algú del temps passat 
y el que Amor pot fer en loch dispost, 
nom d‘amador solament no m‘acost, 
car tant com dech no só passionat. (1-8) 
 
If at any time I thought myself a lover, I can recognize little feeling of love in myself. If I 
compare myself to the majority of people, it is true that I find great love within me; but if 
I consider any (lover) from the past and what Love can do in a place which is prepared 
(for it), I simply cannot aspire to the name of lover, for I am not as passionate as I should 
be. (109) 
 
As this stanza reveals, March continues to consider idealized love through questions of what is 
and is not shared. This is evident not only in the explicit comparison to the ―common people,‖ 
whose love pales in comparison to that felt by the poet, but also in the poet‘s consideration of his 
place in a tradition of lovers (―però si guart algú del temps passat‖) and in lexical choices around 
variations of par/part, as in line three‘s ―compar.‖ The experience of an apparently real death 
makes the question of a poetic tradition more, rather than less, relevant in March‘s introspection. 
He wonders if he can consider himself a lover, but he aspires to the name of lover, to be known 
as a lover. 
 The lyric portrayal of the lady‘s death focuses, however, on what can be shared between 
two lovers. Here, a final memory occasions a reflection on compassion: 
Enquer està que la vida no finí, 
com prop la mort yo la viu acostar, 
dient plorant: ―No vullau mi lexar, 
hajau dolor de la dolor de mi!‖ 
¡O cor malvat d‘aquell qui·s veu tal cas, 
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com pecejat o sens sanch no roman! 
Molt poc·amor e pietat molt gran 
degra bastar que senyal gran mostràs. (17-24) 
 
(Her) life had still not come to an end when I saw her draw near to death, saying with 
tears: ―Please do not leave me, have pity on my suffering!‖ O wretched heart of him who 
finds himself in such a situation, since it is not broken into pieces or left without blood! 
Little love and great pity should be enough for it to show great signs. (109-11) 
 
March narrates here the lady‘s actual transition to spiritual invisibility. He sees his lady approach 
death fearfully (―prop la mort yo la viu acostar‖), just as he, in lines 7-8, is wracked with doubt 
in his own approach to the name of ―lover.‖ The theme is emphasized in his reference to the 
heart of him who sees himself (―qui·s veu‖) in a similar situation. The approach of death also 
reverses the traditional courtly roles, as the lady‘s direct speech (extremely rare throughout 
March‘s poetry) is a macabre imitation of the lover‘s plea for mercy: ―No vullau mi lexar, / hajau 
dolor de la dolor de mi!‖ Here, compassion becomes the figure for the subjected will, the latter 
emphasized in the command ―no vullau.‖ 
 In this moment of extremity, pity or mercy replaces love as the central unifier. 
Compassion is the matter of the final attempt to stay together. The rest of the poem, however, 
explores compassion‘s inadequacy (carved harshly into the poet‘s memory) to the task: 
¿Qui serà·quell qui la mort planyerà, 
d'altre u de ssi, tant com és lo gran mal? 
Sentir no·s pot lo dampnatge mortal, 
molt menys lo sab qui mort jamés temptà. 
¡O cruell mal, donant departiment 
per tots los temps als coratges units! 
Mos sentiments me trob esbalaÿts, 
mon spirit no té son sentiment. (32-40) 
 
Who will mourn for death, his own or another‘s, such is the great evil? One cannot feel 
the mortal injury; he whom death never tempted knows still less of it. O cruel evil, for 
ever separating hearts (which were) united! I find my feelings stupefied; my spirit has 
lost its feeling. (111) 
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Both grief and self-pity are incommensurate with the pain of death, which furthermore is beyond 
our powers of perception (―Sentir no·s pot lo dampnatge mortal‖), even if death has tempted us 
before – which presumably, March seems to be implying, is the case for any courtly lover. The 
cruelty of death lies in its splitting, departiment, of previously united coratges. This latter term, 
well translated by Terry as ―hearts,‖ could refer to any or all of the passions to which the heart 
was subject (Faraudo, ―Coratge,‖ def.). Death is no longer the occasion for hypothetical 
compassion, but rather for real separation: whereas before the lover proclaimed his willingness to 
die by separating his own soul from his body (XIII.39-40), here death separates two united 
spirits. The poet‘s sentiments no longer silence him; rather, they themselves are ―stupefied‖ in 
this separation. 
 These vanished sentiments are contrasted in the poem‘s final stanzas with the poet‘s 
passion, passió, which cannot be alleviated by his friends‘ compassion (complanyiment, lines 41-
2). The poet is now only accompanied by his sad memory of his beloved‘s life, whose pain he 
tries to match with his own grief: ―en tristor visch, de sa vida membrant, / e de sa mort aytant 
com puch me dull‖ (51-2) ―I live in sadness, remembering her life, and I mourn her death as best 
I can‖ (111).24 The poet‘s will is subjected to that of his own grief: ―No bast en més, en mi no 
puch fer pus, / sinó·behir lo que ma dolor vol‖ (53-4) ―I cannot do more: all I can do is obey 
what my grief demands‖ (111). The best state to which this self-subjection can lead, however, is 
absolute isolation, as the poem‘s envoi shows: 
Tot amador d‘amar poch no s‘escús 
que sia viu, e mort lo seu amat, 
o que almenys del món visca·partat, 
que solament haja nom de resclús. (57-60) 
                                                 
24
 Rubio calls this the ―tragic‖ memory of the Cants de Mort (―De Llull a March‖ 121), arguing for an exact 
equation between memory and grief in this series of poems (―Les tres potències‖ 158). As this poem in particular 
shows, however, March‘s grief is inadequate, in his own estimation, to the tragic memory of his lady‘s life and 
death. 
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No lover can escape the charge of loving little if he remains alive when the one he loves 
is dead; or he should at least live in retirement from the world and be known only as a 
hermit. (113) 
 
The envoi‘s ―nom de resclús‖ stands in obvious contrast to the opening stanza‘s ―nom 
d‘amador.‖ Ultimately, poem XCVII shows the poet‘s failed subjection to his dying lady‘s grief, 
and thereafter his realization that subjection to his own grief is insufficient for establishing 
empathetic continuity. This insufficiency is emphasized in the sentence that the failed lover 
should live as a hermit, apartat from the rest of humanity – echoing in life the departiment 
brought about by death. This poem narrates, then, the failure to overcome death through 
empathetic grief, and the hermit-lover of its envoi is a failed reflection of the anchorite. Poem 
XCII, in contrast, portrays an attempt to imagine postmortem unity within an economy of 
Christian salvation. 
 As I mentioned above, poem XCII is the first of the Cants de Mort in Pagès‘s ordering, 
but some critics, citing its lexical style, formal structure, and treatment of the question of time, 
have argued that it was the last to be written.
25
 At 250 lines, it is among March‘s longer poems, 
and many critics have sought to explicate its complex structure. Some see a clear progression, 
from death to God and from ―bodily‖ to ―intellectual‖ (Sobrer, ―The Architecture‖ 274 and 277), 
while others detect a pivot toward the middle, with pietat becoming central from the twelfth 
stanza on (Terry, ―‗Per la mort‘‖ 235). Sobrer sees in the poem‘s many antitheses the structure of 
a church nave, along which the reader progresses toward God in a ―process of conversion‖ (―The 
Architecture‖ 274).26 As we have seen, Christian processes of conversion in the ascetic-monastic 
model tend to lead toward a final denial of the self. This is not the case, however, in poem XCII; 
                                                 
25
 See, for example, Ramírez i Molas, La poesia 296. For a contrasting view, see Terry, ―‗Per la mort‘‖ 231. 
26
 More broadly, Cocozzella sees in all of March‘s poetry the intuition that ―the symbiosis between the human and 
the divine is effected, metaphysically, through the mediacy of suffering,‖ allowing erotic love to be perfected, 
through the human lover‘s imitatio Christi, into a kind of agape (―Ausiàs March‘s Imitatio‖ 433). 
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rather, the poem ends with a striking affirmation, drawing on biblical and Augustinian models as 
an answer to the paradigms of courtly ethics, of a self shared eternally between two lovers. 
 The contradictory nature of this Cant de Mort cannot be denied, but neither can it be 
reduced to a series of antitheses. Rather, the poem has a cyclical structure, as the poet tries to 
explain the feelings of love that have survived his lady‘s death in hylemorphic terms, fails, and 
tries again. In the first stanza, March describes the role of grief in preserving memory: 
Aquelles mans que jamés perdonaren 
han ja romput lo fil tenant la vida 
de vós, qui sou de aquest món exida, 
segons los fats en secret ordenaren. 
Tot quant yo veig, e sent, dolor me torna, 
dant-me recort de vós, qui tant amava. 
En ma dolor si prim e bé·s cercava, 
se trobarà que delit s‘i contorna; 
donchs, durarà, puys té qui la sostinga, 
car sens delit dolor crey no·s retinga. (1-10) 
 
Those hands which never pardoned have now broken the thread which held the life of 
you who have left this world, as the fates secretly decreed. All that I see and feel turns to 
grief, reminding me of you, whom I loved so much. In my suffering, if one looks closely, 
one will find that pleasure is mixed with it; therefore my suffering will endure, since it 
has something to sustain it, for, without pleasure, I believe suffering does not remain. 
(85) 
 
The poem‘s opening thus figures death‘s mercilessness in corporal terms (―Aquelles mans‖), 
while the poet‘s sensations – particularly sight – are converted to grief. March discerns an 
element of pleasure in his grief, this troubadouresque note accented by the use of trobar in line 8. 
This epistemological grief (in that sensations and memory are the roots of cognition in medieval 
psychology) becomes, appropriately enough, a matter for investigation (―si prim e bé·s 
cercava‖). Once again, then, the fellowship March sought among the dead becomes a matter of 
introspection in his own moment of grief. Here, then, March echoes Pedro de Corral‘s 
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observation that grief functions both individually and collectively, but he reaffirms individual 
grief‘s capacity to unite. 
 Each of the next four stanzas repeats, with slight variations, the idea that now that 
March‘s love has died, only his spiritual love will remain. Carnal love is no longer possible, and 
mixed love will eventually die out despite its partial participation in the spiritual. March insists 
twice that his ―honest‖ love will last forever (19-20 and 29-30), but in his final reworking of the 
claim, his certainty disappears: 
Aquell voler qu·en ma carn sola·s causa, 
si no és mort, no tardarà que muyra; 
l‘altre per qui dol contínuu m‘abuyra, 
si·m deffaleix, no serà sens gran causa. 
Ell pot ser dit voler concupiscible, 
e sol durar, puys molt de l‘arma toque, 
e d‘un costat és apetit sensible. 
Aquests volers l‘amor honesta·m torben, 
perqu·entre mal e bé mes penses orben. (41-50) 
 
That desire which arises from my flesh alone, if it is not dead, will not be long in dying; 
that other (desire) by which I am watered with continual suffering, if it fails in me, it will 
not be without great cause. It may be called concupiscible desire, and generally lasts, 
since it greatly concerns the soul, but it fails in time, since it does not call upon virtue, 
and in part is sensual appetite. These desires disturb honest love in me, since, between 
good and evil, they blind my thoughts. (87-9) 
 
March‘s confident assertions of his spiritual love‘s survival are replaced here by an admission of 
confusion, instability, and blindness (―entre mal e bé mes penses orben‖). Sight had earlier been 
associated with the carnal, but here the association is reversed. His blindness seems to explain 
the confused nature of his apparently philosophical exploration of his grief: March‘s formal 
Scholastic vocabulary cannot shape the confused matter presented to it by his grieving senses. 
How then can we explain the continued effort to express his grief in these terms? 
 To begin to answer this question, we should recall that while March‘s theory of love 
combines courtly and Scholastic ideas, his psychology is thoroughly Augustinian. The 
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compositional approach of poem XCII, in which ideas are tried out, expressed fully, but 
eventually rejected or overwritten, recalls Augustine‘s search for the divine image in the Trinity. 
Augustine continually proposes and disqualifies Trinitarian structures he finds in the human 
mind and perception before settling on the self-conscious activity of the mind‘s three powers, 
and in the end he rejects even this final image, affirming humanity‘s fundamental dissimilarity 
from the divine (XV.39). The structure of the Trinity, then, anticipates the ―apophasis-by-
kataphasis‖ (Burrus and MacKendrick 81) of negative theology. Augustine, by saying 
everything about the Trinitarian structure of the mind, ultimately exposes its absolute 
incommensurability with the divine Persons. It is my argument, then, that March engages in a 
similar maneuver in poem XCII, saying everything about the hylemorphic theory of love in order 
to demonstrate its insufficiency in the task of describing love, an insufficiency exposed by the 
experience of grief. 
 In the middle part of the poem, March tries out various descriptions of the relationship of 
body and soul. The first are traditional, laying out in the clearest of terms their contrary natures, 
although they are combined in one being. As in the case of the stanzas on spiritual love, 
however, the picture is complicated by grief: 
Lo loch on jau la dolor gran que passe 
no és del tot fora de mes natures, 
ne del tot és for a de lurs clausures; 
lo movement creu que per elles passé. 
Aquell voler qu·en mi no troba terme 
és lo mijà per on dolor m‘agreuja; 
l‘estrem d‘aquest fora natur·alleuja, 
ffort e punyent, mas encansable verme. 
Oppinió falssa per tots és dita, 
Que fora nós e dintre nós habita. (71-80) 
 
The place where lies the great suffering I experience is not entirely beyond my own 
natures, nor is it entirely beyond their confines; I believe that the motive (for my 
suffering) passes through them. That (other) desire which in me has no limit is the means 
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by which my suffering is increased: its opposite lies outside nature, a strong and piercing, 
but relentless, worm. A wrong opinion is voiced by people in general, since it dwells both 
outside and inside us. (89) 
 
This is March‘s most explicit statement of grief‘s ability to pierce not only through his own 
body, but through the structures of thought according to which he understands his own 
embodiment. The endless desire (―Aquell voler qu·en mi no troba terme‖) that provokes the 
poet‘s grief is both inner and outer, its outer extreme figured as a tireless worm (77-8). In poem 
XIII, two worms attacked the poet‘s body and spirit; here, the poet realizes that the worm is one 
and that it exceeds poem XIII‘s hylemorphic scheme. This, then, is the ―false opinion‖ expressed 
by others. 
 March turns here to pity‘s role in grief and cognition: 
De pietat de sa mort ve que·m dolga, 
e só forçat que mon mal haj·a plànyer; 
tant he perdut, que bé no·m pot atànyer, 
Ffortuna ja no té què pus me tolga. 
Quant ymagín les voluntats hunides 
y ell converssar, separats per a sempre, 
penssar no pusch ma dolor haja tempre, 
mes passions no trob gens aflaquides; 
e si per tempts ells passer havien, 
vengut és temps que començar devien. (111-20) 
 
Out of pity I come to grieve for her death and I am compelled to lament my misfortune; I 
have lost so much that no good can reach me: Fortune has no more to take away from me. 
When I imagine our united wills and our conversation, now separated for ever, I cannot 
think my grief will ever know moderation: I do not find my sufferings have decreased at 
all; and if some day they were to pass, the time for this to begin has now arrived. (91) 
 
Having rejected the received doctrine on ethical love in the preceding stanzas, March declares 
himself subject to the passions that should have faded with the death of his beloved‘s body. The 
poet‘s imagination (related, again, to memory and affect through the concept of intentio) is in 
league with grief, as the poet laments the loss of a unity of will and communication (15-6). His 
grief remains intemperate and his passions strong; they, and thus his grief, are not going to fade, 
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not going to give way to the spiritual love that should emerge victorious in the battle between 
―honest‖ reason and the passions. 
 It was not, then, during the time of earthly love that March‘s will was disordered; rather, 
disorder and confusion have emerged in the wake of his lady‘s earthly demise. As Virginia 
Burrus and Karmen MacKendrick have argued, in examining Augustine‘s view of the 
resurrection of the body, Augustine‘s ideal resurrected will would not be bereft of the body: 
“The will thus reintegrated would harmonize not only with itself and with God‘s will but with 
the flesh as well‖ (84-5). We should not be surprised, then, when March‘s final plea for divine 
mercy is resolutely carnal: 
O Déu, mercé! Mas no sé de què·t pregue, 
sinó que mi en lo seu loch aculles; 
no·m tardes molt que dellà mi no vulles, 
puys l‘espirit on és lo seu aplegue; 
e lo meu cors, ans que la vida fine, 
sobre lo seu abraçat vull que jaga. 
Fferí‘ls Amor de no curable plaga; 
separà‘ls Mort: dret és qu·ella·ls vehine. 
Lo jorn del Juhy, quant pendrem carn e ossos, 
mescladament partirem nostres cossos. (241-50) 
 
O mercy, God! But I do not know what to beg of you, except that you (should) gather me 
to her place; do not delay long in wishing me in the next world, (and) therefore take my 
spirit where her own resides; and, before my life ends, I wish my body to lie with its arms 
around hers. Love dealt them an incurable wound; Death separated them: it is right that 
she should bring them together. On the Day of Judgement, when we take on flesh and 
bone, we shall share out our bodies without distinction. (99) 
 
The poem‘s final image undoubtedly recalls Matthew 19:4-5, in which Christ reminds the 
Pharisees that man and wife become one flesh, but it recontextualizes the biblical verse, 
reimagining it literally on the Day of Judgment. The courtly lover‘s plea for mercy is also placed 
into the context of Christian salvation, becoming a prayer. Arthur Terry has argued that in this 
final image of the Resurrection, the poem‘s tensions between body and soul are resolved (―‗Per 
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la mort‘‖ 240). They are not resolved by removing or even purifying the body, however, but by 
sharing it. March has not subjected his own will to the divine; rather, he recalls it in his wish to 
embrace his lover‘s corpse before dying himself. In this final image, the departiment of death has 
inspired March‘s conception of a future, eternal sharing: partirem, ―we will share.‖   
Pere Ramírez i Molas has called this last image ―rhetorical‖ in the sense that it must be an 
exaggeration meant to stoke the audience‘s emotion (La poesia 278). March‘s preferred 
rhetorical approach, however, is the ethical appeal, and here, his introspection has left him, and 
his audience, beyond the hylemorphic doctrine that dominated erotic and moral thought in 
fifteenth-century Iberia. He is able to imagine the innermost activities of his soul subjected to the 
will of another, and in this poem, he imagines a lover‘s salvation in which divine mercy allows 
the shared will to inhabit a shared body. Compassion is not just a possibility added to moral 
reasoning within hylemorphic structures; it explodes those structures as March‘s lyric exhausts 
them through kataphasis. If this ethical appeal succeeds in stirring the audience‘s compassion, 
they – and we – might imagine an ethical paradigm in which affective unity constitutes a new 
form of communitarian subjectivity. Neither literature nor philosophy would take this course as 
the fifteenth century gave way to the sixteenth, but perhaps now, when the thought of affect and 
community seeks to consolidate itself beyond modern notions of subjectivity, we can seek to 
take up the promise of this earlier articulation of compassionate participation. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
OBLIGATION, GRIEF, COMPASSION 
 
 
 
Loss has made a tenuous ―we‖ of us all. 
– Judith Butler, Precarious Life 
 
 
 
I began this project with the goal of finding a way to read the expressions of emotion in 
the courtly literature of fifteenth-century Iberia without reducing them to tropic instantiations or 
glimpses of an emergent psychological realism. To this end, I developed the concept of the 
affective community, drawing on a genealogy of the concepts of affect, rhetoric, and community 
as they came down to writers in the particular courtly tradition of this particular time. The 
predominance of Stoic and monastic ideas in this inheritance made it clear, as I have argued, that 
the affective rhetoric of the period‘s historiographic romance, sentimental fiction, and courtly 
poetry constituted a method of intervening in the ethical and political debates surrounding 
developing notions of community throughout the Iberian Peninsula. The preceding chapters are 
devoted to a detailed articulation of particular manifestations of this method – although they are 
certainly not the only ones that could be adduced and analyzed. 
 As I developed my particular account of affective communities in medieval Iberian 
literature, I became interested in its implications for broader contemporary debates about affect 
and community. In this conclusion, I want to outline some ways in which the discussions of the 
preceding chapters are relevant to these debates. I am certainly not the first to suggest that 
medieval Iberia makes an interesting reference point for ongoing political debates and theoretical 
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discussions, particularly around culture and conflict.
1
 Of course, the unique historical 
circumstances of interconfessional coexistence that obtained throughout the Iberian Middle Ages 
have evoked the most contemporary research; the fact that Iberia was home to three proto-
national communities whose paths would diverge widely in the centuries to come has also been 
of interest. Through an examination of the intellectual and literary history that accompanied 
these circumstances, I have tried to show that Iberian authors approached questions of affect and 
community in ways that were not circumscribed by events but rather sought to forge new 
possibilities. 
 The contemporary critical debates about affect and community both pose themselves the 
same challenge: how to define and articulate their core concepts after the so-called death of the 
subject. Who or what does the feeling once the subject is no more (Terada 1-3)? On what basis 
can a postsubjective community be constituted (Esposito 2; Nancy 6-7)? With particular regard 
to the communitarian debate, to the conceptual problem of the death of the subject one must add 
the historical problems of (the end of) communism and twentieth-century totalitarianism (Nancy 
1-3; Blanchot 1-3). The melancholy provoked by the first problem and the lingering trauma of 
the second have led to conceptual projects that seek to avoid the politics of shared affect or 
shared effort (hence Nancy‘s ―inoperative‖ community). 
 The Crónica sarracina, the Sátira de felice e infelice vida, and Ausiàs March‘s poetry 
thus have the purely historical advantage of having been conceived and composed during a 
period that predates, on the whole, modern notions of subjectivity. As I have shown, each work 
elaborates concepts of political and personal communitarian ethics that are not the exclusive 
domain of self-conscious monads. The fact that these literary projects were not immediately 
successful – even March, widely admired by his contemporaries and into the sixteenth century as 
                                                 
1
 See Martín and Pinet 4. 
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both a poet and a philosopher, had few poetic epigones – constitutes their promise as spurs to 
contemporary thought: 
If forgetting often preserves, if negligence sometimes becomes a superior form of 
memory, then it is absolutely necessary to recognize that some ideas return before they 
happen: these ideas never found their center of resonance, not so much in the time of 
their birth as in that time in which we believe we have caused their rebirth. These ideas 
were simply never well understood. What‘s more, they are as new now, no more or less, 
as when they existed five centuries ago. They have their own currency and govern their 
own permanence, that of the mental space in which they were formed and which, in this 
case, neither was nor is contemporary to any other. These thoughts are still waiting to be 
shared, waiting for an audience. It would therefore be vain to evoke for them the notion 
of a ―return,‖ even a violent one. It is we who should answer their call, we who should 
make the journey, we who should enter into their time. (Libera 71-2) 
 
Corral, the Constable, and March elaborated notions of community that are still ―new‖ in this 
sense, and it is for us to answer their call. Their development of ideas of mutual obligation, 
political grief, shared suffering, and the relationality of compassion are of particular relevance. 
 Some of the best known contemporary theoretical approaches to community have 
eschewed traditional political philosophy in favor of what Robert Esposito calls ―that more 
radical terrain of ontology,‖ where it becomes clear that ―the community isn‘t joined to an 
addition but to a subtraction of subjectivity‖ (158). Esposito‘s approach fuses ontology and 
etymology, and his exploration of the etymology of communitas (3-6) reveals, through its 
constituent munus (―duty,‖ ―office,‖ ―gift‖), the term‘s conceptual grounding in obligation: 
―What predominates in the munus is, in other words, reciprocity or ‗mutuality‘ (munus-mutuus) 
of giving that assigns the one to the other in an obligation‖ (5). As we saw in chapters one and 
three, the different kingdoms of medieval Iberia shaped Stoic ideas about duties and favors to fit 
their own communitarian circumstances. In Portugal, the Infante Pedro reenvisioned Seneca‘s De 
Beneficiis in terms of feudal bemquerença; the apparently archaic social model featured in his 
Livro da Virtuosa Bemfeitoria was nonetheless the product of a young political dynasty 
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articulating the principles of its own exercise of power. The treatises discussed in chapter one 
also advanced theories of communal obligation grounded in friendship and communication. The 
very distance between these conceptualizations of political life and what we know of its 
historical reality is grounds for reflection on the obligation that, for Esposito, is not a 
communitarian ideal but rather the ―radical‖ definition of community itself. 
 Other ontological approaches to community have identified death and grief as its defining 
features. Thus, Nancy has written that community presents its members with their ―mortal truth,‖ 
a truth that reveals their fundamental self-difference: 
Community is revealed in the death of others; hence it is always revealed to others. 
Community is what takes place always through others and for others. It is not the space 
of the egos – subjects and substances that are at bottom immortal – but of the I‘s, who are 
always others (or else are nothing). If community is revealed in the death of others it is 
because death itself is the true community of I‘s that are not egos. It is not a communion 
that fuses the egos into an Ego or a higher We. It is the community of others. The genuine 
community of mortal beings, or death as community, establishes their impossible 
communion. Community therefore occupies a singular place: it assumes the impossibility 
of its own immanence, the impossibility of a communitarian being in the form of a 
subject. (15) 
 
For Nancy, this portrait of community‘s being supplants mythical accounts of the recuperation of 
lost communities (9). In the Crónica sarracina, however, we have an example of a revelation of 
community through death that is nonetheless deeply tied to mythic loss. Through a 
reappropriation of historical narrative, a political community is exposed to the mythic deaths – 
Rodrigo‘s the most mythic of all – that constitute their future communal possibilities. The 
representation of death is here carried out in the service of a project of political self-realization. 
 The Crónica sarracina is, as I have read it, a call for collective mourning, and this call 
finds a contemporary echo in Judith Butler‘s description of political grief: 
Many people think that grief is privatizing, that it returns us to a solitary situation and is, 
in that sense, depoliticizing. But I think it furnishes a sense of political community of a 
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complex order, and it does this first of all by bringing to the fore the relational ties that 
have implications for theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility. (22) 
 
This is part of a broader argument – described by Butler as ―an insurrection at the level of 
ontology‖ (33) – that seeks to ground a broad political community in our physical dependence 
and physical vulnerability as human beings (31). Here, the ontological approach finds a strange 
reflection in pragmatism, as Richard Rorty grounds his own appeal for broad human solidarity 
not in the ―recognition of a core self, the human essence,‖ but rather in a similar capacity for 
―pain and humiliation‖ (192). These appeals to shared vulnerability or shared suffering raise the 
question of compassion as a political force. As we have seen, this question was approached in 
fifteenth-century Iberia through the Stoic opposition of reason and the passions, according to 
which one could give an account of merciful action that did not imply the emotional response of 
compassion. In a contemporary defense of political compassion, Martha Nussbaum has 
eloquently restated the terms of this debate:  
The debate over compassion constructs, in effect, two visions of political community and 
of the good citizen and judge within it. One vision is based upon the emotions; the other 
urges their removal. One sees the human being as both aspiring and vulnerable, both 
worthy and insecure; the other focuses on dignity alone, seeing in reason a boundless and 
indestructible worth. One sees the central task of community as the provision of support 
for basic needs; bring human beings together through the thought of their common 
weakness and risk, it constructs a moral emotion that is suited to supporting efforts to aid 
the worst off. The other sees a community as a kingdom of free responsible beings, held 
together by the awe that they feel for the worth of reason in one another; the function of 
their association will be to assist the moral development of each by judgments purified of 
passion. (367-8) 
 
Here, the erotic pessimism of the courtly tradition pushed the Constable and March away from 
an account of humans as ―free responsible beings.‖ They were not motivated by pessimism 
alone, however; rather, their recognition of affect‘s potency led them to seek a positive role for 
compassion in the constitution of political communities. The public aspects of their thought were 
expressed in largely, or even exclusively, private terms. However, the private world they 
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approached through allegory was not identical to the psychological self-certainty of the modern 
subject. March in particular, as I showed in chapter four, combined an awareness of death‘s 
centrality in community with a rethinking of compassion that suggests that what is most private 
in us, the soul, is in fact shared. For Nancy, the figure of the ―lovers‖ reveals ―the exposition of 
singular beings to one another and the pulse of this exposition: the compearance, the passage, 
and the divide of sharing‖ (38). In March, this sharing – which transcends grief – is the 
surprising answer to death‘s anguish within an economy of salvation, and at the same time a way 
to escape from the very opposition of reason and the passions that characterized the political and 
ethical debate about compassion. 
 Indeed, probably the best known twentieth-century challenge to ontology characterized 
its central proposition as ―religion‖: 
The relation with the other (autrui) is not therefore ontology. This tie to the other 
(autrui), which does not reduce itself to the representation of the Other (autrui) but rather 
to his invocation, where invocation is not preceded by comprehension, we call religion. 
The essence of discourse is prayer. What distinguishes thought aiming at an object from 
the tie with a person is that the latter is articulated in the vocative: what is named is at the 
same time that which is called. (Levinas 7-8) 
 
Curiously, Levinas‘s prayerful discourse finds an echo in Habermas‘s discourse ethics, whose 
ethical productivity depends on a conception of cognition itself as inherently intersubjective and 
dialogical (9 and 68). These notions of a fundamentally intersubjective ethics can be 
problematized through a close examination of the workings of allegory in courtly ethical 
deliberation. The authors I have studied were not satisfied by the content of the ethical discourse 
they inherited, but its allegorical modality was central to their literary exploration and advocacy 
of moral innovation. This literary approach is indeed dialogical, through its invocation of shared 
tropes and a shared vocabulary (and sometimes literally, in poetic debates), but it also portrays 
self-difference (and not a relation to the Other) as an adequate basis for communitarian ethics. 
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 March finally discovered that this self-difference was not a basis for exclusion from both 
carnal and spiritual participation, through compassion, in the being of another. As I have 
mentioned, this participation takes place within a Christian framework, and the explorations of 
epistemological and ethical participation I have described in Corral and the Constable are also 
informed by the monastic tradition. This tradition forms the unspoken basis for some 
contemporary Christian approaches to community. For example, Enrique Dussel grounds his 
conception of community in the double commandment to love God and neighbor: ―The essence 
of Christian life is community, being together with others; and it is also the essence of the 
Kingdom: ‗being with God,‘ face to face with him in community‖ (15). This conception of 
community, in turn, gives rise to a definition of personhood in which praxis, ―human action 
oriented toward another human person‖ (16), is fundamental; in Dussel‘s communitarian ethics, 
we ―in a way‖ cease to be people when we are alone (17). 
 Ultimately, the connection of practical wisdom to community through affect, which 
survives in Dussel‘s communitarian ethics, was central to the vast majority of courtly literature 
in fifteenth-century Iberia. And, as in Dussel‘s model, this literature found its highest ethical 
expression in conceptions of interiority that were essentially intersubjective. These conceptions, 
in turn, gave rise to a thought of community founded on shared affect and compassionate 
participation. Corral, the Constable, and March went further in their literary articulations of these 
forms of community than the political and moral theorists of their period. Indeed, it was only in 
combining courtly poetics with Stoic and monastic thought that these writers were able to 
transcend all three in their various visions of compassionate community. 
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